文章基本信息

标题：Tax responses in platform industries
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作者：Hans Jarle Kind Marko Koethenbuerger Guttorm Schjelderup
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Bergen
摘要：Two-sided platform Örms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major busi- nesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known result of tax incidence is that consumers of a more heavily taxed good pay a higher price and thus buy less of the good. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad valorem tax may lower end-user prices and spur sales. Thus, two-sided platform Örms may not at all en- gage in tax shifting via price increases. We further show that a higher ad valorem tax may undermine a Örmís incentive to di§erentiate its product from that of its competitors. Finally, we demonstrate that the e§ects of increasing speciÖc taxes may be the opposite of those of increasing value added taxes
关键词：Two-sided markets, ad-valorem taxes, speciÖc taxes, imperfect competition, industrial organization