期刊名称:DIW Diskussionspapiere / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
出版年度:2009
卷号:2009
出版社:Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin
摘要:This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in
Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of
shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred
(non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their class rights.
Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual class stock companies in Russia
and using the difference-in-difference estimator, the study finds a
statistically and economically significant effect of improved protection of
preferred shareholders on the value of their shares. The result is robust to
several changes in the empirical specification.
关键词:Investor protection, company law, dual class stock, class rights, Russia