文章基本信息

标题：Technological Transfers, Limited Commitment and Growth
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作者：Alexandre Dmitriev
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / School of Business, University of New South Wales
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Sydney
摘要：Evidence shows that there are substantial rich-to-poor international capital .ows although not as abun- dant as di¤erences in rates of return would suggest. These .ows are procylcical: abundant in good times and scarce in bad times. Conventional growth models face certain di¢ culties in accounting for this pattern. In this paper, we propose a dynamic model of capital .ows to developing countries which is qualitatively con- sistent with these empirical regularities. The model is based on three main premises: i) international lending contracts are imperfectly enforceable; ii) access to the international .nancial markets results in technological transfers to a developing country from the rest of the world; iii) some of the productivity gains associated with the access to external .nancing are perishable. We solve for transitional dynamics of the model economy with endogenously incomplete markets and compare the results with the solutions obtained from the perfect risk-sharing and autarkic environments. Our .ndings suggest that technological transfers may play a role of an important enforcement mechanism. In our framework, existence of substantial rich-to-poor capital .ows is not inconsistent with the presence of default risk.
关键词：Incentive compatibility, technological di¤usion, international capital .ows, default risk, numerical algorithm