文章基本信息

标题：Competition and quality in regulated markets with sluggish demand
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作者：Kurt R. Brekke ; Roberto Cellini ; Luigi Siciliani 等
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
出版社：Bergen
摘要：We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish demand. We take a differential game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). If the marginal cost of provision is increasing, the steady state quality is higher under the openloop solution than under the closed-loop solution. Fiercer competition (lower transportation costs and/or less sluggish demand) leads to higher quality in both solutions, but the quality response to increased competition is weaker when players use closed-loop strategies. In both solutions, quality and demand move in opposite directions over time on the equilibrium path to the steady state.
关键词：Regulated markets; Competition; Quality; Differential game.