文章基本信息

标题：Optimal monetary policy when agents are learning.
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作者：Krisztina Molnár ; Sergio Santoro
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：Bergen
摘要：Most studies of optimal monetary policy under learning rely on optimality conditions de- rived for the case when agents have rational expectations. In this paper, we derive optimal monetary policy in an economy where the Central Bank knows, and makes active use of, the learning algorithm agents follow in forming their expectations. In this setup, monetary pol- icy can in°uence future expectations through its e®ect on learning dynamics, introducing an additional trade-o® between in°ation and output gap stabilization. Speci¯cally, the optimal interest rate rule reacts more aggressively to out of equilibrium in°ation expectations and noisy cost-push shocks than would be optimal under rational expectations: the Central Bank exploits its ability to \drive" future in°ation expectations closer to equilibrium. This optimal policy qualitatively resembles optimal policy when the Central Bank can commit and agents have rational expectations. Moreover, when beliefs are updated according to recursive least squares, the optimal policy is time-varying: after a structural break the Central Bank should be more aggressive and relax the degree of aggressiveness in subsequent periods. The policy recommendation is robust: under our policy the welfare loss if the private sector actually has rational expectations is much smaller than if the Central Bank mistakenly assumes rational expectations whereas in fact agents are learning.
关键词：Optimal Monetary Policy, Learning, Rational Expectations