文章基本信息

标题：Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting formula apportionment vs. separate accounting
本地全文：下载
作者：Guttorm Schjelderup ; Wolfgang Eggert
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2004
卷号：2004
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper shows in a symmetric tax competition model that a formula apportionment system can attain the first best welfare optimum without any political pre-agreed harmonization or coordination of tax bases and tax rates. The same result cannot be obtained under separating accounting even if countries agree on both tax rates and bases. The efficiency of company tax reform therefore requires more political cohesion under separate accounting than formula apportionment and yields lower welfare.