文章基本信息

标题：Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models
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作者：Jeffery D. Amato ; Hyun Song Shin
期刊名称：DNB Staff Reports
出版年度：2004
卷号：1
出版社：Nederlandsche Bank
摘要：In an economy where agents have diverse private information, public information holds important consequences for the conduct of monetary policy consequences that are not captured in standard models without private information. In an otherwise standard macro model, public information has a disproportionate eect on agents’ decisions, and thereby has the potential to degrade the information value of economic outcomes. In particular, in an economy with keen price competition, prices no longer serve as a good signal of the output gap. Also, increased precision of public information may give rise to more volatile economic outcomes. Since disclosures by central banks are an important source of public information, our results throw some light on the debate on central bank transparency.
关键词：imperfect information, monopolistic competition, targeting rule, Markov chain, Kalman filter