期刊名称:Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度:2008
卷号:1
出版社:New York University
摘要:The value of communication in monetary policy is analyzed in a model in which
expectations need not be consistent with central bank policy .and, therefore, .unan-
chored. .because agents face di¡é cult forecasting problems. When the central bank
implements optimal policy without communication, the Taylor principle is not su¡é cient
for macroeconomic stability: expectations are unanchored and self-ful.lling expectations
are possible. To mitigate this instability, three communication strategies are contem-
plated to ensure consistency between private forecasts and monetary policy strategy: i)
communicating the precise details of the monetary policy . that is, the variables and
coe¡é cients; ii) communicating only the variables on which monetary policy decisions are
conditioned; and iii) communicating the in.ation target. The .rst two strategies restore
the Taylor principle as a su¡é cient condition for anchoring expectations. In contrast,
in economies with persistent shocks, communicating the in.ation target fails to protect
against expectations driven .uctuations. These results underscore the importance of
communicating the systematic component of monetary policy strategy: announcing an
in.ation target is not enough to stabilize expectations . one must also announce how
this target will be achieved.