期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We study the assignment of initial ownership of a good when
agents differ in their ability to pay. Selling the good at the market-clearing price
favors the wealthy in the sense that they may acquire the good instead of poor
buyers who value it more highly. Non-market assignment schemes, even simple
random rationing, may yield a more efficient allocation than the competitive
market would ¡ª if recipients of the good are allowed to resell. Schemes that
favor the poor are even more desirable in that context. The ability to resell
the good is critical to the results, but allowing resale also invites speculation,
which undermines its effectiveness. If the level of speculation is sufficiently high,
restricting resale may be beneficial.
Loading...
