期刊名称:Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度:2008
卷号:1
出版社:Monash University
摘要:We develop a framework, extending the conventional duopoly model by replacing the Hotelling
line with a simplex in high‐dimension spaces, to study the competition and access regulation of
multiple networks. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium when the substitutabilities
of the networks are not too high, or the access charges are nearly cost‐based. We then analyze
how the equilibrium market shares respond to marginal variations in the access charges under
various regimes of access regulation, and thereby examine the efficiency implications of such
regulation regimes. In particular, we analyze the asymmetric scenario in which some networks
are incumbent and some are entrants. It is shown that some existing results of the duopoly do
not extend to a multi‐firm setting, largely because regulation of multiple networks is
structurally far richer. (JEL: L96, L51, D43)