文章基本信息

标题：Long-run Negotiations with Dynamic Accumulation
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作者：Francesca Flamini
期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties, partners in a business) are characterised by dynamic accumulation: current agreements affect future bargaining possibilities. We study such situations by using repeated bargaining games in which two parties can decide how much to invest and how to share the residual surplus for their own consumption. We show that there is a unique (stationary) Markov Perfect Equilibrium characterised by immediate agreement. Moreover, in equilibrium a relatively more patient party invests more than his opponent. However, being more patient can make a player worse off. In addition, we derive the conditions under which we obtain the efficient investment path. Our results are robust to different bargaining procedures, different rates of time preferences and elasticities of substitution.
关键词：Bargaining, Investment, Recursive Optimisation, Markov Perfect Equilibrium.