文章基本信息

标题：Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation
本地全文：下载
作者：Yassine Lefouili ; Catherine Roux
期刊名称：DEEP Cahiers de Recherches Économiques / Université de Lausanne
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：Université de Lausanne
摘要：We examine the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on firms' incentives to engage in cartel activities. Amnesty Plus is a proactive antitrust enforcement strategy aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms already convicted in one market to report collusive agreements in other markets. It has been heavily advertised that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. We show to the contrary that Amnesty Plus does not always have this desirable effect. Only under specific conditions, Amnesty Plus deters a cartel which would have been sustainable under an antitrust policy without Amnesty Plus. Otherwise, Amnesty Plus is either neutral or even stabilizes a cartel. We also show that firms can exploit their multimarket contact to reduce the effectiveness of the Amnesty Plus policy.
关键词：Amnesty Plus; Leniency Program; Multimarket Contact; Antitrust Policy