期刊名称:CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度:2009
卷号:1
出版社:Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要:This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a
two dimensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant
and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the
advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and
under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each
period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation
better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also
strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.
关键词:stock pollutant, capital accumulation, international environmental
agreements, dynamic core solution.