摘要：We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and
across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are
corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the
properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country
externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With
an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission
quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower that the socially optimal subsidy.
The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not
specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax.
Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement.
Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, R&D
investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a
quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best
optimal quota agreement than in the first-best optimum.
关键词：Climate policy, international environmental agreements, R&D
Policy, technology spillovers
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