文章基本信息

标题：Leader Behavior and the Natural Resource Curse
本地全文：下载
作者：Francesco Caselli ; Tom Cunningham
期刊名称：CEP Discussion Paper
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
期号：mar
出版社：Centre for Economic Performance
摘要：We discuss political economy mechanisms which can explain the resource curse, in which an increase in the size of resource rents causes a decrease in the economy’s total value added. We identify a number of channels through which resource rents will alter the incentives of a political leader. Some of these induce greater investment by the leader in assets that favour growth (infrastructure, rule of law, etc.), others lead to a potentially catastrophic drop in such activities. As a result, the effect of resource abundance can be highly non-monotonic. We argue that it is critical to understand how resources affect the leader’s "survival function", i.e. the reduced-form probability of retaining power. We also briefly survey decentralised mechanisms, in which rents induce a reallocation of labour by private agents, crowding out productive activity more than proportionately. We argue that these mechanisms cannot be fully understood without simultaneously studying leader behaviour
关键词：Natural resource endowment, resource curse, political economy