摘要:We attempt to explain the severe 1920-21 recession, the roaring 1920s boom, and
the slide into the Great Depression after 1929 in a unified framework. The model
combines monopolistic product market competition with search frictions in the
labor market, allowing for both individual and collective wage bargaining. We
attribute the extraordinary macroeconomic and financial volatility of this
period to two factors: Shifts in the wage bargaining regime and in the degree of
monopoly power in the economy. A shift from individual to collective bargaining
presents as a recession, involving declines in output and asset values, and
increases in unemployment and real wages. The pro-union provisions of the
Clayton Act of 1914 facilitated the rise of collective bargaining after World
War I, leading to the asset price crash and recession of 1920-21. A series of
tough anti-union Supreme Court decisions in late 1921 induced a shift back to
individual bargaining, leading the economy out of the recession. This, coupled
with the lax anti-trust enforcement of the Coolidge and Hoover administrations
enabled a major rise in corporate profits and stock market valuations throughout
the 1920s. Landmark pro-union court decisions in the late 1920s, as well as
political pressure on firms to adopt the welfare capitalism model of high wages,
led to collapsing profit expectations, contributing substantially to the stock
market crash. We model the onset of the Great Depression as an equilibrium
switch from individual wage bargaining to (actual or mimicked) collective wage
bargaining. The general equilibrium effects of this regime change are consistent
with large decreases in output, employment, and stock prices and moderate
increases in real wages.
关键词:Trade unions, collective bargaining, Great Depression