文章基本信息

标题：Term Limits and Electoral Accountability
本地全文：下载
作者：Michael Smart ; Daniel M. Sturm
期刊名称：CEP Discussion Paper
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
期号：dec
出版社：Centre for Economic Performance
摘要：Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters’ ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such “truthful” behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We show that the combination of these two effects can strictly increase the utility of voters.
关键词：Political Agency, Accountability, Term Limits