期刊名称:HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度:2005
卷号:2005
出版社:Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要:We define and analyze "strategic topologies" on types, under which two types are
close if their strategic behavior will be similar in all strategic situations.
To oper- ationalize this idea, we adopt interim rationalizability as our
solution concept, and define a metric topology on types in the
Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space. This topology is the coarsest
metric topology generating upper and lower hemiconti- nuity of rationalizable
outcomes. While upper strategic convergence is equivalent to convergence in the
product topology, lower strategic convergence is a strictly stronger
requirement, as shown by the electronic mail game. Nonetheless, we show that the
set of "finite types" (types describable by finite type spaces) are dense in the
lower strategic topology.