期刊名称：HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要：We study budget formation in a model featuring separation of powers. In our
model, the legislature designs a budget bill that can include a cap on total
spending and ear- marked allocations to designated public projects. Each project
provides random benefits to one of many interest groups. The legislature can
delegate spending decisions to the executive, who can observe the productivity
of all projects before choosing which to fund. However, the ruling coalition in
the legislature and the executive serve different constituencies, so their
interests are not perfectly aligned. We consider settings that differ in terms
of the breadth and overlap in the constituencies of the two branches, and asso-
ciate these with the political systems and circumstances under which they most
naturally arise. Earmarks are more likely to occur when the executive serves
broad interests, while a binding budget cap arises when the executive's
constituency is more narrow than that of the powerful legislators.
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