文章基本信息

标题：Order Statistic Games by Price Takers
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作者：Wang, Gyu Ho ; Yi, Kang-Oh
期刊名称：Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
印刷版ISSN：0018-280X
出版年度：2007
卷号：48
期号：2
出版社：Maruzen Company Ltd
摘要：This paper investigates the consequence of price-taking behavior in quantal response equilibrium model of order-statistic games. In contrast to the result of Yi (2003, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization) that QRE selects the e$cient equilibrium, if players ignore the influences of their own choices on the game outcome, or behave as price takers, the selection depends entirely on the prespecified order-statistic and the number of players, and an ine$cient outcome could result
关键词：Quantal Response Equilibrium, Coordination, Price-Taking Behavior