文章基本信息

标题：Inflation-Forecast-Based Rules and Indeterminacy: A Puzzle and a Resolution
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作者：Paul Levine ; Peter McAdam ; Joseph Pearlman 等
期刊名称：International Journal of Central Banking
印刷版ISSN：1815-4654
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
期号：04
出版社：IJCB Publications Fulfillment
摘要：We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary authorities claim (namely, to be forward looking and preemptive) and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following "Calvo-type" inflation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules that depend on a discounted sum of current and future rates of inflation. Such rules might be regarded as both within the legal frameworks and potentially mimicking central bankers' practice. We find that Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are, first, less prone to indeterminacy than standard rules with a finite forward horizon. Second, in difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Third, optimized forms have good stabilization properties as they become more forward looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Fourth, they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the euro area.