文章基本信息

标题：Active Courts and Menu Contracts
本地全文：下载
作者：Luca Anderlini ; Leonardo Felli ; Andrew Postlewaite 等
期刊名称：International Studies Papers
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
期号：oct
出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of “menu contracts” between the informed buyer and the uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this case. We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is not contractible ex-ante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let all “widgets” be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.
关键词：Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-ante Welfare, Informed Principal, Menu Contracts