出版社:Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要:In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime.
Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the
Statute Law regime over the Case Law one. However, all Courts rule ex-post,
after most economic decisions are already taken. Therefore, the advantage of
flexibility for Case Law is unavoidably paired with the potential for
time-inconsistency. Under Case Law, Courts may be tempted to behave myopically
and neglect ex-ante welfare because, ex-post, this may afford extra gains from
trade for the parties currently in Court. The temptation to behave myopically is
traded off against the effect of a Court's ruling, as a precedent, on the
rulings of future Courts. When Case Law matures this temptation prevails and
Case Law Courts succumb to the time-inconsistency problem. Statute Law, on the
other hand pairs the lack of flexibility with the ability to commit in advance
to a given (forward looking) rule. This solves the time-inconsistency problem
afflicting the Case Law Courts. We conclude that when the nature of the legal
environment is sufficiently heterogeneous and/or changes sufficiently often, the
Case Law regime is superior: flexibility is the prevailing concern. By the same
token, when the legal environment is sufficiently homogeneous and/or does not
change very often, the Statute Law regime dominates: the ability to overcome the
time-inconsistency problem is the dominant consideration.