文章基本信息

标题：The Supply of Social Insurance
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作者：Gonzalez, M. ; Wen, W.
期刊名称：Cambridge Working Papers in Economics / Faculty of Economics ; Department of Applied Economics
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：Cambridge University
摘要：We propose a theory of the welfare state, in which social transfers are chosen by a governing group interacting with non-governing groups repeatedly. Social demands from the non-governing groups are credible because these groups have the ability to generate social conflict. In this context social insurance is supplied as an equilibrium response to income risks within a self-enforcing social contract. When we explore the implications of such a view of the social contract, we find four main determinants of the welfare state: the degree of aggregate income risk; the heterogeneity of group-specific income risks; the public administration’s ability to implement group-specific transfers; and the ability of the nongoverning groups to coordinate their social demands. We also analyze the link between public good provision and social insurance.