摘要:This paper addresses the scatter problem for foundational evidentialism. Reflection on the
scatter problem uncovers significant epistemological lessons. The scatter problem is evaluated
in connection with Ernest Sosa¡¯s use of the problem as an argument against foundational
evidentialism. Sosa¡¯s strategy is to consider a strong intuition in favor of internalism¡ªthe new
evil demon problem, and then illustrate how a foundational evidentialist account of the new evil
demon problem succumbs to the scatter problem. The goal in this paper is to evaluate the force
of the scatter problem. The main argument of the paper is that the scatter problem has mixed
success. On the one hand, scatter undermines objectual evidentialism, an evidentialist theory
that formulates principles of basic perceptual justification in terms of the objects (or properties)
of perceptual states. On the other hand, the problem of scatter does not undermine content
evidentialism, an evidentialist view that formulates its epistemic principles in terms of the
assertive content of perceptual states. The significance of the scatter problem, especially in
concert with the new evil demon problem, is that it provides an argument for content
evidentialism.