文章基本信息

标题："Kant's Notion of Judgment from the Perspective of the Theory of Tacit Knowing"
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作者：YU Zhenhua ; Notes on Contributors
期刊名称：Tradition & Discovery
印刷版ISSN：1057-1027
电子版ISSN：2154-1566
出版年度：2005
卷号：31
期号：01
页码：24-35
出版社：Polanyi Society
摘要：The dominant view of the Western intellectual tradition, or perhaps more accurately, the continental European tradition, emphasizes the primacy of the universal over the particular when it comes to understanding the nature of knowledge. This preoccupation with the universal is undermined by the theory of tacit knowing which underlines the mediation of the universal and the particular with an emphasis on the latter, that is, the particular. An analysis of Kant’s notions of determinative and reflective judgment reveals that he grounds each in tacit processes, privileging the role of particular examples or exemplars. Structural similarities between Kant’s judgments of taste and Polanyi’s notion of personal knowledge illuminates Polanyi’s surprising claim that ”The very nature of knowledge is in the Third Critique, not in the First Critique.”
关键词：universal-particular distinction, judgment, tacit knowing, Kant, Polanyi