Contradora: a process for Central American peace - transcript

It has been a year since this body last dealt with the Central American question. In that relatively short time, a large number of developments--some positive, some negative--have taken place in the region that merit our review and analysis.

Perhaps there is no better place to start this review than with the Contadora process, given its prominence in public attention, its unquestionable international support and its potential impact on the regional situation.

U.S. Support for Contadora Process

U.S. support for diplomatic efforts to achieve an effective and lasting peace in Central America has been strong, consistent and continues undiminished. Those efforts pre-date the Contadora process and go back to the very origins of the present crisis, when the United States in 1978 sought actively to help bring the bloodshed in Nicaragua to a halt. The continued when, in October 1982, the United States participated in the elaboration of the San Jose accords, whose principles for a peaceful settlement anticipated the content of the Contadora Document of Objectives. And for nearly 2 years, the United States has been represented by a special presidential envoy to promote and support dialogue both among and within nations of the region.

Addressing a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress in April 1983, President Reagan authoritatively set forth our diplomatic policy toward the region. He identified four objectives.

* The United States will support any agreement among Central American countries for the withdrawal--under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions--of foreign military and security advisers and troops.

* We want to help opposition groups join the political process in all countries and compete by ballots instead of bullets.

* We will support any verifiable, reciprocal agreements among Central American countries on the renunciation of support for insurgencies on neighbors' territory.

* And, finally, we desire to help Central America end its costly arms race and will support any verifiable, reciprocal agreements on the non-importation of offensive weapons.

As the Contadora process increasingly occupied center stage of efforts to promote dialogue among nations of the region, the United States repeatedly made its support of that effort clear and unequivocal. Following the Declaration of the Presidents of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama at Cancun, July 17, 1983, President Reagan wrote these Contadora Presidents on July 21 to congratulate them on their efforts to promote dialogue in Central America. The President wrote that, "my government has consistently expressed strong support for the Contadora process. The Cancun Declaration, by articulating the crucial issues which must be treated to reach an effective and enduring resolution of the Central American conflict, is an important contribution to advancing that process."

Following agreement by the five Central American nations on September 9, 1983, on the Contadora Document of Objectives, the U.S. Government took the position that the document represented a comprehensive statement of the issues which must be addressed and declared it "an excellent basis for continued regional negotiation." We have in innumerable instances stated our view that the Document of Objectives constitutes a sound outline of an effective agreement and that was support its comprehensive and verifiable implementation.

That support has been consistently expressed at each stage of the Contadora process. We welcomed the agreement of January 8, which created working commissions to develop recommendations for the implementation of the Document of Objectives. On June 1 of this year, at the request of the President of Mexico, acting on behalf of the Contadora Group, Secretary of State [George P.] Shultz initiated a series of high-level bilateral discussion between Nicaragua and the United States, in support of the Contadora process. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Victor Hugo Tinoco and U.S. Special Envoy Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman have now held six rounds of talks in that series and further meetings will be taking place. Ambassador Shlaudeman has, additionally, consulted repeatedly with all participants in the Contadora process.

When the Contadora participants had under consideration a second draft agreement, the revised acta of September 7, Secretary of State Shultz characterized this draft as a positive development in a continuing negotiating process. Comments on the revised draft acta were submitted by the Central American states as requested by the Contadora Group on October 15. The comments of some of the Central American countries are a matter of public record. They clearly indicate a strongly favorable attitude toward the acta and that the effort to make the acta an effective and comprehensive implementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives should continue.

The preceding should suffice to demonstrate that the United States regards the Contadora process as offering the most appropriate forum and the best hope for achieving a verifiable and comprehensive solution to the problems of the region. It is a regional effor to solve a regional problem, free from outside interference. As that negotiating process now goes forward, our support continues undiminished. The Contadora Group's draft resolution now before us, General Assembly document A/39/L.6, exemplifies such efforts to achieve peace, and the United States is prepared to support it.

In affirming our support for the process, and in applauding the efforts of the nine participating countries, we note with approval the express determination of those countries to continue this effort until a document has been achieved which reflects the views and needs of all the countries in the region. Since this final document will have been drafted to accommodate the views and needs of these countries of the region, they will, of course, be the appropriate signatories of the document.

Contadora Democracies Established

The establishment, strengthening, and protection of democracy is an explicit and essential component of the Contadora formula for a Central American regional solution. So it is entirely appropriate that the Contadora countries themselves are democracies. One of the principal goals put forward in the Document of Objectives signed in September 1983 by the Contadora Four and all five Central American governments, is: "To adopt measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative, and pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights.

A related objective, agreed to at the same time by the nine participants in the Contadora process, is: "To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic processes in accordance with the law."

Agains the expectations of skeptics and pessimists and despite the desperate opposition of groups determined to use violence to frustrate the popular will, Central America is undeniably undergoing a profound democratic transformation fully compatible with these Contadora objectives. My delegation is pleased to note the recent dramatic progress in Central America toward empowering the people to choose, establish, and develop democratic governments. In 1982, the then military government of Honduras peacefully relinquished power to permit free and fair elections for a new president and national assembly, which were duly and constitutionally elected and continue to govern the country democratically despite grave economic problems and deliberate destabilization attempts from neighboring Nicaragua. This determination to continue on the path of democracy--rather than Nicaragua's purely verbal and propagandistic expressions of support--is what demonstrates Honduras' acceptance of the Contadora objectives.

The year 1982 also saw the military reform junta in El Salvador presided over by Jose Napoleon Duarte, peacefully give up power to permit free and fair elections for a constituent assembly that was charged with drafting a new constitution and choosing a provisional president. The winner in the constituent assembly elections was not Mr. Duarte's party but a coalition of the opposition, which elected its own leader as assembly speaker and also chose the provisional president. Just this year, the Salvadoran people again were allowed to vote, this time, directly to choose their president. The contests was vigorous; there was robust competition among many parties. No candidate received an absolute majority in the first round for voting. Only after a spirited runoff campaign was a new Salvadoran president, Mr. Napoleon Duarte, Chosen.

In the Salvadoran elections, which were observed by representatives of 60 nations and international organizations, and 800 journalists, the Salvadoran people took considerable risks for the sake of establishing a democratically elected popular government. Candidates and voters alike participated in the elections under threats of violence from the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas seeking to dominate El Salvador by military force. To demonstrate the deadly seriousness of their threats, the guerrillas stepped up their campaign of violence against civilians during the electoral campaign. Some assembly members were murdered by the guerrillas as a "response" to the election process. Roads were mined, buildings were bombed, bridges were dynamited in the effort to impede the elections. Despite these acts of murder and sabotage, 75% of the eligible voters voted. Under these circumstances, there can be no question as to who supported Contadora's objectives and who did not.

The same is true with respect to the courageous offer of President Duarte to go unarmed to meet and seek conciliation with the commanders of the in-surgents of his country. With the whole world watching, the meeting took place peacefully in the church at La Palma, with the mediation of the Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Rivera y Damas. President Duarte's objective in the meeting was precisely that I have cited from the Contadora Document of Objectives: "To promote national reconciliation efforts" where "deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic processes in accordance with the law."

Guatemala also has taken significant steps toward establishing a constitutional, popular and democratic government. Just a few months ago, the people of Guatemala peacefully, freely, and fairly elected a constituent assembly that promises to prepare the way for presidential elections next year. That, too, is progress toward the Contadora objectives.

Finally, in 1982, the people of Costa Rica continued their proud and admirable tradition of nearly four decades of uninterrupted rule by popularly elected governments by electing a new president. And in this most recent election, as in every election but one since the 1940s, the president elected was of the opposite party from that of the president he replaced. Needless to say, no better example of the democratic spirit embodied in the Contadora objectives can be found.

The record is clear that three of the five Central American nations now have democratically chosen civilian governments, and that one other has taken concrete steps toward establishing democratic, civilian rule while promising unambiguously to follow through to the completion of that process next year. The recent elections in these four republics met the key criteria for authentically democratic elections: They permitted open competition under conditions of free speech, press, and assembly. They were inclusive: large, nearly universal portions of the adult populations of these countries were eligible to participate. And their results were definitive: that is, the outcome of the votes largely determined the partisan composition of the governments.

Nicaraguan Elections: FAir or Farce?

In contrast to the other Central American nations, Nicaragua is openly defying both Contadora and the movement toward democratic, civilian, and constitutional government evident throughout the region. As an outward symbol of its contempt for civilian government, the Sandinista leaders not only prefer to be addressed by the military title of comandante but even appear before this General Assembly in full military regalia.

We must confess we were not surprised. For a number of years, my delegation has been pointing to the accumulating evidence indicating the real nature of the Sandinista regime.

Indeed, the unelected military rulers of Nicaragua have a longstanding record of ideological contempt for free, fair, inclusive, and competitive, democratic elections in their own country and their neighbors'.

Although 1 month before they achieved power in 1979, the Sandinista leaders promised the Organization of American Stages that they would hold free elections after assuming power, they quickly reneged on that promise and have never shown the slightest genuine inclination to implement it.

Early in 1980, the Sandinistas consolidated their control over the Council of State, enlarging it and packing it with their own supporters to ensure a permanent majority. In July 1980, Sandinista Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announced that there would be no need for elections since the people had already "voted" during the revolution. "Elections," he ominously declared, "could not be held until the people had been 'reeducated.'"

The following month, in August 1980, Humberto Ortega announced that elections would be put off until 1985. Even then, it was said, these would not be "bourgeois" elections--which I take to mean the kind of authentically democratic elections called for in the Contadora objectives and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--but "people's" elections. Power "will not be raffled off," insisted the Sandinista Interior Minister, Tomas Borge.

On August 25, 1981, Humberto Ortega remarked in a speech to the military: "We have not promised the elections that they (the bourgeoisie) think we are going to promote, and we are never going to discuss power, as we have already said on other occasions, because this power was taken by the people through arms, and here the power of the people will never be questioned."

Three years later, after enormous international pressure, national elections were scheduled for this coming November 4, in Nicaragua. But how do the military rulers of Nicaragua conceive of these elections? Here is what a member of the military junta, Bayardo Arce, said in May 1984.

What a revolution needs is the power to enforce. This power to enforce is precisely what constitutes the defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat--the ability of the class to impose its will using the intruments at hand, without going into formal or bourgeois details. From that point of view, the elections are bothersome to us.

At the same time, Comandante Arce predicted that following the certain Sandinista victory in the November elections, the Sandinistas would remove the "facade of political pluralism" and establish "the party of the revolutionary, the single party."

In view of all these antidemocratic statements emanating from several comandantes, no one should be surprised when the November 4th "elections" in Nicaragua turn out to be a farce incapable of deceiving even those few who still harbor hopes that the comandantes will turn out to be the genuine democrats after all.

How can these elections be deemed democratic? Who can claim that they comply with Contadora? To put it simply, conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua do not exist. All the news media are controlled by the Sandinistas with the exception of the newspaper La Prensa, which is routinely censored, and the radio of the Catholic Church, which is forbidden to broadcast political material. There is evidence that the draconian military draft is being used as a means of intimidating supporters of the political opposition. The electoral council created to administer the elections is completely dominated by members of the Sandinista Party. Vigilante mobs--the infamous "turbas"--have been encouraged to, and do intimidate the opposition. And the most representative elements of democratic opposition simply are not being allowed to participate in the elections. The principal opposition alliance, the Coordinadora Democratica, had asked to have its candidates placed on the ballot, but only if certain essential conditions were met. These included commonplace conditions for democratic contests such as: an end to press censorship, suspension of martial law, separation of the state from the Sandinista Party, and an amnesty law to allow all Nicaraguan citizens to participate in the electoral process. The conditions were refused, and the Coordinadora, not wishing to be a part of a farcical election, refrained from registering for places on the ballot.

Religion and Human Rights Under

Sandinista Rule

Many other aspects of the situation in Nicaragua are gravely at odds with the Contadora objectives of regional peace, social well being and internal democracy. One of these is intense religious intolerance. The Roman Catholic Church, of which a majority of Nicaraguans and other Central Americans are members, is suffering persecution. Faithful clergymen are being intimidated by the violence of "turbas divinas;" even Pope John Paul was rudely mocked by Sandinista operatives when he visited Nicaragua last year. When the military regime summarily expelled 10 Catholic missionary priests from the country in July of this year, the Archbishop of Managua, Monsignor Obando y Bravo, remarked: "We want to state clearly that this government is totalitarian.... We are dealing with a government that is an enemy of the Church." The Archbishop of San Jose in Costa Rica, Monsignor Roman Arrieta, received the expelled priets into his country in a poignant ceremony and declared: "There were still in the world men and women of good will, who did not believe at totalitarian regime had enthroned itself in Nicaragua. Now those people know the truth."

The Nicaraguan delegation is fond of quoting The New York Times in their statements. Let me also quote from the Times. Just today the Tiems carries a front page article quoting Nicaraguan Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega's statement that, "It is said and repeated that all these calamities and wars are caused only by foreign aggression of an imperialism that is the enemy of humanity. The people, for their part, ask: To What imperialism belong those who impose a regime that plunders, jails and issues constant calls to arms? Who has decided this? Who has made the choice to move from one system to another ...? ... Why do they wish to impose by fore and deceit, ideologies which, good as they may be, are not accepted by the people? Why are we offered only new oppressions and more serious confrontations? Is this not the basic cause of our growing internal weakness?" Anyone that has followed Nicaraguan developments the last few years will have no dificulty answering those questions. Certainly, the Nicaraguan people have no doubts about how to answer them.

Minority religious communities in Nicaragua have also suffered under the Sandinistas. Virtually the entire Jewish community of Nicaragua has fled the country since the Sandinistas took over. Moravians and evangelical Protestants, who make up a large proportion of the Miskito Indian population, are also being persecuted.

My delegation has addressed this Assembly before on the matter of the gross violations of human rights committed by the Sandinistas against the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama tribes of indigenous peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. These Sandinista practices, including forced relocation into concentration camps, destruction of villages, homes and livestock, and violence against civilians, have elicited the grave concern of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

The militarization of Nicaragua under the Sandinistas is a concrete threat to the peace of the entire region. Since 1979, Nicaraguan-trained military forces have increased from 10,000 to over 100,000. This is an extraordinary level of militarization for a country with a population of only 2.8 million. Sandinista armed forces outnumber the combined armed forcds of all of the other Central American countries.

Despite the Sandinistas clear anti-democratic intentions, their violations of human rights, their denial of social and political pluralism, their continuing subversion of neighboring countries, their frenetic arms buildup, and their harboring of thousands of foreign troops and advisers, the Sandinista regime shamelessly declares its support for Contadora and cynically proclaims its intention to sign the Contadora acta as it now stands. Of course they will. But then they will sign anything and promise anything that will perpetuate their power and privilege.

Conclusion

This expediency in the pursuit of power, this reliance on military means to dominate a resisting populace, this ostentatious fascination with military titles, symbols, and uniforms sadly reminds us of the era of military dictatorship the world had hoped Nicaragua had already transcended. Regrettably, this is not the case and that is why in recent weeks crowds of Nicaraguans that have perceived the real nature of the Sandinistas have been heard in the city of Corinto chanting the slogan, "El Frente y Somoza son la misma cosa" ("The Sandinistas and Somoza are the same thing").

The people are seldom deceived and the Nicaraguans are no exception. They see their Sandinista rulers living in luxury in former Somoza mansions enjoying privileges denied their fellow citizens and partaking of sumptuous meals when mothers see their children grow hungry for lack of milk. So it is not surprising that remembering the inequalities of the Somoza regime the Nicaraguans today shout that, "El Frente y Somoza son la misma cosa."

The people remmeber. Somoza repressed political freedoms; censored La Prensa; jailed, tortured, and murdered his political opponents; and generally intimidated the population into political acquiescence. But the Sandinistas today are doing exactly the same thing and, naturally, the Nicaraguan people have concluded that "El Frente y Somoza son la misma cosa."

Let the Sandinistas, too, remember. Let them remember the fate of Somoza because, if the long-suffering Nicaraguan people are equating the Sandinistas' Front with the Somoza regime, they are likely to take the same measures with the Frente that they previously took with Somoza.

COPYRIGHT 1985 U.S. Government Printing Office
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