Soviet activities in Latin America and the Caribbean

In the course of the last 25 years, the Soviet Union has moved from having a marginal presence and little influence to being a major actor with multifaceted activities throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

* In 1960, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with only five countries in the region and few significant overt relationships aside from ties to communist parties.

* Today the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations with 16 countries, one of which, Cuba, is an active member of the Soviet bloc and a major conventional military actor in Africa as well as this hemisphere.

Public attention has recently focused on the Soviet Union's key role in the militarization of Nicaragua. But the range of Soviet activities is less widely appreciated: for example, the U.S.S.R. operates major electronic intelligence facilities aimed at the United States from Cuba purchases $1 billion of grain from Argentina every year, is a primary supplier of modern military hardware to Peru, and provides more official scholarships to Latin America than does the Government of the United States.

The nature of this varied Soviet presence, and the objectives which have led to its steady expansion, pose a major challenge to U.S. interests. They deserve careful attention in the formulation of U.S. policy.

Soviet Strategy

Historically, the Soviet Union paid scant attention to the Western Hemisphere, preferring to concentrate its energies on regions closer to the Soviet homeland and wishing to avoid confrontation in an area so close to the United States.

Cuba became the first exception to this pattern. The U.S.S.R. supported the development of a communist regime 90 miles from U.S. shores and in 1962 sought to exploit these circumstances to gain a major advance in nuclear capability vis-a-vis the United States. After that adventure turned sour, caution once again became the Soviet watchword. The Soviets did not, however, lose sight of the military importance of Cuba and continued to upgrade equipment, personnel, and missions on the island.

Apart from Cuba, Soviet policy has displayed differing tactics, intended to meet local circumstances.

The Caribbean Basin. Soviet interest in the Caribbean Basin grew markedly in the late 1970s. In looking for reasons why this was the case, I would suggest that the overall increase in Soviet global presence probably emboldened Kremlin planners. In Africa and elsewhere, the "correlation of forces" appeared to be shifting in directions favorable to the U.S.S.R. By 1979, the coming to power of the New JEWEL Movement in Grenada and of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua certainly contributed to the view that the time was right to encourage and even arm minorities opposed to the status quo.

In reinforcing Marxist-Leninist regimes and movements and in encouraging insurgency in the Caribbean Basin, the U.S.S.R. has had three basic goals:

* To divert U.S. attention and U.S. resources to Latin America, thus providing the Soviets with potentially greater freedom of action in other parts of the world;

* To complicate U.S. defense planning in the event of hostilities; and

* To sustain the future-oriented image of Marxist-Leninist ideology in a world where communist regimes are generally failing to meet their people's needs.

South America. In South America, we see a different Soviet approach. The difference is reflected in the overt Soviet presence in South America as compared to the Caribbean. In South America, the Soviet Union maintains 10 Embassies, 7 trade offices, 6 civilian technical missions, and 1 military mission.

By contrast, in the Caribbean Basin (apart from Cuba) the Soviet Union has relations with few countries and maintains only 4 Embassies, 3 trade offices, 2 civilian technical missions, and 1 military mission (in Nicaragua).

In emphasizing official state-to-state relations with the larger countries of South America, the U.S.S.R. seeks to gain commercial advantages, to appear as a "responsible" member of the international community, and to promote anti-Americanism among countries with important international roles.

Case Studies

We are, of course, attempting here today to analyze the motivations and the actions of closed societies--the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Soviet-bloc members. Our information is not comprehensive, and some of the available data is classified and based on sensitive sources. The U.S.S.R., for example, often acts through others or in concert with others in Western Hemisphere matters. Much of this cooperation is covert.

It is, therefore, often difficult to draw a dividing line between the actions of the Soviet Union and those of members of the Soviet bloc such as Cuba, the East European states, North Korea or Vietnam, and various "liberation" movements.

Cuba. Cuba is the cornerstone of the Soviet policy of support for insurgency and the destabilization of democratic nations in the Caribbean Basin. The Soviets have built the island into a heavily armed military outpost, and they singlehandedly keep the island's failing economy afloat. This very expensive subsidy is unique in Soviet foreign affairs.

Cuba is perceived by the U.S.S.R. as a major military asset. In addition, Cuba is presumably intended to be a showcase of Latin American "socialism," but that has been less successful. Like their Soviet patron, the Cubans have been able to build an impressive military establishment but have been unable to run a civilian economy.

Cuba occupies a special position in the Soviet bloc.

* Cuba now receives more than $4 billion annually in economic aid from the U.S.S.R. This aid constitutes one-quarter of Cuba's GNP [gross national product] and is the largest account in the U.S.S.R.'s global economic assistance program.

* In addition to maintaining a combat brigade of 2,800 men in Cuba, the Soviets have 2,800 military and some 7,000 civilian advisers in Cuba. Soviet intelligence officers within the hierarchy of the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence have decisionmaking authority.

* The Soviets have constructed a major intelligence gathering facility operated by 2,100 Soviet technicians at Lourdes, near Havana. This electronic facility monitors a wide range of U.S. civilian and military communications and is the most sophisticated such Soviet facility outside the territory of the U.S.S.R.

* Periodic Soviet air deployments stage from Cuba. Naval visits are also part of the Soviet Caribbean presence, Soviet navy task forces having deployed 24 times to the Caribbean since 1969.

* More than 60,000 tons of Soviet arms were delivered to Cuba in both 1981 and 1982 (the highest levels since the 1962 missile crisis). The 1983 and 1984 shipments were only slightly lower at 51,000 and 56,000, respectively.

Soviet arms deliveries have made Cuba's Armed Forces the best-equipped in Latin America, with a demonstrated capability of force projection as far afield as Africa and with more extensive and more recent foreign combat experience than any other army in the hemisphere; 160,000 active duty personnel and 135,000 well-trained reservists operate more than 950 tanks and more than 200 jet fighters, some of them Mig-23s. The Cuban Navy--already equipped with frigates, submarines, missile- and torpedo-equipped patrol boats--has recently added two amphibious landing ships.

Not every action of the Cuban Government necessarily has full Soviet approval or support. But Cuba's current level of activities, particularly abroad, would be impossible without this extraordinary level of Soviet military and economic support.

Grenada. The rich volume of documents recovered during the Grenada rescue mission (and now available to the public in the National Archives) illustrates the pattern of Soviet/Cuban strategies in the Caribbean Basin. The documents detail the way in which Maurice Bishop's New JEWEL Movement sought--in classic Marxist fashion and in close cooperation with Soviet bloc--to establish a totalitarian regime and to repress individual freedoms. Also included among these documents were five secret military agreements--three with the U.S.S.R., one with Cuba, and one with North Korea.

Cuba served as the primary funnel for Soviet military, economic, and technical assistance to Grenada and built the Point Salines airport. Grenada became a clandestine storage base for large quantities of Soviet arms and ammunition, far in excess of Grenadian defense needs. Grenade also became the focal point of antidemocratic activities in the eastern Caribbean. In doing this, Grenade surrendered a large part of its sovereignty to the Cubans and Soviets.

Nicaragua. The Soviets and their Cuban allies have also been instrumental in aiding the Sandinistas to tighten Marxist-Leninist rule in Nicaragua. After nearly 6 years of Sandinista rule, no sector of Nicaraguan society--be it the church, unions, private schools, the business community, political parties, the media, or Indian groups--remains unaffected. Some 3,000 Cuban military and security personnel attached to Nicaragua's Armed Forces, internal security, and intelligence organizations have played a key role from the start in helping the Sandinistas to develop and impose a system of mass controls. The Soviet presence in Nicaragua is modest by comparison.

The internal clamp-down in Nicaragua is complemented by that Sandinista military buildup.

* Sandinista internal security and military strength now stands at 62,000 men on active duty, with an additional 57,000 serving in the reserves and the militia.

* The Sandinista military has received 340 tanks and armored vehicles and 70 long-range howitzers, providing a ground-strike force superior to any of the neighboring countries.

* The Nicaraguan Air Force now fields a half dozen Soviet MI-24 helicopter gunships, among the mosts advanced in the Soviet inventory.

* More than 20 major new military facilities and bases have been constructed with financing and technical assistance from the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and other Soviet-bloc nations.

The Underpinnings of Soviet Action

Use of Surrogates. Sensitive to the Caribbean Basin's proximity to the United States, the U.S.S.R. has preferred to work covertly and indirectly through intermediaries. Could Grenada possibly be a threat to anyone? Yet in October 1983, this tiny country, whose ruling party had 80 members and 83 candidate members, harbored some 800 Cubans, 49 Soviets, 17 Libyans, 15 North Koreans, 10 East Germans, and 3 Bulgarians and was well on its way to becoming an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the service of the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Union's ability to act through others, particularly through personnel or organizations acting in the name of small developing countries, has given it a significant operational and propaganda advantage vis-a-vis the West. By disguising Soviet activities and increasing local impact, the use of countries like Grenada, Nicaragua, and even Cuba--all of which are so small as to seem incapable of threatening U.S. interests--seeks to lull Western public opinion against accepting the reality of the Soviet challenge.

One reason for the use of Cuba as a surrogate is the comparatively greater effectiveness of Cuban diplomants, military advisers, technicians, and covert agents. They speak the main regional language and are themselves products of a local culture. In Central America's armed conflicts, Cubans can pass as natives of a Central American country. But use of the Cubans as surrogates is particularly important because it helps maintain a low profile for the U.S.S.R. itself. This, the Soviets hope, deflects international criticism and perhaps even some American public concern at their interference in a region so close, in all senses, to the United States.

Guerrilla Insurgencies. Throughout the 1960s, the Soviets held aloof from Castro's attempts to foment guerrilla wars in Latin America. The Soviets argued that the "objective conditions" for revolution did not exist in the region, and their view was supported by the persistent failure of Cuban efforts.

The Soviets are, of course, not opposed in principle to armed violence. Article 28 of the new Soviet Constitution, adopted in 1977, commits the U.S.S.R. to support "the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress." This is quite similar to Article 12(c) of the 1976 Cuban Constitution. Soviet writings and propaganda also repeatedly stress Soviet backing for insurgencies. Soviet-Cuban differences in the 1960s were thus a matter of tactics, not principle.

Since the mid-1970s, there has been a convergence of views between the Soviets and Cubans in support of armed violence in Central America. Certainly guerrilla successes in Vietnam, Angola, and Nicaragua have made insurgencies seem more promising.

Cuban military facilities have been available for the training of terrorists since the first years of the Castro regime. At least 20,000 persons, including some from virtually every Lating American nation, have received training in these schools. Since the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, potential guerrillas from all over Central America have found it easier to receive Cuban training. The Cubans now transport them via unscheduled flights to and from Nicaragua.

Soviet-bloc support for subversion in El Salvador is multifaceted.

* The Cuban role in unifying the Salvadoran guerrillas is well known. In 1980, five factions were united by Castro into the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).

* The Soviet bloc as a whole became involved in arming the FMLN as a result of the 1980 travels of Shafik Handal, Secretary General of the Moscow-line Salvadoran Communist Party, to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, and Ethiopia to obtain weapons for the guerrillas' failed 1981 "final offensive."

* Guerrilla defectors have repeatedly stressed the Cuban/Nicaraguan role in training and in the planning of operations. Alejandro Montenegro, the guerrilla leader who commanded the attack against the Ilopango Air Force Base in 1981, revealed after defecting that the operation had been planned in Cuba and that the attackers had trained for the assault in Cuban schools. Intelligence reporting indicates that guerrilla military leaders and their political front men have traveled to Havana to consult with Cuban leaders.

* Nicaragua continues to host the main command and logistic center for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Weapons, ammunition, and supplies continue to filter into El Salvador from Nicaragua through a variety of land, sea, and air routes.

Soviet-bloc support for subversion has not been limited to El Salvador. The Cubans have attempted to unify the guerrilla groups in Guatemala and have trained guerrillas destined for Colombia. Nicaragua has sponsored terrorist actions in Costa Rica. In 1983 and again in 1984, Cuban-trained guerrillas infiltrated into Honduras from Nicaragua only to be quickly defeated by Honduran forces. The documents found in Grenada contained repeated references to the New JEWEL Movement's ambition to emulate, in the eastern Caribbean, Nicaragua's role in Central America.

State-to-State Relations. While the Soviets support insurgencies in some countries, mainly in the Caribbean Basin, they emphasize diplomatic and commercial relations in others--mainly in South America. The U.S.S.R. takes a long-term view of political developments and will patiently develop contacts with opposition forces in host countries while providing funding, scholarships, training, and other support.

Despite trade fairs and cultural activities, Soviet economic penetration of Latin America is limited. Only in Peru and Argentina have the Soviets achieved significant relationships. The Soviet Union was at one time Argentina's number-one trading partner, principally due to large grain sales. In the case of Peru, Soviet ties result from the sale of arms to the Peruvian military.

The long-term impact of Soviet ties with Peru is not clear. The U.S.S.R. has developed a meaningful presence, but the Puruvians are increasingly aware that the weapons the Soviets have provided are not relevant to the pressing internal security threat.

Both Soviets and Cubans actively seek to open offices and gain landing rights for their airlines, even though there is little prospect of these enterprises being economically viable.

Soviet magazines and communist broadcasts are supplemented by offices of official press organs such as TASS, Novosti, and Prensa Latina. Nicaragua has now entered this field with its New Nicaragua News Agency. These offices function as vehicles for "active measures" (see "Active Measures," p. 6).

Scholarships. Both the Soviet Union and Cuba have invested heavily in scholarships for Latin American and Caribbean students. This is a major, growing program that operates directly or indirectly in more than four-fifths of the countries of the region.

* The total number of academic students in the U.S.S.R. from Latin America and the Caribbean has more than doubled in the last 5 years, rising from 2,900 in 1979 to 7,600 at the end of 1983.

* In addition, there were approximately 3,000 such students in East European countries in 1983, and another 6,400 in Cuba in 1984. Of the students in Cuba, about 5,600 came from Central America and 380 from the Caribbean.

* While the Soviets and Cubans have been plagued by the nonrecognition of their degrees in many Latin countries, these barriers have begun to fall. The U.S.S.R. signed agreements with Ecuador and Nicaragua in 1982 allowing for the recognition of Soviet degrees. Returning graduates have entered the professions and government bureaucracies in Costa Rica, Panama, and several other democracies.

Active Measures. In Latin America, regional front groups, mostly directed from Havana, are the major Soviet vehicle for "active measures"--the dissemination of misleading or false news stories designed to damage Western interests in Latin America.

As part of a massive campaign involving virtually all Soviet and Cuban international fronts against the Grenada rescue mission, Soviet media carried charges that U.S. forces had killed over 2,000 Grenadians with chemical weapons and filmed their agony. A rumor which first appeared in the Indian press was widely replayed reporting that the United States was responsible for the death of former Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.

Other Soviet active measures have accused the United States of germ warfare in El Salvador and claimed that Pentagon use of chemical weapons in El Salvador has caused outbreaks of polio, conjunctivitis, and chemical bronchitis. The Soviets also distorted charges made by an ecological organization before a UN forum in Nairobi about the use of defoliants in the Amazon Basin by the Brazilian Government to clear space for new hydroelectric projects. The Soviets circulated reports that the United States was testing chemical/biological weapons on the local population.

In February 1984, two forged U.S. documents, purported to be State Airgram 1490 and Munitions Control Bulletin No. 98, were planted in Peru to "prove" that the U.S. Government was planning to supply massive amounts of arms to Chile, including Pershing missiles.

Conclusion

Soviet actions, both direct and through others, have become increasingly significant in the hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean Basin. U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean must recognize this reality and take it into account. Laissez-passez is not an option.

Some argue that the United States can only make matters worse by reacting, that Soviet gains are the result of U.S. mistakes. We refused to sell F-5s to Peru, and the Soviets ultimately sold Sukhois. We embargoed U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets bought heavily from Argentina. But the ties thus formed only underscore that, whatever the Soviets' intentions in the hemisphere, what the United States does or does not do still matters.

To deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity to fish in waters already troubled by historic and often deeply rooted political and economic problems, the United States must act with constancy to help our neighbors make democracy work and achieve equitable, sustained economic growth. We must encourage peaceful solutions to conflict and, at the same time, help to provide security against violent threats to liberty and individual opportunity.

These would be wise policies for the United States even if the Soviet Union were not as active in this hemisphere. It is obvious, for example, that more students from Latin America and the Caribbean should receive scholarships for study in the United States that will help them to build a better future. The fact that the majority of foreign scholarships now available to these students are from the Soviet bloc adds another important reason for a major increase in U.S. scholarship programs.

In sum, the policy interests of the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean are challenged not only by endemic political, social, economic, and security conditions but also by an active, sophisticated, and opportunistic Soviet effort to gain increased influence in the region. To meet the challenges will require a long-term national commitment in which the executive branch can act effectively with bipartisan support from the Congress. If we are divided and indecisive, we will jeopardize important national interests. I hope that this hearing will help to increase public understanding of the challenges we face and, in this way, contribute to achieving the national resolve we must have.

COPYRIGHT 1985 U.S. Government Printing Office
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group