Aerospace - Industry Overview

This chapter covers the following Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories: Aircraft (3721), Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts (3724), Aircraft Equipment, NEC (3728), Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles (3761), Guided Missiles and Space Vehicle Propulsion and Parts (3764), and Guided Missiles and Space Vehicle Equipment NEC (3769).

For answers to questions regarding data collection procedures, factors affecting trade data, forecasting methodology, the use of constant dollars, the difference between industry and product data, sources and references, and the SIC system, see "Getting the Most Out of Outlook '94" on page 1. For other topics related to this chapter, see chapters 15 (Electronic Components, Equipment, and Superconductors), 28 (Space Commerce), 30 (Telecommunications and Navigation Equipment), and 40 (Transportation Services).

The U.S. aerospace industry, one of America's most successful industries, is facing some difficult challenges. The three key issues confronting the aerospace sector are: continuing defense cuts, increasing international competition, and a weak global economy.

Still a global leader, the U.S. aerospace industry is a critical part of the country's domestic and export economies. The aerospace industry is the nation's leading net exporter of manufactured goods, selling products worth $40 billion in 1993. The aerospace industry produces the largest trade surplus of any U.S. manufacturing industry (approximately $28 billion in 1993). Aerospace is also a leading technology driver, utilizing a number of the technologies identified as critical by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Commerce. The industry accounts for more than 25 percent of all the nation's research and development (R&D) expenditures, making it the country's leader in R&D spending on new technologies.

Industry Sales Continue Down

The aerospace industry is facing serious challenges. Due to continued defense cuts, a weak global economy, and increased international competition, industry shipments (in constant dollars) will decline in 1994 for the third year in a row. The value of aerospace industry shipments, unadjusted for inflation, peaked in 1992 at $134 billion. Shipments in 1993 fell 11 percent, in real terms, and shipments in 1994 are expected to be I I percent lower than 1993. Historically, at least half of the industry's revenues were derived from the military sector. Cuts in the defense budgets for aerospace products, both in the United States and in other developed countries, have reduced requirements for military aircraft, missiles, and related equipment from U.S. suppliers. Total U.S. defense spending peaked in 1985, and current budget requests indicate an annual average decline of overall spending of more than 5 percent per year through 1997. The major impact will be from procurement cuts, estimated to be down 47 percent from the peak years of the 1980's build-up. Increased emphasis on dual-use technology combined with funding for defense conversion should focus future attention on research and development. Rather than canceling ongoing projects, the 1994 defense budget recommends continuing development. By contrast, the defense industry's production will continue to fall (Figure 20- 1).

In the past, significant growth in the civil sector sustained the aerospace industry during periodic downturns in defense spending. Between 1985 and 1991, when defense aerospace shipments were declining at a rate of approximately 2 percent per year, commercial aerospace shipments increased more than I I percent per year. This counter-cyclical characteristic of the industry has disappeared. In 1992, civil orders represented 62 percent of the industry's total order backlog - down from 65 percent in 199 1. The civil sector is facing the cumulative effect of the worldwide economic downturn and a decline in global airline passenger traffic. Airline traffic reached its peak of 466 million passengers in 1990. Thereafter, a series of events began which severely damaged the economic underpinning of the industry. The Persian Gulf crisis and the worldwide recession caused airlines' loss of $13 billion between 1990 and 1993. This weak financial performance of the airline industry has, in turn, affected aerospace equipment orders and shipments during 1992 and into 1993.

The downturn in the industry is reflected in a severe decline in employment. Between 1989 and 1993, total aerospace industry employment fell from 912,000 to 615,000, according to Bureau of Labor statistics (Figure 20-2). Total aerospace employment declined between December 1989 and June 1993 at an average rate of almost 6,000 jobs per month. Layoffs have occurred in both the commercial and military sectors. Capacity utilization for the industry, as calculated by the Federal Reserve, fell from 85 percent in mid- 1990 to only 69 percent by May 1993. As long as capacity utilization remains low, prospects for reversing or stabilizing employment trends remain poor.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

The U.S. aerospace industry faces increasing international challenges as well. While the United States retains both market and technology leadership within the global aerospace industry, its position has eroded. In 1970, the United States led the global aerospace market with a share of almost 80 percent (excluding the former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON, a group of nations led by the former Soviet Union). In 1993, U.S. aerospace shipments still led the world, but had shrunk to less than 60 percent of the worldwide market. This decline reflects the success of other countries in their efforts to foster the development and growth of their national aerospace industries, particularly Europe. Many foreign governments have ambitious plans for developing competitive aerospace industries and support the growth of these industries with subsidies for product development and production. Foreign governments have required U.S. aerospace companies to provide offsets and technology transfers and made sales contingent upon their own firms supplying some of the components. In addition, some governments have encouraged consolidation and cooperation among domestic companies to reduce competition within their borders, enabling their firms to compete more effectively with established U.S. companies (Figure 20-3).

Europe provides the most formidable competition to the U.S. aerospace industry. According to European Community (EC) statistics, the EC aerospace industry grew almost twice as fast as the U.S. industry during the period 1978-1989. In 1990, the EC industry was nearly half the size of the U.S. industry. The emergence of the Airbus Industrie consortium, composed of the member governments of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain, is primarily responsible for the erosion of global U.S. market share. Since its inception, Airbus has received an estimated $26 billion, including interest, in direct government supports to assist in the development of its fleet of aircraft. Historically, U.S. companies have not received government assistance. European governments also support their commercial space, smaller aircraft, rotorcraft, engine, and parts industries.

Most individual EC governments have encouraged concentration in their aerospace industries, leading to diversified, national monoliths such as Deutsche Aerospace (Germany), Aerospatiale (France), Alenia (Italy), Fokker (Netherlands), and British Aerospace (U.K.). Even though Deutsche Aerospace privatized their operations in 1992 and Aerospatiale has been offered by the French government as a candidate for future privatization, the trend toward intra-EC ventures will continue to lead to even larger industry consortiums as the EC governments work to integrate their economies. An example is the recent takeover of Fokker by Deutsche Aerospace, with a possible further consolidation with Aerospatiale and Alenia's regional jet programs, the ATR-42 and the ATR-72.

In the future, Japan will become a more significant competitor in several segments of the industry. Small by global standards, the Japanese aerospace industry production totaled only $8.5 billion in 1991, but the industry has grown at a rate of 9 percent a year since 1984. Targeted by the Japanese government, aerospace research and development efforts have focused on aircraft fuselage and systems components, electronics, high-speed propulsion systems, and space launch vehicles. Japan's growth in the aerospace industry stems from its partnerships and cooperative ventures with Western aerospace companies, most notably Boeing. These partnerships enabled Japanese aerospace output to grow from less than $1 billion in 1970 to more than $8.5 billion by 1991. Japan, a "program partner" in the new Boeing 777 aircraft, already possesses much of the expertise needed to produce a world-class aircraft of its own design in the future. In fact, discussions are underway for Boeing to assist its Japanese suppliers in building an 80-seat jetliner, the YSX.

China also has become a major market for U.S. aerospace products. In 1992, U.S. aerospace exports to China totalled over $2 billion. More than 40,000 U.S. aerospace jobs are estimated to have been created as a result of trade with China. It is estimated that China will need more than $40 billion in new aircraft over the next 20 years, making China one of the brighter spots in today's aerospace market. China's market remains fragile, as does its foreign relations with the United States, but the market potential is promising. China also plans to build an indigenous aerospace industry and will become both a growing subcontractor and competitor in segments of the aerospace industry, especially in lower-cost military and commuter aircraft.

The new spirit of international cooperation prevalent in the Russian aerospace industry presents both opportunities and challenges for the U.S. industry. A market that contains the world's largest airline, largest space industry, and greatest pent-up consumer demand certainly provides new long-term opportunities for U.S. aerospace companies. It is estimated that the former Soviet market will require 2,000 new aircraft for domestic service and 250 aircraft for international routes during the next 18 years. Yet it also presents the challenge of new competition. An example is the 1993 roll-out and first flight of the IL-96M, a four-engine, long-range aircraft. While the IL-96M will be powered by U.S.-built Pratt & Whitney engines and fitted with U.S. advanced avionics, it will compete with the McDonnell Douglas' MD-11 and Boeing's future 777 twin-engine aircraft. Another recent product of Russian aerospace collaboration with the West is Tupolev's TU-204, a mid-range, 200-seater twin jet airliner with Rolls-Royce engines designed to compete against the Boeing 757. Prior to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Soviet aerospace factories produced at least as many aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft as the United States. Today, most of these facilities are operating at less than 30 percent capacity. Desire for new orders for those factories, for technology, and for hard currency will force the industries of the former Soviet republics to both collaborate and compete in the international market. These factors play a key role in Russia's future participation in the Space Station. In September 1993, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to the construction of a space station blending elements from the U.S. Freedom and Russian Mir projects.

Other countries also seek larger shares of the global aerospace industry, including: Canada, Brazil, Indonesia, Sweden, South Korea, Israel, and Australia.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE

The aerospace industry has made great strides in addressing environmental problems which are aircraft related. Today, on take-off and landing, a jetliner produces less than one-quarter of the pollutants produced by a 1960's transport. Noise abatement also has been a major concern. By the year 2000, most of the commercial jet aircraft will meet stringent Stage 3 noise standards even though this will mean the retirement of many aircraft before the end of their functional lifespan. Hughes Aircraft has developed partnerships with local governments in Southern California, working to reduce the region's problem with smog. Boeing, Hughes, IBM, Autoclave Engineers Group, and five national laboratories are leading a large research and development cooperative to find more environmentally sound processing techniques for aerospace materials including reducing the volatile organic compounds used in paints, coatings, and solvents. Environmental concerns now are considered at the earliest stages of designing an aircraft.

Pratt & Whitney, General Dynamics, Hercules, and many others have major campaigns to eliminate wastes produced in the production of aircraft parts and aircraft engines. In many cases, wastes have been reduced 60 to 90 percent. Aerospace companies have recognized that they have valuable technologies to supply to the global environmental marketplace. Several companies have formed environmental subsidiaries, such as General Dynamic's Environmental Sciences and Technologies, Lockheed's Environmental Systems & Technology Company, and Hughes' Environmental Systems, to develop and market environmental products worldwide. As traditional markets shrink, aerospace companies are expected to diversify further into the environmental technology industry.

The cost of environment requirements is becoming a competitive concern. McDonnell Douglas estimates that costs related to safety, health, and environmental requirements in California alone have more than doubled since 1986. Business planning has become more difficult and time consuming in order to meet constantly changing environmental regulations. In addition to increasing production costs resulting from U.S. regulations, disparity in costs related to international environmental standards among nations could place U.S. manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage in the near future. The U.S. aerospace industry is urging negotiated international standards.

Outlook for 1994

U.S. aerospace sales should continue to decline in 1994. From January through June 1993, new aerospace orders were 24 percent lower than orders during the same period of 1992. Although the aerospace manufacturers' backlog remains quite large ($202 million), it has gradually declined since its peak in March 1991. Between the end of 1991 and the end of 1992, the backlog declined nearly 9 percent. Between January and June 1993, the backlog declined by more than 4 percent. As a result, aircraft manufacturers have been forced to reduce their production rates. For example, Boeing will cut its production of jetliners by one-third from January 1993 to mid-1994 - a reduction of almost 50 percent from peak production levels of early 1992. Defense spending as a share of U.S. gross domestic product will be about 3 percent, the lowest level of the post-world War II period and half of what it was in the mid-1980's. With economic uncertainty restricting aftermarket purchases of spares, engine and parts suppliers in both military and civil segments of the industry will decline as well. Defense cutbacks have curtailed demand in the missile segment. U.S. space vehicle manufacturers will see an increase in commercial launches in 1994 due in part to long delays in launch schedules during 1993.

U.S. aerospace industry shipments will total about $102 billion in 1994. Aircraft production will continue to lead the industry with shipments of $42 billion. Shipments of engines and engine parts (SIC 3724) will fall to $17 billion, and shipments of aircraft parts (SIC 3728) will decline to $16 billion. Shipments of guided missiles and space vehicles (SIC 376) will increase 2 percent to $22 billion. Employment in that sector will decline 4 percent.

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U.S. aerospace export sales, including avionics and flight simulators, are forecast to decline to about $35 billion in 1994, but will remain stronger than domestic sales (Table 1). More than 40 percent of the existing aerospace backlog is from foreign customers. Imports will also decline in 1994 to about $11 billion (Table 2). Imports will be driven primarily by increased shipments of Airbus Industrie aircraft to U.S. airlines. Aerospace companies will continue to cut back on employment as military programs are delayed or terminated.

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Long-term Prospects

The trend toward continued reductions in defense spending is forcing the industry into a major restructuring. The preliminary I)OD budget projects a 7 percent decline in military spending in 1994. The Pentagon's bottom-up review process has focused on additional reordering of priorities. The industry will continue to consolidate operations and reduce R&D and capital investment. Layoffs are expected to continue at approximately the same rate as defense procurement reductions - about 7 percent in 1994 - but the rate will slow as the major effects of reform are concluded by the mid-1990's. As this restructuring represents a fundamental change in the way the industry operates, only minor cyclical employment increases are anticipated in the future.

Commercial aircraft long-term prospects are more positive, but still uncertain. A strong world economy and recovery from the 1990-1993 global recession would ensure continued steady demand for airline, corporate, and general aviation aircraft and equipment. The introduction of a high-speed civil transport (HSCT) - an aircraft that can fly at speeds two to three times the speed of sound and have a range of 5,000-6,000 nautical miles - could have a major impact on the aircraft industry in the early 21st century. The expanding economies of Asia and the Pacific Rim also will significantly influence industry sales. Space exploration and commercialization face unreliable government funding and uncertain commercial demand. A successful conclusion of multilateral negotiations to reduce government supports to international aerospace industries would help level the playing field for U.S. manufacturers.

AIRCRAFT

The large civil transport sector includes all passenger and cargo aircraft weighing more than 15,000 kilograms, typically two- and four-engine jetliners. In contrast to the booming production rates and bursting order books of the late 1980's, the large transport industry is adjusting itself to lower demand and declining orders from the airline industry, reduced production of narrow-body and wide-body aircraft, and fierce competition from Europe.

Large Transport Sector Restructuring Continues

The future prospects for the large civil aircraft sector are mixed. Defense cuts continue to have a significant impact. U.S. military aircraft shipments, which long comprised a significant share of U.S. aircraft manufacturing, declined after reaching a record of $24 billion in 1987. Military aircraft shipments dropped to $8.4 billion in 1993 (Table 3). Boeing sells 20 percent of its products, by value, and McDonnell Douglas sells 60 percent of its products, to the U.S. Government, almost all of it to the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Exports are crucial to both companies. Boeing exports 55 percent of its aircraft and McDonnell Douglas exports approximately 25 percent of its products. Therefore, the significant reductions in DOD and foreign government military aircraft procurements, as well as the global recession, have affected the two U.S. aircraft manufacturers.

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In the past, business on the commercial side has compensated for the cuts in defense. However, the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf, combined with the worldwide recession, stymied growth in airline traffic. Although international traffic recovered during 1992, and U.S. domestic traffic was stimulated by significant price discounting, the airline industry remained in dire financial straits. From 1990-93, the U.S. airline industry lost $13 billion and is only now showing signs of partial, fitful, and inadequate recovery. After a decade of growth in the 1980's, these recent losses contributed to large-scale layoffs by airlines, aircraft manufacturers, and suppliers. While deregulation fostered increased price competition among airlines, the economic downturn and slowdown in traffic reduced or even eliminated profit margins in the short-term for many carriers, with some companies declaring bankruptcy. Braniff, Eastern, and Pan Am went out of business. Numerous smaller airlines such as Air Florida, People Express, and Ozark have merged or disappeared while others such, as TWA, Northwest, and Continental are close to emerging or have recently emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

To help address these problems, President Clinton created the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry on April 7, 1993. The Commission's mandate was to investigate, study, and make policy recommendations about the financial health and future competitiveness of the U.S. airline and aerospace industries. The report summarizing the Commission's findings was released on August 19, 1993. Key recommendations contained in this report include: 1) creation of an independent Federal corporate entity within the Department of Transportation (DOT) to manage air traffic control and related functions; 2) establishment a financial advisory committee to review the financial condition of individual airlines; 3) negotiation of multilateral agreements for passenger and cargo services, replacing the current system of bilateral agreements; 4) permit foreign investors to hold up to 49 percent voting equity in U.S. airlines; 5) increase Export-Import Bank funding levels for large and small aircraft; and 6) enactment of a statute of repose for general aviation aircraft which would limit the liability of manufacturers of these air-craft to 15 years from the date of manufacture. The Commission made over 60 specific recommendations, but its omissions were equally significant. The Commission did not recommend major revisions to the present deregulated structure or suggest increased U.S. Government supports or loan guarantees for the purchase or retrofitting of aircraft to meet Stage 3 aircraft noise standards. The Commission reasoned that although the U.S. International Airline Transport Association projected U.S. airline losses of $2 billion in 1993, airline over-expansion and aircraft over-capacity need to be addressed through market forces.

In addition to U.S. airline losses, international airlines are facing the difficulties of both a sluggish world economy and the competitive challenges derived from increased deregulation and international competition. This combination of events has led to restructuring policies by airlines, a slowdown in aircraft orders, and order deferrals. As a result, aircraft manufacturers have had to cut production rates of most models and are often confronted with unsold or "white tail" aircraft produced without a firm customer. These disruptions have undercut manufacturers' efforts to adjust to the defense cuts by transferring employees from defense to commercial product lines. At this time, both segments of the industry remain in a recession. Even significant international customers, such as the leasing company Guinness Peat Aviation Group of Ireland, have been forced to restructure in order to avoid bankruptcy and are canceling or rescheduling orders.

Strong competition from the European-based Airbus Industrie is further exacerbating the effects of lower demand. While U.S. aircraft manufacturers maintain 65 percent of the current world backlog of firm orders for large aircraft (Boeing with 56 percent and McDonnell Douglas with 9 percent), Airbus has established a firm control of the number 2 position with 34 percent and other European manufacturers with 1 percent. Helping to increase the pressure on the U.S. companies, Airbus introduced several new aircraft models over the last 2 years: the A340 in October 1991, the A330 in October 1992, and the A321 in May 1993. Airbus also announced its intention to launch a 130-seat derivative of the A320 - the A319 - in 1993. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have introduced their own new aircraft models: Boeing will deliver its first 777 aircraft, a twin-engine long-range jet, in May 1995, and has announced its intention to upgrade the line of 737 aircraft; McDonnell Douglas will deliver its first MD-90, a narrow-body, low-noise level aircraft, in October 1994. During 1993, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas exported 275 large transport aircraft valued at $19.5 billion, and were the most significant contributors to the trade performance of the U.S. aerospace industry. The value of large civil transport exports are expected to fall 29 percent in 1994; imports will rise 1 percent.

All of these factors have affected the two U.S. producers. Both McDonnell Douglas and Boeing have announced reduced production rates for their aircraft and have had to resort to layoffs. Boeing announced planned layoffs of 28,000 workers for 1993 and first half of 1994. By June 1993, McDonnell Douglas had trimmed its workforce by almost 59,000 or 44 percent below the peak levels of June 1990.

Foreign Markets Are Source of Future Growth

To help stem the tide of this declining demand and overcapacity, U.S. manufacturers are looking to Asia to provide future growth markets and partnerships for increasing their competitiveness. McDonnell Douglas has increased its ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1992, McDonnell Douglas successfully concluded a contract with the PRC to produce 40 narrow-body aircraft as part of their "trunkliner" program - 35 were previously co-produced with the PRC. Boeing has made their three major Japanese suppliers "program partners" on the 777, and is also expanding its relationships with smaller Asian countries like Taiwan. This region of the world is attracting U.S. aircraft manufacturers with access to inexpensive capital, high quality manufacturing, and lower production costs.

Over the long-term, this segment of the aerospace industry should see increased growth. Demand in world commercial markets, particularly the expanding economies of Asia and the Pacific Rim, is expected to show increases over the next 10 to 15 years. In fact, the larger share of the commercial transport market is now overseas. The U.S. share, as a percentage of the world market, will shrink. Airline traffic, especially international traffic, is expected to show strong growth throughout the rest of the decade and the industry expects to deliver more than 14,000 aircraft over the next 20 years. Many new commercial sales are expected to come from the replacement of older, less fuel-efficient aircraft that will not meet airlines' requirements or federal and international noise and emissions standards.

Widebody, long-range aircraft, those targeted for the fast-growing international markets in Asia, will experience the most growth. Industry forecasts predict annual deliveries of about 225 long-range aircraft in 2011, compared with only 129 per year in 1992. In this product segment, the U.S.-made aircraft, the Boeing 747 and the Douglas MD-11, are competing against the A340, which is Airbus' first entrant into the long-range market.

The U.S. industry will continue to confront fierce competition from Airbus Industrie. However, there are indications that the U.S. and EC aerospace industries may be able to cooperate in the future. One example is the joint feasibility study being conducted by Boeing and the four major European aircraft manufacturers (Aerospatiale, Deutsche Aerospace, British Aerospace and CASA) to determine the potential market for a Very Large Commercial Transport (VLCT) that would carry more than 600 passengers over long-range routes. A second example is the bilateral and multilateral negotiations to reduce the level of government supports provided to the aerospace industry. On July 17, 1992, the U.S. Government and the European Commission signed a bilateral agreement which restricts government supports provided to the large civil aircraft sector. Specifically, the agreement prohibits all production supports and sets limits of 33 percent on the level of permissible government funding for new aircraft programs (down from 70 to 90 percent of existing Airbus aircraft). This agreement is viewed by the U.S. Government and the domestic aerospace industry as a critical step in leveling the competitive playing field for U.S. large transport manufacturers who have suffered significantly from the competition of government-supported Airbus. Multilateral negotiations, which are focusing on broadening the product and country coverage of the bilateral agreement, began in July 1992 and are expected to continue at least through 1993. As part of these negotiations, the United States is seeking to strengthen the disciplines in the bilateral agreement by further reducing the level of government support allowed on new aircraft programs and adopting a stronger dispute settlement mechanism. The U.S. Government and the European Commission are also holding consultations to monitor and enforce each party's adherence to the 1992 bilateral agreement.

Aircraft Engine Manufacturers Invest for the Future

The aircraft engine (SIC 3724) and aircraft parts (3728) industries face the same challenges confronting the U.S. large aircraft manufacturers. In 1993, U.S. manufacturers of aircraft engines, engine parts, and aircraft parts shipped an estimated $41 billion of products and employed 236,400 workers. This is down from shipments of $47.4 billion and employment of 276,000 in 1992. Shipments for this sector are expected to fall 18 percent in 1994 to $33.4 billion.

The recent deferrals and cancellations of aircraft orders by the airlines have directly affected the engine orders associated with those aircraft. The worldwide backlog of orders for civil turbofan engines stood at 5,800 at the beginning of 1992, but declining production rates at Boeing and McDonnell Douglas will stretch that backlog out several years. Therefore, the engine companies have been forced to restructure while they continue to invest heavily in the development of new products and technologies to take advantage of the recovery when it finally comes. All three major engine companies - General Electric (GE) and United Technologies' Pratt & Whitney (P&W) division in the United States, and Rolls Royce in the United Kingdom - are in the midst of costly programs to develop new engines to power the next generation of widebody aircraft. GE is investing in the GE90, Rolls Royce is working on the Trent and P&W on the PW4000.

Aerospace suppliers of aircraft structures, systems, and components also face the same problems and are undergoing an unprecedented consolidation with many companies destined to exit the industry ranks for good. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have concentrated their purchases on a smaller number of high-quality suppliers. In 1992, the number of aerospace/defense suppliers dwindled to about 30,000 companies, down from 120,000 in the mid-1980's. More than 60 percent of the value of each U.S. aircraft is produced by subcontractors. Fuselage, wing, and empennage structures, hydraulic, electrical, pneumatic, and environmental systems, avionics, composite structures, and assorted other parts are manufactured by thousands of other U.S. and foreign suppliers to the prime aircraft manufacturers.

These consolidations translate into job losses. All three of the big aircraft engine manufacturers have announced workforce reductions. P&W is cutting its peak 1991 workforce of 44,000 down to 30,000, while GE is reducing its payroll from 36,000 to 30,000. Rolls Royce is shrinking its workforce by 10 percent. Similar reductions are expected from the large suppliers of aircraft systems, such as Raytheon, GM-Hughes, Martin Marietta, Allied Signal, and TRW. Employment in the U.S. aircraft engines and engine parts (SIC 3724) and aircraft parts (SIC 3728) sectors fell 16 percent between 1990 and 1992. Long-ten,n prospects are for continued declines on the military side and stabilizing employment on the commercial side.

In spite of the reduced demand, the U.S. engine segment is maintaining its global market position in the face of difficult economic conditions and foreign competition. Profit margins for new engines have been squeezed by the present perilous state of airline finances. In addition, since airlines fly less and require fewer spare engines in a recession, the engine manufacturers' lucrative spare parts business has been adversely affected.

Aircraft parts suppliers face the additional challenge of further globalization of large transport aircraft. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas gradually have increased the foreign content of their aircraft. For example, the percentage of foreign products (excluding the engines) installed on the Boeing 727, launched in 1959, was approximately 2 percent. Foreign products (excluding the engines) installed on the 767, launched in 1978, represent closer to 15 percent, and on the 777, launched in 1990, it may be almost 30 percent. For McDonnell Douglas, foreign products (excluding the engines) range from 15 to 20 percent of the aircraft value on the MD-11 and MD80/90, up significantly from the content on the older DC-9 and DC-10.

The huge costs and risks, coupled with long lead times of developing new engines, have forced engines manufacturers to rely increasingly on international collaboration with foreign manufacturers. This approach has led to a maze of interlocking relationships involving shared responsibilities for a variety of production and research programs. GE and the French state-owned engine manufacturer SNECMA have been collaborating for two decades on civil engines, such as the CFM-56, CF6-80, and GE90. P&W has forged a strategic alliance with Motoren und Turbinen Union (MTU), the German engine manufacturer part of Daimler-Benz's Deutsche Aerospace subsidiary. The International Aero Engine (IAE) consortium, consisting of Rolls Royce, P&W, MTU, Fiat, and the Japanese Aero Engines Corporation (JAEC), produced the V2500 engine. Antitrust laws have prevented the two U.S. engine manufacturers from collaborating with each other on specific products, but they have joined forces in high-speed propulsion research. Rolls-Royce has also been increasing its collaborative ventures with Japanese manufacturers taking a 7.5 percent stake in the Trent engine.

General Aviation and Helicopter Sectors

Manufacturers in the general aviation and helicopter sectors produce fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft for business transportation, regional airline service, recreation, specialized uses (such as ambulance and agricultural spraying), and training. During 1993, the general aviation and helicopter segments shared an uncertain domestic demand, a short-term drop in international demand, and growing international competition. Modest growth is anticipated for these segments in 1994. Shipments of general aviation airplanes should increase from 710 units in 1993 to 730 in 1994, as the domestic and international markets for the higher volume piston-powered segments recover from the economic downturn. Improved corporate profitability will drive growth in the higher value turbine segments, ensuring an increase in the dollar value of shipments by about 3.6 percent.

Aerospatiale of France plans to assemble general aviation aircraft in the United States, but has not yet started production. Demand for piston aircraft could be stimulated in 1994 if Congress enacts product liability legislation, as recommended by the National Airline Commission. High liability costs for owners and manufacturers of U.S.-produced small airplanes have been a major contributor to the sector's decade-long slump.

U.S.-manufactured turboprop and turbofan airplanes, used primarily in corporate fleets, account for more than 90 percent of the dollar value of fixed-wing general aviation shipments. The corporate market should begin to recover in 1994 from the continued economic uncertainty among U.S. and international corporate buyers. Production in the corporate turboprop segment declined during 1993 while production of business jets remained stable. As corporate profitability recovers, and orders for new aircraft rise, production rates during 1994 should increase as well.

Piston-powered helicopters accounted for almost 72 percent of all U.S. commercial unit shipments in 1992, dropping to 68 percent in the first half of 1993. International customers were a major driving force prior to 1993, but growing economic uncertainty in key markets (such as Germany and Asia) depressed this sector's production. Recovery in domestic and foreign markets during 1994 should reestablish the segment's production rates.

Exports and new products are sustaining the market for turbine helicopter manufacturers. Expansion of offshore operations for oil and gas exploration failed to materialize in 1992 and 1993 as expected, in addition to the falloff in the corporate market. Only slight growth in the international oil industry is expected and the slow recovery of the corporate market indicate a moderate increase in shipments during 1994.

U.S. factories produce about 60 percent of the value of the world's general aviation aircraft, but less than 30 percent for helicopters. France is the major competitor for U.S. companies in all but the piston helicopter segment. State-owned Aerospatiale produces single-engine piston aircraft, large regional turboprops, and business jets. Canada, the United Kingdom, and Italy also have competitive companies in these segments. Many smaller countries have small piston aircraft industries based mainly on U.S.-licensed products. U.S. companies produce few aircraft in the regional airliner segment, the largest part, in dollars, of the general aviation industry. As a result, the United States continues to record trade deficits in this sector, forecast to be $910 million in 1994.

In the area of new technology development, DOD is reassessing the Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey for medium-lift capability. The Osprey is a vertical take-off and landing aircraft, which can fly as fast as a conventional fixed-wing aircraft. The potential export market is significant, but customers are waiting for cost and safety experience from the military for this new technology. Efforts are currently underway in both Europe and Japan to develop tilt-rotor aircraft.

Military Aircraft Sector

U.S. military aircraft manufacturers shipped only $8.4 billion in complete aircraft in 1993 and are downsizing to adapt to the worldwide decline in defense spending for aircraft. U.S. manufacturers expect to ship only 540 aircraft or $7.9 billion in sales in 1994, less than half the number shipped in 1987. Historically, the U.S. Government accounted for 80 percent of military aircraft sales. DOD's Foreign Military Sales program and direct exports of military aircraft, have accounted for the remaining 20 percent. The reduced threat from the former Soviet Union has made defense spending a significant target for budget cuts. Although the United States has become the world's largest arms exporter with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international market for aircraft has decreased as well. The latest Pentagon budget request indicated a cumulative real decline in DOD budget authority of more than 40 percent since 1985. The 1994 budget request also projects a 7 percent reduction in procurement funds. While procurement of aircraft has declined significantly, research, development, testing, and evaluation funding has remained stable, providing some haven for U.S. providers of advanced military aircraft technologies.

The budget cuts have hit all military aircraft: fixed-wing and helicopter, combat and transport, as well as production and development programs, resulting in cancellations and delays. DOD canceled the Navy A-12 attack fighter in 1991 after schedule delays, cost overruns, and technical problems. Programs such as the Army's RAH-66 light helicopter and the Air Force's F-22 fighter, B-2 strategic bomber, and C-17 transport, have been funded at levels lower than originally planned. Total C- 17 procurement may be cut or procurement schedules stretched out. While the C-17 program has suffered from cost overruns and technical problems in the past, 1993 was a turning point for the program. The C-17 survived heavy Congressional scrutiny and a successful resolution of the technical problems is expected.

Lost jobs are the ultimate price of defense cuts. Defense firms have cut hundreds of thousands of jobs over the past 5 years, and military aircraft companies are no exception. During 1992 alone, the prime military aircraft manufacturers, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Northrop, Lockheed, Rockwell, and Grumman, cut more than 29,000 jobs. These same companies have announced plans to cut another 20,000 jobs during 1993-94. In the first half of 1993, aerospace employment declined at a 15 percent rate with commercial employment declining faster than military. Unlike past business cycles, the commercial sector is not able to absorb job losses in the military aircraft sector. As the restructuring winds down, the rate of job loss is expected to slow to between 5 and 10 percent in 1994. Increases in employment may not occur until the second half of this decade.

Exports provide little buffer from domestic spending cuts. Global defense spending is on the decline everywhere. U.S. manufacturers are finding it more difficult to compete in the European defense market as Europe's own military aircraft industry has been consolidated in an attempt to hold on to a larger share of declining local markets and to maintain a viable European defense industrial base.

Overcapacity resulting from years of Cold War production is intensifying competition worldwide. In 1990, U.S. manufacturers produced only about one-third of the world's military aircraft. Russia, the Ukraine, and other newly independent states produced thousands of military aircraft. Now operating at production rates less than one-third of capacity, these facilities in the former Soviet Union are scrambling for international sales. Both new and used MIG aircraft are being offered in aircraft competitions around the world. Other major competitors, such as France and the United Kingdom, are struggling to find international customers for their aircraft. China, Brazil, Italy, Taiwan, and Sweden are developing or producing fighters for international sales. Sales that are being made are often at break-even prices and require substantial concessions such as offsets and technology transfer. Most of the 1994 U.S. military exports will be helicopters as the need for sophisticated, front-line fighters decreases. The recent arms build-up in the Persion Gulf region is coming to an end and the latest reduction in tensions between Israel and its neighbors will continue to reduce the need for new front-line fighters.

MISSILES AND SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Shipments of U.S. missile systems, space launch vehicles, and related equipment are forecast to increase at a real rate of nearly 3 percent in 1994. Defense cutbacks and continued decline in the aerospace industry has curtailed demand in the missile segment which is forecast to increase by only 2 percent. The space launch industry will increase commercial launches in 1994 due in part to long delays in launch schedules during 1993.

Missile Systems

In the wake of the cold war, Pentagon officials are shifting priorities away from nuclear weaponry and toward missile systems that will provide enhanced strategic conventional capability. New weapons programs in missiles and space will focus on U.S. ability to deter or win regional, non-nuclear conflicts. The President's budget request for fiscal year (FY) 1994 includes procurement of 24 Trident II nuclear missiles at a cost of more than $1.1 billion.

Improvements to the U.S. missile and space arsenal will highlight capabilities for precision strikes on command and control centers and knocking down enemy tactical ballistic missiles. Smarter and more lethal systems that increase standoff attack capabilities, such as the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile (TSSAM), will also take priority. Requested FY94 funding for initial procurement of the TSSAM was $195 million, while research and test outlays for the program are $433 million.

The Army and Navy are seeking to develop deep-strike missile systems to engage enemy targets quickly and improve reaction times. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a ground-based, deep-strike system that would coincide with Air Force attack capabilities. The Pentagon requested $144 million in the FY94 budget to procure 255 ATACMs. The Navy relies on its Tomahawk cruise missile for precision strikes against targets deep in enemy territory. The Navy plans to procure 216 Tomahawks in FY94 at a cost of $248 million.

On the defensive side of missile procurement, high priority will be given to ground-based Anti-tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBM) and theater missile defensive systems over space-based interceptors. The FY94 budget request for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) remained at the same $3.8 billion funding level of 1993. Funding for Theater High-altitude Area Defense Missile (THAAD) and the Patriot/ERNT programs will receive priority under the new plan, while the Brilliant Pebbles program will be scaled back from $219 million in FY93 to $73 million in FY94, mainly for research and development.

The Defense Department requested $484 million for the THAAD system, built by the Lockheed Corp., which will use a kinetic kill missile with a range of more than 100 miles. Israel is working on an ATBM system called the Arrow. Developed with DOD funding by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), the Arrow is still in the testing phase. The United States has allocated $461 million to the Arrow program. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended tighter cost controls over the program with clear and definable performance targets. The Russians have developed a similar ATBM system which is called the Alamaz S-300OPMU (SA-Grumble). European governments have not decided whether they will develop an independent ATBM system or participate in one of the systems already in the design phase. Concern over fielding effective ATBM systems has increased as North Korea and China are believed to have stepped up sales of their respective Scud-C and M-11 missiles to Iran and Pakistan.

In the air-to-air missile category, the Defense Department has requested a major procurement of 749 AMRAAM missiles for $510 million in the F-Y94 budget. The Pentagon also will spend more than $20 million for modification/upgrades to the AIM-9 Sidewinder and nearly $36 million to improve the Sparrow missile.

Overall, 1994 DOD missile outlays are expected to increase by 2 percent, followed by cuts of 2 percent and 3 percent in 1995 and 1996, respectively.

The export market will become increasingly competitive in 1994 as European and Russian manufacturers compete with U.S. companies for shrinking defense spending overseas. Sales of U.S. missile systems (SIC 3761) through Foreign Military Sales programs reached an estimated $338 million in 1993, down significantly from $599 million in 1992. Air-to-air missiles represent the majority of this market. The United States has led this market in the past as foreign buyers looked to equip American-made fighters with U.S. missiles. The French MICA and Russian built AS-12 air-to-air missiles now pose a challenge to U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM as well as the popular Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles. Unfortunately for U.S. suppliers, Israel has decided not to purchase the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) in 1994 fearing similar escalating purchases by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Israel will rely on upgrades to the existing AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.

Several European missile manufacturers are expected to merge in 1994-95 to compete with larger and already consolidated U.S. companies. Shrinking defense budgets in Europe are expected to result in the consolidation of missile manufactures to benefit from joint R&D and economies of scale in production for European, U.S., and export market sales. Paris-based Matra-Hachette and the U.k.'s British Aerospace are contemplating the first move. British Aerospace was selected in 1992 to build the European Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM).

Space Launch Vehicles

The international market for commercial launch services for medium and large geosynchronous communications satellites declined from 14 launches in 1992 to 9 launches in 1993 due to delays in launch schedules. Geosynchronous, also known as geostationary, refers to satellites that travel at the same speed as the earth's rotation so the satellite appears to remain in the same place. The market is forecast to double in 1994 with 18 commercial launches scheduled. The actual number may be less if launch service companies are again unable to meet their aggressive schedules.

After 5 years of competing for commercial launch services, U.S. providers General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas are holding on to a 36 percent share of the international market. The French/European consortium, Arianespace, had 7 launches on its manifest for 1993 and plans 10 launches in 1994. Arianespace controlled 62 percent of the large geosynchronous (GEO) commercial market in 1993. Arianespace currently has a launch backlog of 39 satellites worth approximately $3 billion. China's Long March Industry Corporation launched two commercial payloads in 1993 and has two launches on its manifest in 1994.

Commercial launch manifests for 1994 are crowded due to several launch failures in 1993. The failures caused long delays in international launch schedules as investigators determined causes and rockets lay idle awaiting green lights or modifications. Although expected launch rates may double in 1994, U.S. commercial launch providers still face another year of flat demand for satellite launch services. The demand for commercial launches of medium and large communications satellites leveled off at about 10 to 14 per year and is projected to remain that way for the next 5 years. The initial surge in demand for Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) caused by the 1986 Challenger disaster, and aided by the U.S. Government policy shift to dedicated launch vehicles, has subsided. Commercial launch service providers have since caught up with the backlog of commercial and military launches. Launch capacity will continue to exceed demand over the next 5 years as more international players enter the already crowded market for commercial launch services.

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) licensed four large vehicle launches for geosynchronous communications satellites in 1993 and one launch for a Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) experimental satellite. The communications satellite launches include two UHF satellites, the NATO IVB satellite, and the Telstar 401 satellite. Four of the five GEO launches were set for December 1993.

The Government remains the largest consumer of U.S. space launch services, albeit a declining one. DOD, NASA, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have had a joint requirement for about a dozen expendable launch vehicles per year, two or three of which are procured commercially, plus another three to four small orbital or suborbital launches. However, the declining strategic military threat and concomitant decline in defense spending has resulted in a downward revision in DOD's launch plans. Previously, the U.S. Government used refurbished strategic missiles to meet some of its medium-and large-capacity launch requirements. A DOD directive now prohibits this practice because it unfairly competed with private U.S. launch services.

The United States lofted 14 expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and 8 Space Shuttle missions from Cape Canaveral, Fla., and 4 ELVs from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in 1992. The French company Arianespace launched seven Ariane-4 boosters from Kourou in French Guiana. Russia conducted 33 launches from Plesetsk and 21 from the Baikanour Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. The People's Republic of China conducted two launches out of Jiquan in addition to two flights of the Long March ELV from Xichang. Japan and India each launched one rocket.

U.S. commercial launch service providers will face increasingly fierce foreign competition in 1994. The European Space Agency is testing its next generation of the Ariane booster, the Ariane V, which will be able to put three medium-size satellites or several small satellites into orbit with a single launch at a reduced cost. In January 1993, the U.S. Government approved Lockheed Corp.'s request to enter into a joint venture with Russia's Khrunichev Enterprise, maker of the Proton launch vehicle. The new company, called Lockheed Khrunichev Energiya or LKE, will provide marketing and integration support for the Russian-made Proton. Negotiations to allow the launch of Western communications satellites on the Proton were completed in 1993 allowing Russia eight GEO launches through the year 2000. Launch prices for Russian ELVS are required to meet a 7.5 percent threshold below the lowest Western bid for a given contract. Proton launches to low earth orbit (LEO) will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Russia has already received U.S. permission to launch a satellite for the international consortium INMARSAT. The Proton is currently the most powerful commercial ELV in the world with the ability to loft several small communications satellites to low earth orbit or two large satellites to geosynchronous orbit. The PRC, originally expected to capture a limited share of the market, has had difficulties winning launch contracts. China's 1989 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the United States allowing the Chinese to launch nine satellites over 6 years expires at the end of 1994. Negotiations are expected to resume in 1994 to renegotiate a follow-up agreement to the 1989 MOA.

The trend towards larger vehicles, with dramatically increased lift capabilities such as the Proton and Ariane V launch vehicles, is expected to curtail the number of commercial launches in coming years. The ability to launch multiple satellites on a single rocket could reduce demand for launch vehicles even in a growing market for satellite-based telecommunications, remote sensing, and direct broadcast services. Currently, the ability to "multiple-manifest" commercial launches for different customers remains largely unproven. Delivery lead times and changing launch schedules cause problems for customers and launch service providers. The ability to efficiently schedule and launch two GEO telecommunications satellites for different customers could prove to be a determining factor in lowering the cost per pound to orbit.

Developing the next generation U.S. launch vehicle remains a low funding priority in FY94. The President's budget proposal scales back funding for the Spacelifter program, delaying yet again the development of a new rocket to replace the nation's current stable of ELVS. The National Aerospace Plane (NASP) program was also the victim of tighter budgets. In FY94, the United States will reduce funding for research and development in space transportation technologies. Lack of support for developing a new vehicle was reflected in the Senate Armed Services Committee suggestion that DOD investigate the possibility of launching payloads on non-U.S. launch vehicles. The House version of the budget retained the requested $53.9 million for spacelifter and added $36.74 million to the NASP program.

Strides toward developing new single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) technology highlighted industry R&D efforts last year and work continues in 1994. On August 18, 1993, the McDonnell Douglas Delta Clipper Experimental (DC-X) SSTO vehicle made a successful hover test, rising 150 feet in the air, moving laterally 350 feet, and landing. The DC-X will test the SSTO concept to demonstrate the viability of leap-frogging ahead of foreign competition in the international launch services industry. The House Armed Services Committee requested $75 million in additional funding in FY94 to continue the DC-X program and build a larger version of the experimental vehicle. The House committee also recommended that the SSTO program be shifted from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).

NASA announced initial funding in both FY93 and FY94 for a four-phase study on developing new launch vehicles to meet expected demand in non-military launch markets. The work will be conducted by a consortium of five aerospace companies including Boeing, Martin Marietta, Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Rockwell International.

Although funding for the next generation of launch vehicles has not increased, the Department of Defense announced a winner in the hotly contested Medium Launch Vehicle three competition (MLV-3). In April of 1993, the McDonnell Douglas Delta II ELV was awarded the contract to launch replacement satellites for the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS). Under the new contract, the Air Force has options for 36 launches valued at over $1 billion. The contract calls for McDonnell Douglas to "launch on demand" within 40 days of an Air Force notice.

In 1994, the new and growing segment of the space transportation industry continues to be the small and medium launch vehicle industry. Small launch vehicles serve the market for light weight payloads (from a few hundred to 2,000 lbs) launched to low earth orbit or a sub-orbital micro-gravity applications. These payloads consist primarily of sub-orbital scientific micro-gravity experiments as well as small telecommunications satellites, commonly known as microsats or lightsats. Medium vehicles serve the small communications and remote sensing markets with lift capabilities from 3,000 to 6,000 pounds to low earth orbit.

Lockheed Corp. announced it will enter the market for launch vehicles capable of placing payloads into low earth orbit (LEO) with a family of rockets to debut in 1995. The French company, Aerospatiale, is also considering the small vehicle market using Russian propulsion units to develop new light weight vehicles capable of carrying single or multiple LEO payloads. These new vehicles would compete with Orbital Sciences Taurus ELV on the low end of lift capacity at approximately 3,200 lbs to LEO. McDonnell Douglas has also proposed a new launcher called the Delta-Lite which would compete in the high-end of the market at 5,000 lbs to LEO. EER's Conestoga rocket was scheduled to carry NASA's COMET reentry vehicle in the summer of 1993, but funding problems caused a delay and the launch date is undetermined.

Orbital Sciences Corp.'s winged Pegasus launch vehicle conducted four launches in 1993 including the launch of a small environmental satellite for Brazil. The Pegasus is currently launched from under the wing of an airborne B-52 aircraft, but will soon be paired with a converted commercial L-1011 aircraft owned by Orbital Sciences. The Pegasus satellite manifest for 1994 includes a number of Orbital Communications (ORBCOM) satellites that will create a global network for transferring data and typed messages.

Overall, demand for small-launch vehicles did not increase in 1993. However, many of the proposed global LEO telecommunications systems awaiting Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approval could significantly boost demand through the end of the decade. Most of the announced systems would use large ELVs to orbit initial systems and turn to LEO rockets for replenishment services. The proposals, which account for as many as 500 small satellites, not including one recently submitted constellation of 800 micro satellites, need investors to raise the capital for these multi-billion dollar networks. The majority of these satellite constellations are expected to be launched in groups on medium- and large-capacity expendable launch vehicles and replenished by individual launches of small ELVs. Scheduled launch dates range from mid-1994 through the end of the century. (See chapter 30 Telecommunications.)

Regulatory changes and technological developments intended to increase the commercial viability of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) television services also may result in a marginal increase in launch demand (four to five launches total) by the middle of the decade. Hughes Aircraft Company, a subsidiary of General Motors, has its first launch scheduled for late 1993/early 1994. The DBS satellites will use new video digital signal compression technology to supply 150 television channels from satellites in geostationary orbit. Signal compression technology also continues to increase reliability and lifespan of traditional communications satellites and could reduce demand for launches over the next 10 years, thus negating any upturn in demand from new DBS systems.

In the long term, the U.S. launch industry is working to focus efforts on lowering the cost per pound to orbit for commercial payloads. Three options-upgrading the existing fleet of vehicles, developing a new vehicle with off-the-shelf technology, and investing in new leap-frog technology - are at the center of the debate. Over the past 3 years, Congress has watched the National Launch System (NLS), Spacelifter, and a host of new single-stage-to-orbit and two-stage-to-orbit vehicles claim the next generation mantel. Projected costs for a completely new launch system are $8 to $10 billion over 10 years. Marshalling these billions of dollars under increasingly tighter budgets will continue to be the major challenge facing U.S. launch service companies and policy makers over the next several years.

Additional References

(Call the Bureau of the Census at (301) 763-4100 for information about how to order Census documents.) New Complete Aircraft and Aircraft Engines (Except Military), Current Industrial Report, M37G series, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20233. Telephone: (301) 763-5573. Backlog of Orders for Aerospace Companies, Current Industrial Report, MA37D series, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20233. Space Business Indicators, Office of Space Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230. Telephone: (202) 482-6125. Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1992-1993, Aerospace Industries Association, 1250 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. Telephone: (202) 371-8400. The U.S. Aerospace Industry in the 1990's: a Global Perspective, Aerospace Industries Association, 1250 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. Telephone: (202) 371-8400. General Aviation Statistical Databook, 1992 Edition, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, 1400 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. Telephone: (202) 393-1500. Engine Industry, Technical Report WL-TR-91-2066, Aero Propulsion and Power Laboratory, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433. Aerospace Daily, 1156 15th St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. Telephone: (202)822-4600. Aerospace Propulsion, 1156 15th St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. Telephone: (202) 822-4647. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020. Telephone: (212) 512-2000. Defense News and Space News, 6883 Commercial Dr., Springfield, VA 22159. Telephone: (703) 658-8400. Aerospace and the Environment, Aerospace Industries Association, 1250 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. Telephone: (202) 371-8400. Change, Challenge, and Competition: The National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, A Report to the President and Congress, August 1993, U.S. Government Printing Office, ISBN 0-16-041887-9. Global Competitiveness of U.S. Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Large Civil Aircraft, U.S. International Trade Commission, August 1993.

COPYRIGHT 1994 U.S. Department of Commerce
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