Architect or home builder? President George W. Bush, Mexico, and the misunderstood European referent

ABSTRACT

Was the U.S.--Mexico immigration initiative which so marked the initial phase of the George W. Bush presidency the result of an architect's vision or that of a general contractor? Evidence can be found for either interpretation. But the strategic vision of a European referent to NAFTA appeared to originate in the Fox Administration and ignored major differences between labor migration in NAFTA and European regional integration history. Faulty understanding of the European referent combined with the sheer size and complexity of U.S.--Mexico migration issues scuttled the initiative even before September 11, 2001. The post--September 11, 2001 war on terrorism made it very difficult to revive the initiative. If anything eventually does come out of it, the changes are likely to be modest and small--scale, a far cry from what was billed and celebrated as a new departure in U.S.--Mexico relations in the early months of George W. Bush's presidency.

INTRODUCTION

U.S. immigration policy has largely been viewed as a domestic issue and one where the prerogatives of the Congress prevailed over those of the executive and judicial branches. By the 1970s, however, concerns over growing illegal migration led to the creation of an interagency task force to study the phenomenon. During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy issued its Staff Report in March 1979, which noted that "In the last twelve years, I.N.S. apprehensions of deportable aliens have Increased twenty--fold and the vast majority of those apprehended are Mexican nationals." (1) The work of the Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy was superseded by the creation of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy by Public Law 95-412 in 1979. The 16 member Select Commission included four presidential appointees, four cabinet members, four U.S. senators, and four members of the U.S. House. It was led by Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, the President of the University of Notre Dame.

An influx of Haitian entrants and the Cuban government-sanctioned outflow, which included numerous Cubans who had been incarcerated for non-political offenses, hurt Carter's bid for re-election. In Arkansas, a riot by Cubans at a detention center in 1980 was widely seen as costing then Governor Bill Clinton re-election. The stakes of immigration and refugee policies for U.S. presidents were rising. This reflected a broader pattern of politicization and securitization of international migration policies in the transatlantic area. (2)

The Select Commission communicated its report and recommendations to President Ronald Reagan. It recommended a legalization policy, imposition of employer sanctions for unauthorized hiring of aliens, a system of more secure identification for all employees and a slightly modified, "streamlined" H-2 temporary foreign worker program which did "... not exclude a slight expansion of the program." (3) The purpose of the Select Commission was to forge a national consensus concerning reform of immigration policy. However, the vote on the question, "Do you favor employer sanctions with some system of more secure identification?", was eight yes, seven no and one pass. (4) The vote concerning temporary foreign workers was an unambiguous fourteen to two, a major setback to proponents of expanded temporary foreign worker policy. The text voted upon included "The Commission believes that government, employers and unions should cooperate to end the dependence of any industry on a constant supply of H-2 workers." (5)

Bills reflecting the Select Commission's recommendations concerning illegal migration were then submitted to both houses of the U.S. Congress but became mired in a protracted and complex debate. (6) Supporters of expanded temporary foreign worker policy helped prevent passage of legislation until 1986 when Congressman Charles Schumer of New York brokered a deal which would authorize a special legalization program for foreign agricultural workers that ended the legislative logjam. President Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) into law on November 6, 1986. Meanwhile, all major Democratic Party presidential hopefuls in 1984 had announced their opposition to the imposition of employer sanctions. They viewed employer sanctions as damaging their electoral prospects with Hispanic voters. Polls, however, indicated that Hispanic voters were about evenly split for and against enactment of employer sanctions.

One provision of IRCA authorized the creation of a Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development (CSIMCED). This Commission would produce numerous reports and studies which would pave the way to President George H. W. Bush embracing a Mexican proposal to enlarge the free trade agreement signed in 1988 between Canada and the United States to include Mexico. Very significantly, the major research funding of the scores of studies commissioned by the CSIMCED held that trade liberalization would reduce illegal migration from Mexico only in the long run. Over the short to medium term, it would significantly increase it. Philip L. Martin would later refine this insight into his theory of a migration hump. (7)

President George H. W. Bush, signed the Immigration Act of 1990 into law, which increased legal immigration into the United States by 35 percent. The new law reflected a growing conservative celebration of international migration as economically beneficial. Both of the principal contenders for the presidency in 1992 touted a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a way to reduce illegal migration. President George H. W. Bush, referred Mexican President Carlos Salinas' proposal for the creation of NAFTA to the National Security Council which, according to Mexican immigration specialist Jorge Bustamente, determined that international migration had created such interdependency between the United States and Mexico that any adverse development in Mexico would affect the United States. It recommended U.S. support for the Mexican initiative which dovetailed with many of the recommendations made by the CSIMCED. During the 1992 presidential campaign, the Democratic nominee criticized President Bush's policy of forcibly repatriating Haitians only to reverse his stand shortly before his inauguration. (8)

NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994. Later that year, a sharply contested referendum to deny public benefits, such as education to illegally resident alien children, passed by a large margin in California. Proposition 187 had been openly opposed by Mexican government officials who helped organize protests against the measure. Although implementation of the measure was determined to be unconstitutional, as it clearly clashed with the 1982 Plyler versus DOE Supreme Court decision which upheld the right of undocumented children to attend public schools in Texas, the referendum sounded a tocsin in Washington, DC.

The subsequent flurry of legislative proposals to curtail legal immigration to the United States were defeated, however. President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility act of 1996 and thereby largely defused immigration as a campaign issue in the 1996 presidential election. The far-ranging legislation reflected a hardening of views in that it mandated a massive increase in Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel as well as support for enhanced border interdiction, removal of criminal aliens and expedited abjudication of asylum cases. Very significantly, however, the 1996 law did not reflect the recommendations of yet another federal commission, the Commission on Immigration Reform, which had recommended implementation of a secure employee identification system and other measures to bolster lagging enforcement of employer sanctions. President Clinton had endorsed the Commission on Immigration Reforms recommendations, which included reduction in legal immigration. (9) President Clinton repeatedly voiced his opposition to guestworker policy and threatened to veto any measure expanding admissions of unskilled foreign workers.

While immigration issues did not centrally affect the outcome of the 1996 presidential election, they nevertheless were accorded much more significance than had been the case in elections in the 1960s or 1970s. Influential newspapers scrutinized the positions of Senator Robert Dole and President Clinton on immigration. (10) Senator Dole supported an amendment which would have denied public education to illegal immigrant children whereas Clinton opposed the amendment. The unsuccessful candidacy of Patrick Buchanan also served to heighten awareness of the principal candidates' stances on immigration. By 2000, George W. Bush would conclude that the anti-immigration overtones of the 1996 GOP candidates had hurt the party's performance in the election.

By the 2000 election, international migration could be viewed in a strategic way. Virtually everyone acknowledged that international migration constituted a key dynamic within globalization which, in turn, was viewed as central to the advancement of U.S. foreign and security interests. (See the article by Oliver in this issue.) Moreover, more ideologically-inclined Republicans took a dim view of governmental regulation in general and found confirmation of the accuracy of their views in the flagging effort of the U.S. government to curtail illegal migration despite the vast increases in resources devoted to that task in the Clinton administrations.

Nevertheless, Republican candidate George W. Bush did not articulate a strategic or architect's vision of international migration policy in overall U.S. foreign and national security policy in the 2000 campaign. It was widely known that he had supported a Southwest Governors' endorsement of expanded admissions of temporary Mexican workers. The Republican candidate was generally not viewed as well-versed in foreign policy matters, save for his knowledge of Mexico. He had some Spanish language facility and kin of Hispanic background. Immigration policy issues, however, did not figure centrally in the 2000 race, although both candidates campaigned for Hispanic votes. Thus, if the Republican contender possessed a strategic vision of international migration in regional or world order, it was kept under wraps. In all probability, any strategic or architect's view of international migration in global and regional order came from Vincente Fox Quesada, elected President of Mexico in July 2000 who, shortly after his election, called for the creation of a North American common market that would allow freer flow of merchandise and workers. (11)

THE U.S.--MEXICO MIGRATION "HONEYMOON"

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the initial (pre-9/11) period of the Bush administration's foreign policy involved its relationship with the new Mexican government led by President Vincente Fox. The historic transfer of power in Mexico appeared to set the stage for a new approach. The former Coca Cola executive and U.S.-educated Mexican president was unabashedly pro-American and had promised to make improvement of the lot of Mexican citizens abroad a top priority. President Fox came into office in a bilateral context that had evolved significantly in recent years due in part to the patient work of a bilateral commission on border issues and a web of institutionalized meetings between U.S. and Mexican legislators and governmental counterparts that had fostered considerable mutual understanding. The North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada in 1993 profoundly altered the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Its signature bore witness to growing North American socio-economic and political interdependence. However, with one minor exception, immigration issues were pointedly excluded from NAFTA's purview because U.S. and Mexican positions on issues like illegal migration diverged to such a degree that they were deemed unbridgeable. During President Clinton's second term, nevertheless, progress had been made in easing bilateral tensions over migration issues. For instance, the United States acceded to, even welcomed, expanded Mexican consular protection of its citizens within the United States.

In the last year of President Clinton's second term, the AFL-CIO declared its support for a broad legalization or amnesty for Mexican workers and withdrew its support for enforcement of provisions of the 1986 law which made it a punishable offense for U.S. employers to hire aliens ineligible for employment under the U.S.-employer sanctions. The new Mexican administration accurately interpreted the AFL-CIO shift as signaling a possible seachange in the political environment of U.S. immigration policy. It made betterment of the status of Mexican citizens abroad through diplomatic initiatives the centerpiece of the Fox administration's foreign policy.

As expected, President Bush made his first trip abroad to Mexico where he met with President Fox at his home. In the weeks preceding the visit, there was a frenzy of talk and speculation about the possible contours of a U.S.-Mexico migration initiative. Reference was made to a European referent in negotiations over labor mobility in the context of regional integration. The Treaty of Rome of 1957, which created the European Economic Community, contained provisions for freedom of movement for employment within the then six-nation framework. It seemed that the Fox administration perceived the freedom of labor mobility provision as something for possible emulation in the context of North American regional integration. The OECD had several years earlier held a conference on migration, free trade and regional integration in North America which may have encouraged such thinking. (12) At a subsequent summit of the three heads of states of the NAFTA signatories in Ottawa, Canada, however, President Fox could only articulate a vision of greater labor mobility and deeper North American integration as long-term goals. Speculation about opening of borders and freedom of movement for employment in North America proved to be just that. The substance of U.S.-Mexico talks about immigration during the early months of the Bush administration appeared to center chiefly around proposals for expanded temporary foreign worker recruitment and the modalities of a legalization or regularization initiative. This outcome supports interpretation of President Bush's foreign policy as the product of a home builder more so than that of an architect.

Presidents Fox and Bush agreed to establish a high-level (Cabinet) bilateral working group to translate the desire for improved relations into specific policy initiatives. Shortly before the September 11, 2001 violence, President Fox toured areas of the United States and addressed a joint session of Congress. U.S.-Mexico agreement on an immigration-related initiative was announced. But the details of it were not specified. The Mexican President returned home with a face-saving promise without mutually agreed upon content. Moreover, U.S. congressional leaders made it clear that they would exercise their traditional prerogatives. In other words, the U.S. Congress would have to authorize through legislation components of a U.S.-Mexico agreement concerning U.S. immigration law. As best as can be discerned, the Bush administration appeared to offer a vague reassurance that it would endeavor to expand temporary foreign worker recruitment perhaps in conjunction with an earned legalization procedure for illegally resident Mexicans in the United States. Interpreting just what was promised or agreed to, however, is challenging because of the vagueness of public declarations. The Bush administration clearly was already backtracking on the bilateral immigration initiative even prior to 9/11. No consensus for either expanded temporary foreign worker policy or legalization emerged in the U.S. Congress or in public policy debates.

The U.S.-Mexico high-level dialogue over migration in the initial period of the George W. Bush presidency appeared quite broad ranging. Mexico unilaterally announced a legalization program for certain illegally resident aliens. And it pledged to cooperate with the United States in suppression of human trafficking. The contours of the improved bilateral cooperation seemed to include measures to prevent illegal entry from the Mexican side in return for legalization of Mexicans illegally residing in the United States and for expanded legal employment opportunities for Mexicans in the United States. Foreign Minister Casteneda made reference to a whole enchilada and, at one point, warned that all the requisite elements of a comprehensive migration initiative had to be in place for Mexico to support it. (13) The Mexican foreign minister also claimed that the bilateral talks were without historical precedent.

ASSESSING THE HONEYMOON

The events of 9/11 abruptly ended the honeymoon. By the end of the day, matters like overstaying of visas or document fraud to circumvent immigration law loomed large as they affected everyone's security. The legalization proposal had dropped off the agenda. Several days later, the Bush administration did announce that it intended to respect its commitments pertaining to the U.S.-Mexico migration initiative, but prospects for congressional support for expanded temporary foreign worker recruitment or legalization had dimmed, especially as the economic downturn and unemployment worsened.

In retrospect, several competing interpretations of the honeymoon appear plausible. If one accepts the gloss of U.S. and Mexican proponents of the initiative, it might be viewed as a radical departure in U.S. foreign policy. Migration policy became the priority and there was comprehensive discussion of how it affected U.S.-Mexico relations. Moreover, the U.S. relationship with Mexico became a top priority if not pre-eminent concern. This suggested a fundamental recasting of U.S. foreign policy by the Bush administration, an architect's vision of U.S. foreign policy.

A less generous view derives from skepticism about the Bush administration's foreign policy credentials in general. Seen in this light, the honeymoon betrayed inexperience and diplomatic naivete. The new administration rushed pell-mell into an embrace of the Fox administration which itself harbored unrealistic expectations for radical departures in U.S. foreign policy, especially within the context of NAFTA. The lack of preparedness and unsophistication of the new U.S. administration overall provided a window of opportunity which was exploited by a relatively small coterie of diplomats and migration policy advocates to advance their agendas. This resulted in the creation of unrealistic expectations about prospects for a U.S.-Mexico immigration initiative that burst before, not after, the events of 9/11.

A third interpretative narrative would view the honeymoon as a regression to an earlier period in U.S.-Mexico relations. In this perspective, underneath the hoopla and symbolism of the honeymoon lay the reality of Americans and Mexicans negotiating a return to bracero policy, a recurrent feature of U.S.-Mexico relations in the twentieth century. Ever since the unilateral termination of the bracero policy by the United States in 1964, successive Mexican administrations had sought renewal of U.S. authorization for temporary Mexican employment in agriculture and other industries heavily dependent on illegally employed workers. Contrary to appearances, thus, the U.S.-Mexico migration initiative principally involved a turning back of the clock. The Fox administration might aspire to major power status and posture as an equal partner to the United States but this stance had little to do with U.S. and Mexican realities which have proven durable In the face even of skillful public relations. Hence, stripped of its embellishments, the U.S.-Mexico initiative centrally involved renegotiation of a temporary Mexican worker admissions program that would subordinate Mexico once again in a bilateral labor agreement with the economically and diplomatically dominant United States. Was there any reason to believe that the outcome of a renewed bracero policy would differ from the past?

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the honeymoon involved the European referent. Both the Mexican media and U.S. media began to buzz with allusions to a coming opening of borders In North America and freedom of labor mobility within the NAFTA bloc. Much of such speculation might best be described as journalistic hyperbole, but the Fox administration and its allies in the United States contemplated a recasting and deepening of NAFTA to become a regional integration framework akin to the European Union. By early February 2001, as Secretary of State Powell journeyed to Mexico to set the stage for President Bush's inaugural trip abroad to Jalisco state, the Bush administration already was pointedly distancing itself from speculation about open borders and freedom of labor mobility within NAFTA.

In fact, NAFTA differed greatly from the European regional project. While it is true that the original proposal floated by then President Salinas was referred to the U.S. National Security Council, which recommended approval on the grounds of U.S.-Mexico interdependence, NAFTA was a free trade agreement without an explicit political project. The origins of the European Union, on the other hand, involved an explicit security policy-driven commitment to the goal of European federation. Supporters of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the European Economic Community and today's European Union, viewed regional integration as imperative to prevention of recurrence of war in Europe.

The Treaty of Rome foresaw eventual implementation of freedom of labor mobility between the signatories. However, with the partial exception of the Italian case, there has been relatively insignificant labor movement within the European regional framework. This was due to continuing barriers to freedom of labor mobility long after the coming into effect of the Treaty of Rome, the rigidities of European labor markets and the underlying socioeconomic convergence of the states involved.

More to the point, the European referent speculation or vision seemed to obscure the key fact that the states involved in the European regional integration process had pointedly rebuffed Turkish and Moroccan bids for full membership. The Islamic background of Turkey and Morocco figured in this. But Europeans obviously would not agree to extension of full membership to states and societies that would likely result in large-scale emigration even after a transition period. In other words, the European referent, when construed to suggest that the NAFTA signatories could and should follow the precedent for labor mobility within European regional integration badly missed the mark. It is within the realm of possibility, however, that President Fox's call for a new vision of NAFTA at the Ottawa summit of the NAFTA signatories may still prove prophetic. Some view the integration processes generated by free trade agreements as mechanistically fostering deeper forms of integration, although this did not occur in the history of the European Free Trade Agreement and the world is littered with regional pacts that have gone bust or become moribund. Another clear difference between the North American and European situations arose from U.S. preponderance within NAFTA as compared to the European situation. The predominance of one partner country in African regional integration frameworks has contributed to a pattern of failure of such pacts in Africa. (14)

Another puzzling aspect of the honeymoon arose from the sheer complexity of the bundle of legalization and temporary foreign worker recruitment issues. A series of federal commissions studying U.S. immigration laws and policies had consistently recommended against expansion of temporary foreign worker recruitment. Nevertheless, advocacy of such policy has been persistent and support in Congress for expanded temporary foreign workers admissions had grown although partisans of such an approach often disagree on key features of such a policy. Canada's relatively small admissions program for Mexican agricultural workers was touted as fit for emulation by the United States. In fact, steadily growing numbers of temporary foreign workers, including Mexicans, have been admitted to the United States in recent years.

Advocacy of legalization or regularization policy also has been persistent. But again no consensus emerged amongst advocates as to the scope and nature of the policy. Many Republicans, such as the influential former Republican senator from Texas, Phil Gramm, vociferously oppose legalization on the grounds that it undermines the rule of law and rewards lawbreaking, but favor expanded temporary foreign worker admissions. While Senator Gramm proposed detailed legislation to expand temporary foreign worker admissions, like-minded conservatives often favor administrative transformation of currently illegally employed aliens into legally-admitted temporary foreign workers. However, with an estimated nine million illegal aliens in the United States, transforming a concept into administrative reality is a daunting matter. Would a temporary foreign worker program be available only to Mexican workers? What would be the rights of such workers? Could they qualify for eventual legal residency in the United States with full employment rights after a certain period of employment in the United States? The answers to such questions were not disclosed.

Advocacy of legalization similarly came in different shapes and sizes. At one end of the spectrum, the U.S. Catholic Conference and the AFL-CIO called for a quite open-ended legalization available to non-Mexicans as well. While several proposed bills before Congress envisage some form of legalization, they differ on scope of eligibility and other all important details. Moreover, the legalizations enacted under the much- decried 1986 law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act, resulted in widespread fraud, especially in the Special Agricultural Workers program. The Bush administration's problem was clear. Even if called regularization and not legalization, the narrower the scope of eligibility and the higher the standards set for eligibility, the less likely it was to address the public policy problem for which it was ostensibly designed to correct. Likewise, the greater the coverage and openendedness of such an initiative, the less likely it was to gamer congressional and public support.

More puzzling still, beneath all of the diplomatic fanfare of the honeymoon period lay a domestic political calculation, perhaps constituting the best evidence of an interior decorator reality behind the Bush administration's policy. President Bush apparently viewed a migration initiative with Mexico as a way to garner more electoral support for Republicans like himself amongst Mexican-American voters and perhaps Roman Catholic voters. Similarly, President Fox's initiative towards Mexican expatriates was also calculated to result in additional votes for his National Action Party. To the extent that the honeymoon was motivated by domestic political calculations, President Bush certainly appeared to be gambling as Mexican-Americans vote heavily Democratic. It may be that he viewed the migration initiative as likely to reduce the level of Mexican- American support for Democratic candidates. President Bush also sought a greater constituency amongst Roman Catholic voters and may have viewed the U.S.-Mexico migration initiative as a means to that end even though migration policy matters do not sway Roman Catholic voters to the same extent as abortion or death penalty questions do. In sum, the domestic political calculus on the U.S. side of the honeymoon loomed large but also, at best, was highly dubious. The risk of alienating voters through a migration initiative, including loyal Republicans opposed to legalization, also ran high.

The honeymoon in U.S.-Mexico relations appeared to end in the days prior to September 11, 2001 when President Fox returned home with a promise but no deal. The sheer complexity of bilateral U.S.-Mexico migration issues mitigated against the quick deal sought by the Fox administration in particular against a backdrop of growing economic and political woes in Mexico. (15) The Fox administration staked its prestige on securing improved treatment of Mexicans in the United States and its partnership with the Bush Administration. This created enormous pressure on the Bush administration to fashion policies amenable to Mexico. But, in the end, longstanding differences on policy matters and enduring realities like the socio-economic disparities between Mexico and the United States could not be overcome. Any victory, if a U.S.-Mexico migration initiative could be termed such, was likely to prove pyrrhic over the long run. In the final analysis, a genuine referent to Europe was missing because there was no consideration on the U.S. side of a massive program of investment in Mexican infrastructure and economic assistance to reduce inequalities in Mexico that would reduce incentives for emigration.

THE U.S.--MEXICO INITIATIVE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: FROM HONEYMOON TO LIMBO

An assortment of mainly recent immigrants from the Middle East perpetrated the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. In late 1999, the arrest of an Algerian who belonged to the Armed Islamic Group and who planned to bomb Los Angeles airport prompted a month-long state of alert. Nevertheless, despite such ominous warnings, securitization of U.S. immigration policy had not occurred prior to September 11,2001.

The concept of securitization derives from the post-Cold War or new security literature and specifically from writings by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan. (16) Securitization refers to a perception of an existential threat to the ability of a society to maintain and reproduce itself. When this occurs, issues are viewed differently and governments reserve the right to address the threat by extraordinary means. A number of analysts have argued that European migration policies, and particularly asylum/refugee policies, were securitized in the 1990s. In the United States, the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrated by U.S. citizens and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing prompted adoption of a new counter-terrorism and effective death penalty law with significant implications for non-citizens and influenced adoption of the 1996 immigration law. But even key features of the 1996 law motivated in part by security concerns, such as the provision calling for implementation of monitoring system for foreign students studying in the United States, remained stillborn due to intense opposition to the measure.

In the wake of 9/11, however, opposition to implementation of the monitoring system for student visa holders crumbled. The Border Patrol immediately went into a heightened state of alert and much more aggressively patrolled the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, which caused enormous backups and considerable economic losses. Both the Canadian and Mexican governments declared their support for the Bush administration's campaign against terrorism and promised full support for bilateral efforts to prevent cross-border movements of political extremists and funding. Some analysts argued in favor of deepening NAFTA area "perimeter defense" through closer cooperation on migration and security issues. But such advocacy ran smack into a long-standing frustration in the United States with Canada's migration policies and its perceived laxity towards militants from Sri Lanka and Algeria in particular. Similarly, cascading revelations about corruption in Mexico's police and civil services did not inspire confidence in "perimeter defense" from the south. Nevertheless, heightened "harmonization" of U.S. migration policies with its neighbors to the North and South in the context of NAFTA has been discussed. The concept resembles the Schengen visa-free zone among participating members of the European Union.

The attacks of 9/11 exacted a large toll in immigrant dead. While incomparable, the economic effects of 9/11 on immigrants also were devastating. Several industries particularly dependent upon immigrant labor experienced mass layoffs. Moreover, it became increasingly difficult to cross into the United States illegally from Mexico or Canada. The heightened prospects for an economic recession made congressional support for legalization and/or temporary foreign worker policy less likely. Overnight, the discourse about U.S. migration policies shifted to prevention of recurrence of 9/11.

Admission of refugees to the United States slowed. U.S. visa policy came under intense scrutiny as most of the airplane hijackers possessed visas, although some had overstayed theirs. In 2000, almost 10 million aliens applied for visas and three-quarters of the applications were approved. About 1,100 consular officers at U.S. embassies and consulates around the world bear the brunt of the visa workload. Most consular officers are young and relatively inexperienced. The Congress chronically underfunds the Department of State and the extremely heavy caseload of individual consular officers has long been a concern. (17)

Most of the 31 million aliens entering the United States temporarily each year, however, do not require visas. They are citizens of 29 countries which have signed reciprocal visa waiver agreements with the United States. At least one suspect arrested in the wake of the attacks had French citizenship and thereby entered the United States visa-free. (18)

The United States also has made special arrangements for Canadian and Mexican citizens living in border areas to receive Border Crossing Cards. There are about 500 million recorded crossings each year at the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canadian borders. The 1996 immigration law authorized creation of a system to track all aliens entering and leaving the United States. But, like the monitoring system for students, the measure generated intense political opposition. Compliance with the new 1-94 form requirement for airlines to provide the Immigration and Naturalization Service with records of entry and exit by airline passengers has been incomplete and many aliens exiting by overland routes do not turn in the form. (19)

The work cut out for the newly created Department of Homeland Security headed by former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge in the visa area seems enormous. Consular officers currently have no way of knowing who overstays visas and who does not. Nearly half of the estimated 9 million illegally resident aliens in the United States are thought to have overstayed visas. (20) The National Automated Lookout System used by the INS, Customs officials and the Department of State to stymie entry of unwanted persons can be circumvented by changing names or adoption of a false identity. Moreover, access to the information stored in the system is limited.

Interior enforcement of U.S. immigration law also came under renewed scrutiny. Several of the hijackers had obtained valid drivers licenses through fraudulent means. Several states are notorious for the ease of obtaining valid driving licenses by illegally resident aliens. The driving licenses are then used, along with other false documents, to prove eligibility for employment in the United States and thereby circumvent the intent of the 1986 immigration law. (21) The events of 9/11 quickly rekindled discussions of the pros and cons of a national identity card and a more counterfeit-resistant card for resident aliens and temporary visitors. In 1986, the Congress did not adopt a recommendation by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to adopt a counterfeit-resistant employment eligibility document when it made employment of unauthorized aliens illegal and punishable. In so doing, Congress all but invited wholesale circumvention of the 1986 law through document fraud. The Commission on Immigration Reform subsequently recommended adoption of a counterfeit-resistant employment eligibility document, but no such provision was adopted in the 1996 immigration law. The events of 9/11, however, seemed to alter the context or policy environment of matters like enforcement of employer sanctions. Suddenly, the germaneness of effective employer sanctions enforcement to a comprehensive response to perceived insecurity could be ascertained. However, it was also clear that whatever steps were taken could not preclude a similar disaster. There is no silver bullet solution to U.S. vulnerability.

Estimates of the Muslim population in the United States vary from two to six million. (22) Most Muslims are of immigrant background. President Bush and many other U.S. officials and local and state government officials spoke of the need to differentiate between a minority of political extremists and Muslims in general. Still, there has been some political violence targeted at foreign-looking persons, such as a Sikh apparently killed in response to 9/11. And many immigrants have reported incidents of harassment. Between seven and eight hundred individuals were detained by law enforcement officials, most of whom appeared to be of immigrant and Muslim background. And a new counter-terrorism law lengthened the time that suspects could be detained without formal charges being brought. Many of those detained were detained for violations of immigration laws.

It is conceivable that the response to 9/11 will jeopardize integration and incorporation of Muslim immigrants. Measures to curb fundraising and financing of terrorism raise important disagreements over what precisely constitutes terrorism.

More broadly, the events of 9/11 raise important questions about the relationship between immigration policies and U.S. foreign policy in general. Several years ago, the influential American Assembly called for more systematic coordination of U.S. immigration and foreign policies. (23) Whereas U.S. unilateralism characterized the initial period of the Bush administration's foreign policy, save perhaps with reference to NAFTA partners, its declared war on terrorism clearly necessitates close cooperation and harmonization of policies with states and international organizations around the world. Inevitably, a campaign against global terrorism must engage the so--called root causes of terrorism. When that happens, the migration and security nexus will come into sharp relief as will the insecurity perceived by so many around the world, inclusive, of course, of the many millions of international migrants driven by adverse circumstances to seek better lives elsewhere.

Unlike the post-1993 situation, securitization of U.S. immigration policy is occurring. This is unlikely to result in fundamental alteration of legal immigration policy. It will foster more credible enforcement of existing laws and better coordination of immigration, foreign and security policies. A principal casualty of securitization was the U.S.-Mexico migration initiative, but that foundered before September 11, 2001, perhaps for the better. The long history of temporary foreign worker policies suggests that they are not conducive to improved bilateral relations, but the contrary. Studies of past legalizations in the United States and elsewhere suggest that they do not alter underlying labor market dynamics fostering illegal migration. Indeed, such policies attract further illegal migration. Nevertheless, Democratic Congressman Richard Gephardt of Missouri would call for legalization at a 2002 meeting of Hispanics, suggesting that the U.S.-Mexico initiative could rise like the biblical Lazarus, back from the dead.

NOTES

(1) Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy, Staff Report (Washington, DC: Departments of Justice, Labor and State, 1979).

(2) The French presidential election of 1981 witnessed Socialist candidate Mitterand vow his solidarity with the SONACOTRA rent strikers, a protest movement that had begun in 1975. Asylum policy played a key role in the 1982 German elections won by Helmut Kohl. On the concept of securitization, see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

(3) Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, US Immigration Policy and the National Interest, staff report of April 30, 1981, p.Lii.

(4) Ibid, p. xxxiv.

(5) Ibid, p. Lii.

(6) Mark J. Miller, "Continuities and discontinuities in immigration reform in industrial democracies: The case of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986" in Han Entzinger and Jack Carter, eds. International Review of Comparative Public Policy, volume 1, (Greenwich, CT/London: JAI Press, 1989), pp. 131-151. Also see Nancy Humel Montwieler, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986, (Washington, DC: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1987).

(7) Philip L. Martin and J. Edward Taylor, "Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Policies," in Aristide R. Zolberg and Peter M. Benda, eds., Global Migrants, Global Refugees, (New York/Oxford, Berghahn, 2001), pp. 95-120.

(8) Eric Schmitt, "Milestones and Missteps on Immigration," The New York Times, October 26, 1996, p. 9.

(9) Ibid, p.9.

(10) See, for example, Gerald F. Seib, "Backlash Over Immigration Has Entered Mainstream This Year," The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1996, p. A20.

(11) Ginger Thompson, "Victor in Mexico Plans to Overhaul Law Enforcement," The New York Times, July 5, 2000, p. A8.

(12) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Migration, Free Trade and Regional Integration in North America, (Paris: OECD, 1998).

(13) Ginger Thompson, "Mexico Takes Small Steps to Improving its US Ties", The New York Times, September 5, 2001, p. A6.

(14) Anderanti Andepoju, "Regional Integration, Continuity and Changing Patterns of Intra Regional Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa," in M.A.B. Siddique, ed., International Migration into the 21st Century, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 50-73.

(15) Ginger Thompson and Tim Weiner, "Great Expectations of Mexico's Leader Sapped by Reality", The New York Times, September 4, 2001, p. A1.

(16) Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework of Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998).

(17) Philip Martin and Susan Martin, Immigration and Terrorism: Policy reform challenges, manuscript submitted to Migration World, pp. 3-6.

(18) Ibid, p. 3

(19) Ibid, p. 3

(20) Martin and Martin, p. 1

(21) Ibid, p. 5

(22) Daniel Pipes and Khalid Duran, "Muslim Immigrants in the United States," Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies backgrounder series, August 2002.

(23) Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, eds., Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

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