Unconventional Warfare: SF's Past, Present and Future - special forces

The United States Army Special Forces Command recently began pursuing a series of initiatives to ensure the relevance of SF during and after the Army Transformation. The most dramatic of those initiatives thus far has been the reassertion of unconventional warfare, or UW as the primary mission of SF. At the same time, the command has embraced the joint definition of UW and has broadened the scope of SF mission sets, capabilities and training requirements. [1] In order to plan for and to train for this complex mission, SF soldiers at all levels must understand how UW is defined.

Defining UW

Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines UW as a "broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces, who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape." [2]

The April 1990 edition of FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, used the same definition for UW that Joint Pub 1-02 used [3]; however, in explaining SF's role in UW, FM 31-20 focused almost exclusively on guerrilla warfare. Until recently, almost any discussion of UW operations evoked images of the Office of Strategic Services' Jedburgh teams or the Robin Sage UW exercise in which all SF soldiers participate during the Special Forces Qualification Course. The soon-to-be-published FM 3-05.20 (formerly FM 31-20) also uses the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, but it gives that definition a much broader interpretation.

Although guerrilla-warfare operations are unconventional, they are merely one of the many types of missions covered under the broad joint definition of UW. Recent UW seminars conducted by the Army SF Command have further widened the definition by aligning UW operations with the phases of Army Visions 2010 and 2020 -- engagement, crisis response, warfighting, and return to engagement -- rather than with the seven phases of UW detailed in FM 31-20. [4] Under the new definition, many missions of foreign internal defense, or FID, are better classified as UW. Coalition support and counterinsurgency missions also fall under the UW umbrella.

Relevance

The UW discussion is more than wordsmithing; by redefining the core mission and the core purpose of SF, the Army SF Command has highlighted the reason why SF units are and will continue to be relevant as the entire Army attempts to transform into a more agile and lethal force.

Other units within the military can and do perform some of SF's missions. There are units within the Army and other services that are tailored to conduct unilateral direct-action missions. Likewise, an increased investment in high-technology platforms --coupled with the nation's aversion to risking lives -- indicates that special-reconnaissance missions will increasingly be executed by unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites and miniature robots.[5]

Forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, are the only ones authorized by law to conduct UW operations,[6] and SF is the only force within USSOCOM specifically created and designed to conduct UW across the spectrum of conflict. UW is our mission; it is the only mission that is unequivocally ours. While other special-operations and conventional units may assume a larger role and perform many of the missions that SF has traditionally conducted, no other unit can conduct UW on the scale that SF can, or with SF's expertise.

Broadening the definition and the scope of UW highlights the capabilities of today's SF units. SF soldiers conduct FID missions in many places where violence or instability could quickly escalate beyond engagement and require direct U.S. involvement in hostilities. Numerous troubled areas across the globe threaten vital U.S. and allied interests. In many regions, fierce economic competition, tribal or ethnic conflicts, narco-trafficking or vast ideological differences exist. They can flash in an instant to open hostility. These threats are of a smaller scope and scale than those the U.S. encountered during the Cold War. Most are regional, and they typically do not involve peer competitors who can engage our general-purpose forces. They are, to describe them more precisely, unconventional threats, and to deal with them effectively, we require an unconventional force.[7]

A unique and inherent ability to work with indigenous forces is the essence of what makes SF a relevant force, today, tomorrow and in the long--term. While the rest of the Army attempts to transform to meet the varied threats of today and of the future, SF units are engaged across the globe on any given day. The ability of SF to work with indigenous or surrogate forces to pursue our national interests is of particular value to our Army, which is dependent on early and rapid deployment. Early intervention by SF can eliminate the need to deploy a general-purpose force.

Preparing for the Future

While UW doctrine is being revised to reflect the widened scope of the UW mission, [8] the Army SF Command is identifying critical tasks that SF units will perform during UW. As higher echelons thus refine doctrine and tasks, subordinate units and individual SF soldiers should take the initiative and embrace UW as the core mission of SF. Our actions right now should be threefold:

* Hone combat skills through intense training. SF soldiers must be peerless combatants on the battlefield. They must be able to fire their weapons with precision, and they must be masters of small-unit tactics, because in UW operations, they may be required to train and advise foreign militaries in combat operations. The Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC, is an excellent example of a training initiative that units can take. By adopting a program of marksmanship and smallunit offensive operations tailored specifically to the group's regional area of responsibility, or AOR, units can rapidly elevate the combat proficiency of their SF detachments.

SFAUCC provides an excellent start, but SF groups can go farther. SF soldiers should be proficient at employing heavy weapons, such as mortars and crew-served weapons. Nearly half of all new SF soldiers come from non-combat-arms units, so it is imperative that units develop intensive training programs to build these skills. Groups must find innovative ways of sustaining levels of tactical proficiency as well, since SF'S high optempo and supportcycle requirements constantly challenge SF leaders to manage time effectively

* Sharpen cultural skills and regional focus. SF soldiers should be experts regarding their group's AOR; they should have a thorough understanding of the cultures, demographics, political situations, military capabilities and geography of the countries for which their group is responsible. SF soldiers must possess the language capability and cultural skills to operate effectively in their AOR. A great deal of regional orientation comes from experience. Deploying to the AOR and working with host-nation personnel expands the knowledge base, the language capability and the experience level of SF soldiers.

SF units can do even more to build expertise, however. Whenever possible, units should provide language instruction to SF soldiers; this training should be a command imperative. While SF soldiers need not be linguists to perform their duties effectively, language proficiency is a force multiplier for any SF soldier deployed in his AOR. Units should also leverage technology to bring regional information to the fingertips of all SF soldiers. Most SF groups are equipped with local-area networks, or LANs. Unfortunately, the majority of the information passed across the LAN is administrative and does little, if anything, to prepare soldiers for operational missions. The group information-management officer can work in conjunction with the S2 to build databases that SF soldiers can easily access on the LAN. The technology exists to create a database of detailed maps, political information, and unit experience that would be available instantly to every soldier in a group.

* Maximize individual knowledge and capability. Each SF soldier must work to develop and sustain his personal skills in three areas. The first is physical training, or PT. PT is a personal responsibility, and soldiers must go beyond what is detailed in FM 2 1-20. SF soldiers should incorporate combatives or martial arts training into their individual PT plans, and they should work as much on cross-country rucksack marches, long-range swims and upper-body strength as they do on cardiovascular training.

Second, soldiers should study unconventional conflicts across the globe, gleaning all they can from current operations in places such as Chechnya and Sri Lanka, as well as reading up on past UW operations.

Third, soldiers should stay abreast of Army doctrine. According to current SF doctrine, an SF detachment must be able to develop, organize, train, advise and assist a surrogate force up to battalion size.[8] To perform these tasks effectively, detachment members must understand battlefield operating systems and light-infantry tactics up to and including the battalion level. Soldiers can increase their knowledge of Army doctrine and tactics by reading field manuals, professional journals and books.

Conclusion

It is important that SF soldiers maintain proficiency in all their doctrinal missions, but it is especially important that they maintain proficiency in UW, the core mission of SF. UW is the only SF mission that no other U.S. military unit is capable of conducting. SF's unique ability to work directly with indigenous or surrogate forces across the spectrum of conflict is a vital capability for the U.S. in today's rapidly changing world. Regardless of how UW is ultimately defined, SF's UW focus will ensure our relevance as the Army transforms around us.

Captain Robert Lee Wilson is commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company 7th SF Group. He previously served as an SF detachment commander in the 7th SF Group. Commissioned through ROTC as an Infantry officer, Wilson holds a bachelor's degree in finance from the University of Connecticut.

Notes:

(1.) Michael R. Kershner, "Special Forces in Unconventional Warfare" Military Review, January-February 2001, 84.

(2.) Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994, as amended through 6 April 1999), 713.

(3.) FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1990), 3-1.

(4.) Kershner, 85.

(5.) Discussed during USASFC Unconventional Warfare Seminar, August 2000.

(6.) U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167, "Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces" www.4.law.Cornell.edu//uscode/), January 2000.

(7.) Kershner, 84.

(8.) Discussed during USASFC Unconventional Warfare Seminar, August 2000.

COPYRIGHT 2001 John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
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