Joint fires support, the joint fires element and the CGRS: keys to success for CJSOTF-West

During the early, pre-deployment planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the combined-force commander gave Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West, or CJSOTF-W, the mission of interdicting ground-based time-sensitive targets, or TSTs, in the western desert of Iraq in support of the combined force air-component commander, or CFACC, and the CFACC's counter-SCUD mission.

The mission marked two firsts: (1) For the first time, the CFACC had operational control of an extensive piece of ground--the entire western desert of Iraq, which was his assigned area of operations, or AO; (2) CJSOTF-W, a subcomponent of the Combined Force Special Operations Component commander, or CFSOCC, was designated as the supporting commander for the mission--the first instance of a SOF task-force commander serving as a supporting commander to the CFACC.

CJSOTF-W comprised units from the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group and the British and Australian Special Air Service regiments. Its C-SCUD mission would become the largest coalition SOF operation in history. To plan the mission, CJSOTF-W established a coalition working group consisting of planners from the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, or ACC; the U.S. Central Command Air Force, or CENTAF; other government agencies and coalition special-operations planners from CJSOTF-W's U.S., British and Australian contingents.

In addition to traditional staff planning, CJSOTF-W conducted a series of three live-fly exercises at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., to develop and test the mission's tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs; and its concepts of operation, or CONOPS. The live-flys consisted of joint air-ground operations on the Nellis ranges conducted by portions of CJSOTF-W; the Joint Special Operations Aviation Detachment-West, or JSOAD-W; and CENTAF assets who would later deploy together to conduct the mission. Assets in the live-flys included SF operational detachments and patrols; infiltration platforms; bomber and strike platforms; tanker and airborne command-and-control, or [C.sup.2], support; and a complete combined air operations center, or CAOC.

The CFACC established a dedicated air wing, the 410th Air Expeditionary Wing, or AEW, which consisted of strike assets from the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve and the British Royal Air Force, to support the C-SCUD mission. The operation became the first instance in which a SOF task force received all of its apportioned close air support, or CAS, as well as much of its support for air-interdiction, or AI, from a single, dedicated air wing.

Dedicated joint-fires support available to CJSOTF-W included CAS from the 410th AEW, AI support from both the 410th AEW and other CENTAF assets, and AC-130 gunship support from JSOAD-W. Additional joint-fires support was available, upon request, from U.S. Army high-mobility artillery rocket systems, with Army tactical-missile-system capability, that were operating within the area. Other potential joint-fires support assets available in theater included Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles and Air Force air-launched cruise missiles.

The joint-fires element

From the beginning, the success of the CJSOTF-W TST mission depended upon CJSOTF-W's ability to plan, request and control joint-fires support. During early operational planning, based on lessons-learned from OEF, planners determined that a joint-fires element, or JFE, would have to be created as a separate entity within the CJSOTF-W operations staff to manage the complex joint-fires environment. Joint Publication 3-9, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, describes the JFE as a staff element within the joint operations center, or JOC, that provides recommendations to the J3 on fires planning and synchronization.

The responsibilities of the JFE are divided among its plans, targeting and operations sections. The CJSOTF-W JFE was organized as follows: two joint-fires plans officers (Field Artillery fire-support officers) belonging to the JFE were assigned to the current-plans section of the JOC to prepare the fires portion of all CJSOTF-W plans and orders. Targeting support was provided by two qualified Air Force intelligence targeteers attached to the JFE from CENTAF assets. Their primary responsibility was to work inside the sensitive compartmented information facility, developing target folders in the same format as those used within the CENTAF CAOC, thereby speeding up the process of getting CJSOTF-W targets onto the joint integrated prioritized target list, or JIPTL.

The operations section, working front and center on the JOC floor, consisted of the JFE director (U.S. Army SF); the fighter duty officer, or FDO/JFE shift leader (U.S. Air Force); the fighter duty NCO, or FDNCO (USAF); the current targets officer (British Royal Air Force); the air liaison officer, or ALO (USAF); the air liaison officer (Australian Royal Air Force); the 410th AEW liaison officer (USAF); the gunship liaison officer (USAF SOF); and the tactical air control party, or TACP, NCO (USAF). Each of the JFE positions was replicated on the day and night shifts, except for the JFE director.

The duties and responsibilities of each position within the CJSOTF-W JFE operations section are briefly listed below:

* JFE director/JFE OIC. Coordinated directly with the CJSOTF commander, J3 and current-ops officers on all fires issues. Approved the joint-fires portion of all CJSOTF plans and orders. Drafted commander's targeting guidance, as required. Chaired the CJSOTF coalition targeting board, as required.

* FDO/JFE shift leader. Gave final JFE deconfliction and clearance for all fires mission requests. Prepared fires portion of the commander's update brief and was the primary fires-log recorder.

* FDNCO. Served as JFE shift NCOIC. Coordinated directly with the battle captains and the liaison officers, or LNOs, of the coalition task forces and U.S. forward operating bases to deconflict immediate or in-extremis fires. Responsible for maintaining the fires overlay that illustrated the current locations of all units and showed all airspace control measures, or ACMs, and fire-support coordination measures, or FSCMs. Was the alternate fires-log recorder.

* Current targets officer. Maintained a detailed targeting log on all TST and theater-ballistic-missile target-interdiction requests from CJSOTF ground units. Plotted locations of all targets and troops-in-contact for real-time placement on the CJSOTF common operating picture. Monitored the joint TST manager in the advanced deep-operations coordination system, or ADOCS.

* Air liaison officer. Monitored the friendly air picture and all current interdiction or CAS sorties supporting the CJSOTF, as shown in the air tasking order, or ATO, and in the airspace control order, known as the ACO, via ADOCS. Maintained constant contact with the CAOC TST cell's representative from the special-operations liaison element, or SOLE, to transmit immediate TST strike requests or immediate and in-extremis requests for CAS. Maintained awareness of the current threat air picture.

* 410th AEW LNO. Coordinated directly with the supporting air wing. Coordinated directly with the CAOC C-SCUD cell chief and maintained constant awareness of all C-SCUD operations in the AO. Prepared the JFE portion of the daily C-SCUD planning video teleconference with the CAOC. Advised the JFE on air-wing capabilities and status. It is crucial that LNOs from any unit providing dedicated joint-fires support to a JSOTF be represented within the JSOTF JFE.

* Gunship LNO. Coordinated directly on AC-130 fires issues between the JFE and JSOAD-W. Participated in the CJSOTF J35 planning cell on all future-fires mission planning. Advised the JFE on AC-130 fires capabilities and status.

* TACP NCO. Monitored and served as the primary radio operator for the "SCUD-Net." Maintained the JFE radio log. Maintained awareness of the status of the CJSOTF [C.sup.2] net. Coordinated, as required, with communications support elements assigned to the CJSOTF. Served as the JFE communications-security custodian.

The Air Force personnel within the JFE made up the joint air-coordination element, or JACE, which served as the CFACC's liaison element to CJSOTF-W. The JACE chief, who served as the FDO/shift leader for the JFE day shift, was also responsible for administrative control of all Air Force terminal attack controllers attached to SF teams and patrols within CJSOTF-W. The JACE provided the JFE with the capability for a "mini" air-support operations center and managed all immediate and in-extremis CAS requests on the joint air-request net, commonly known as the JARN. In the future, an ALO and senior TACP NCOs should be assigned to each SF group headquarters to form the core of the deployed JACE.

During the live-fly exercises, CJSOTF-W developed and refined specific responsibilities for each duty position within the JFE and formalized joint-fires TTPs for the C-SCUD mission. The TTPs, written into the classified C-SCUD CONOPS, gave the JFE complete control of all joint fires within any CJSOTF-W joint special-operations area, or JSOA. No air-to-ground ordnance could be dropped within a JSOA without clearance by either the JFE director or the FDO/shift leader, as delegated by the CJSOTF-W commander. Specific, detailed and thoroughly rehearsed procedures for deconfliction and clearance of fires allowed rapid approval of immediate and preplanned CAS as well as air-interdiction missions in support of SF teams and patrols within their JSOAs.

These rapid clearance procedures were facilitated by several command and control, communications and collaborative tools that allowed the JFE to maintain constant contact with the CAOC, the CFSOCC, subordinate CJSOTF units and supporting joint-fires providers, as well as to maintain constant situational awareness of the CJSOTF common operating picture. The tools included ADOCS; secure e-mail; secure phones; command-and-control personal computer, or C2PC; Microsoft Internet Relay Chat, or MIRC chat (used for passing critical time-sensitive information by real-time text messaging); and, most importantly, secure SATCOM on the SCUD-Net. The SCUD-Net was a dedicated satellite-communications, or SATCOM, radio channel that linked the teams, advanced operating bases, forward operating bases, JSOTF JFE, CAOC TST cell, airborne [C.sup.2] platforms and certain strike platforms into a real-time communications net.

In addition to its minute-by-minute monitoring and control of joint fires within the JSOAs, the JFE was also responsible for conducting the CJSOTF's dally coalition targeting board, which collected and prioritized air-interdiction target requests and requests for pre-planned CAS submitted by its subordinate units. The JFE sent prioritized requests for pre-planned CAS to the CFSOCC JFE for further prioritization and submission to the CAOC. The JFE sent prioritized air-interdiction target requests to the CFSOCC J2 targets section for further prioritization and nomination to the JIPTL, produced by the CAOC.

The same procedure was used to nominate any applicable targets within the JSOAs that did not appear on the combined-force commander's approved joint target list, or JTL. Only targets that appeared on the approved JTL could be nominated to the JIPTL. The JFE ALOs would monitor the execution of all CJSOTF-W air-interdiction missions or pre-planned CAS missions that made it into the daily ATO issued by the CAOC.

CGRS

During development of the C-SCUD CONOPS, planners decided to use a CONOPS recently developed by the U.S. Central Command for killbox interdiction/close air support, as the basis for identifying TST locations on the ground. This common geographic reference system, or CGRS, uses lines of latitude and longitude to construct a grid of cells, each measuring 30 minutes by 30 minutes (approximately 30 nautical miles by 30 nautical miles). Those cells are subdivided into nine keypads measuring 10 minutes by 10 minutes (See Figure 1). (1)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

During OIF, the 30-minute-by-30-minute cells were mistakenly referred to by all parties as "killboxes." Killbox is actually a functional capability that can be assigned to any particular cell or keypad. The nomenclature was clarified and corrected in Appendix G (CGRS) of the Air Land Sea Application Center's Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting Multiservice TTP (FM 3-60.1), published in April 2004. The appendix was written by a joint working group composed of subject-matter experts in targeting and joint-fires. The group included ARSOF representatives, many of whom had participated in OIF initial combat operations, specifically the C-SCUD TST operations. A more detailed description of killbox techniques can be found in the ALSA MTTP For Killbox Employment (FM 3-09.34), which is currently in coordinating-draft form.

During the live-fly exercises, it became apparent that with the large number of SF teams that would be operating in the AO, and with a large number of strike platforms in the air, a more precise, fluid and nontraditional construct would be needed for coordinating and deconflicting all joint fires in the AO and delineating the shifting boundaries of operational areas being used by SF units.

The majority of the CFACC's AO became designated as "Special Operations Area-West," or SOA-W. This area established the land boundaries within which CJSOTF-W was allowed to conduct operations. SOA-W was sub divided into several sectors corresponding to the various U.S. and coalition SF tactical headquarters.

Within these sectors, each SF tactical unit was allowed to establish a JSOA. These JSOAs were constructed at the keypad level, the intent being to minimize the area of the JSOA within each sector, in order to give supporting aircraft maximum freedom of strike and maneuver.

Traditional JSOA boundaries are coustructed along geographic or political boundaries, which normally give the JSOA an irregular shape on the map. CJSOTF-W delineated the boundaries of its JSOAs using keypads, resulting in various arrangements of contiguous blocks of terrain of no set shape. Using the keypads also allowed CJSOTF-W to make changes in the JSOAs' shape and location as necessary because of operational necessity or speed of maneuver.

The procedure of changing the JSOA boundaries consisted of opening and closing designated keypads. As mounted SF tactical units moved rapidly across the western desert, they closed keypads to their front and opened those they had vacated. Boundary changes could occur several times during the ATO day. While units kept the changes to a minimum, it was possible to make them as often as every two hours.

The boundary changes were made by means of thorough, preplanned procedures designated in the C-SCUD CONOPS and the ATO special instructions, commonly known as "SPINs." SF tactical headquarters would transmit their desired JSOA changes to the CJSOTF JFE approximately 36 hours prior to release of the ATO for which the changes would be valid (See Figure 2). However, as mentioned, procedures were in place to make the changes more rapidly. The CJSOTF-W JFE could transmit the requested changes to the CAOC TST cell's representative from the SOLE, with a copy to the CFSOCC JFE and J3. As the supported commander who owned the AO, the CFACC had been delegated approval authority, by the CFC, for these immediate JSOA boundary-change requests.

During OIF, the CGRS boundaries of the JSOAs also delineated the boundaries of all FSCMs, such as no-fire areas, or NFAs; ACMs and maneuver-control measures, or MCMs. JSOA keypads were described by a special color designation of "black," thus indicating their multipurpose function.

Essentially, each JSOA was an NFA with designated altitude restrictions for overflying aircraft. Traditional NFAs were used on only three occasions during the operation--once to protect a friendly asset, once to protect a displaced-persons camp, and once to protect a reconnaissance team surveilling an airfield target. It was undesirable for the SF tactical unit's JSOA to include this target's location, as it would have unnecessarily restricted the freedom of maneuver of strike platforms around the target. (2)

The CGRS construct was found to be adaptable and served a number of other purposes. Planners constructed keypad routes for the initial infiltration of mounted SF tactical units into the western desert of Iraq as they moved toward their respective sectors and initial JSOA locations. CJSOTF-W also used keypad routes and boundaries to control the passage of friendly forces from one sector into or through another sector.

In a unique use of keypads, long-distance infiltration routes were established that facilitated an operation across component boundaries. SF teams were inserted clandestinely into a remote desert airstrip within the CFACC's AO, but they then moved overland along the planned keypad routes into the AO of the combined-force land-component commander, or CFLCC, to conduct strategic reconnaissance missions in support of CFLCC offensive operations. Just as with the "moveable" JSOAs, as these teams moved across the desert, they closed keypads ahead of them and opened keypads to their rear. Only small segments of the infiltration routes were therefore "closed" or placed under restrictive ACMs at any one time.

The use of a CGRS during initial SOF combat operations in OIF reflects the noncontiguous, nonlinear nature of the modern battlefield. SOF ground forces operating in that environment required the ability to move rapidly within their assigned AO in order to identify and prosecute TSTs. Boundaries of JSOAs and the FSCMs and ACMs protecting the forces within those JSOAs had to be modified quickly and in a manner that could be easily transmitted and coordinated with higher headquarters, the CAOC and any units providing fires support.

The fidelity of the cell/keypad CGRS structure allowed those control measures to be easily modified, particularly during rapid cross-country movement of mounted SF forces. The latitude/longitude structure of the CGRS and the simplicity of the alphanumeric keypad designator allowed the JSOTF, CAOC, airborne [C.sup.2] platforms and airborne strike platforms to rapidly communicate boundary changes and easily identify new boundaries from the cockpit. Rapid, decisive operations require speed in ground maneuver, [C.sup.2] coordination and deconfliction of joint-fires. CGRS provided that critical solution for CJSOTF-W, facilitating numerous and concurrent successful SF operations within the deep battlespace.

Conclusion

The CGRS techniques used by CJSOTF-W, although they worked well, can certainly be improved upon in the future. The application of these techniques also need not be limited only to SOF operations. There are various opportunities for their use at the operational and tactical levels within any conventional force--be it air, land or sea.

In a memorandum signed Dec. 15, 2004, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to adopt the regional-based CGRS (as used during OIF) as each service's training standard. The applicable reference is Appendix G to the Air, Land, Sea Application CenteFs T/me Sensitive Targeting Multi-Service TFP. Further, the Joint Chiefs have recommended that the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency develop a global-based CGRS for use in the future. CGRS will soon become an integral part of operational training for every ARSOF soldier and unit.

It should be noted that the CGRS was designed as an area reference system, not a point reference system, and that CGRS is not intended to be a substitute for the Military Grid Reference System. CGRS is simply an improved technique for the delineation of operational boundaries, MCMs, FSCMs, ACMs and area targeting efforts.

JFEs are destined to become a standing capability within every future ARSOTF/JSOTF. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command have worked diligently during the past year to develop a template for the future SOFJFE, which will be embedded in the headquarters of each SF group. This SOFJFE will form the core of the deployed ARSOTF/JSOTF JFE and can be further augmented as required. The first "proof of concept" SOFJFE is already in service with a deployed JSOTF. It is imperative that future ARSOF tactical and operational commanders and their senior operations officers and NCOs receive appropriate training on the proper employment of joint-fires support and proper utilization of their SOFJFE.

The success of the JFE in coordinating joint-fires support for CJSOTF-W through the use of a CGRS can be measured in the operational results. Over the 27 days of initial combat operations in the western desert of Iraq, the CJSOTF-W JFE conducted 393 joint-fires deconflictions, with no instances of fratricide or injury by friendly fire. Concurrently, CJSOTF-W prosecuted the highest percentage of dynamic target strikes within the Iraqi AOR, as reported in the initial CENTAF OIF after-action report.

This was a significant difference from OEF, during which there were several unfortunate incidents of friendly-fire fatalities. Lessons learned from both OEF and OIF indicate that centralized control and effective deconfliction of joint fires in support of ARSOF operations will not occur without a trained and capable JFE. The JFE and CGRS are combat-proven capabilities for enabling SOF mission success while reducing operational risks. They are valuable tools to be used and further developed in the support of all future SOF operations.

Notes:

(1) During OIF, CGRS was referred to as the "killbox/keypad methodology," because the TST multiservice TTP, in which the term "CGRS" was first coined, had not yet been written.

(2) The recent addition of 5 minute-by-5 minute quadrants to the CGRS construct (not available during OIF) will greatly aid in closer coordination of air support for SF tactical units.

Colonel Robert Green, U.S. Army Reserve, serves as the assistant chief of staff (IMA) for the US. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He served as director of the joint-fires element for CJSOTF-W during initial combat operations in OIF. Prior to being attached to CJSOTF-W, he served as the J3, director of operations, for SOCJFCOM. Before being mobilized to active duty following Sept. 11, Colonel Green served in a civilian capacity in the Pentagon as the deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for reserve affairs. During his 25-year career in Special Forces, he has served in various active-duty and Army Reserve command and staff assignments. In "SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield," published in the May-June 2003, issue of Military Review, Colonel Green, Colonel Mike Findlay and Major Eric Braganca examine the challenges that arose during OEF with the integration of SOF on the contemporary battlefield.

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