U.S. relations with Honduras and Nicaragua - transcript

U.S. relations with Honduras have historically been stable and constructive. This traditional bilateral cooperation is shaped today by two region-wide objectives shared by both countries:

* To broaden popular participation in a broad, cooperative effort to overcome ingrained patterns of social inequity, economic stagnation, and political authoritarianism; and

* To meet the security threat created by Soviet and Cuban support for regional subversion and the military buildup in Sandinista Nicaragua.

Honduras and the United States make good partners in seeking these objectives.

Honduras is a new democracy buffeted by the Instability of its immediate neighbors, Nicaragua and El Salvador. It has, nonetheless, maintained the integrity of its institutions and played a consistently creative--and too little appreciated--role in seeking diplomatic resolutions of the tensions afflicting Central America.

The United States, for its part, has helped Honduras to strengthen its democratic institutions and to counter the impact of the global economic recession and the military pressures directed against it by Nicaragua.

The U.S.-Honduran partnership is a force for both stability and hope in Central America. Its continued development is essential to prevent a wider regional conflict and to improve prospects for a political solution to Central America's problems.

A full explanation of the relationship between our country and Honduras--the why and how of U.S. policy--must, therefore, begin with a look at the Central American crisis as a whole. U.S. Policy in Central America

There are short-term needs but no short-cuts to resolution of the Central American crisis. Building a durable peace in Central America will require U.S. efforts across a broad range of activities identified by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, and the comprehensive long-term program the President submitted to the Congress on February 17. These efforts must be sustained to succeed.

This policy is designed to work over the long term by addressing each of the interrelated factors that have produced widespread suffering and uncertainty in Central America.

First, inherited inequities between the landed rich and the landless poor continue and the benefits of economic growth have not been widely spread.

That is why we emphasize social and economic reform, including land reform.

Second, political systems have too often been closed to some social groups, including the awakening poor.

That is why we stand so firmly by the democracies--the recent burgeoning in Honduras as well as the continuing tradition in Costa Rica.

And that is why we favor free, fair, open elections and democratic processes in El Salvador, in Guatemala, and in Nicaragua.

Third, reliance on violence to resolve conflict has proved unworkable, and it is morally offensive.

That is why we are promoting security against violence. That is why we are working to help strengthen judicial processes. That is why we are insisting on an end to death squads wherever they exist. And that is why we applaud the Contadora recognition of internal democracy, and not "power sharing," as the only legitimate mechanism toward the resolution of internal conflict.

Fourth, the downturn in the global economy compounded by the spread of guerrilla warfare, particularly in El Salvador, has devastated the Central American economies.

That is why the substantial financial and economic assistance called for by the bipartisan commission is vital: first to help stabilize the situation, then to help restore growth and regional cooperation.

Fifth, the guerrilla movements of the left do not have broad indigenous support--government reforms and the guerrillas' economic warfare undermined the popular support they had before mid-1980, but they do have the outside backing they need to function.

That is why this Administration, like its predecessor, has sought and continues to seek security assistance for El Salvador. And that is why the bipartisan commission warned that: "The worst possible policy for El Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep the war going, but too little to wage it successfully."

Sixth, Nicaragua's massive military buildup and communist military ties are already a source of instability in the entire region.

* Cuban "advisers" entered Managua on the heels of the Sandinista takeover, the Cuban presence reaching hundreds in a matter of months. Today, excluding several thousand Cuban civilians, who increasingly are young males who have served in the Cuban militia, we estimate that between 2,500 and 3,500 Cuban military and secret police personnel are in Nicaragua.

* Soviet-bloc military aid of more than a quarter of a billion dollars since 1979 has made the Sandinista Armed Forces the largest and most heavily equipped in Central America--a military establishment five times larger than Somoza's National Guard and four times that of the Honduran Armed Forces.

This military buildup in Nicaragua not only underpins the Sandinista regime's internal power but is also an instrument of direct harassment and intimidation against its neighbors, Costa Rica and Honduras.

That is why we are providing security assistance to those neighbors. And that is why it is important to help maintain regional balance through joint training exercises which gives palpable reality to U.S. commitments under the 1948 Rio Treaty. Honduras and U.S. Policy

The internal conditions that facilitated the Sandinisa takeover in Nicaragua and nurtured the development of the guerrilla movement in El Salvador do not exist in Honduras.

* Honduras does not have a landed oligarchy. Land reform is a success.

* An independent and free press is open to everyone, including the political opposition.

* Trade unions are an effective force and have been for more than 30 years.

* Although still the strongest single institution, the military has never been a praetorian guard for the privileged, nor is it repressive.

But Honduras does face the serious problems associated with building democratic institutions on a partially feudal (albeit nonviolent) past, in the face of extreme economic hardship, and threatened by political instability on every border.

Economic Difficulties. Consolidation of Honduran democracy will depend less on the balance of civilian-military relations than on managing a difficult economic situation. Hondurans is the poorest Central American nation and the Suazo government inherited an economy that was nearly bankrupt. Fueled by world recession, depressed global markets for the tropical and subtropical agricultural products that are Honduras' major exports, and continued regional instability, the economic crisis can be expected to last well into the 1980s. Burgeoning population growth, declining productivity, a sharp drop in international reserves, limited sources of domestic revenue, and a growing export-import gap are all reasons why Honduras will continue to require substantial bilateral and international assistance.

The inflow of over 44,000 refugees fleeing internal crises in neighboring countries has made major demands on Honduras' fragile economy. About 18,000 are Salvadoran; 700 are from Guatemala; and the rest--more than 20,000--are Nicaraguan, the majority Miskito and Sumo Indians.

Yet, despite economic pressure, high unemployment, and strong austerity measures, the government enjoys substantial popular backing.

Security. In terms of national security, Honduras is preparing principally against terrorism and guerrilla warfare designed to destabilize its popular civilian government.

Beginning in 1981--82, Honduras was struck by a wave of terrorist and subversive attacks. The timing, targets, and accompanying propaganda made it obvious that they were orchestrated by Nicaragua to intimidate the Honduran Government and in retaliation for depriving the Salvadoran guerrillas of sanctuary in Honduran territory.

The government's reaction to the terrorist violence has been firm but measured. Fears of 2 years ago that a rising level of terrorism would provoke police repression have not been borne out. Public security forces have demonstrated a growing antiterrorist capability without providing the radical left the martyrs they seek.

Honduras' external security situation continues to be precarious, however. The Sandinistas have not relented. Their strategy is to increase the political and psychological pressure, backed by a considerable Nicaraguan military buildup and heightened destabilization efforts. Last July Nicaragua infiltrated Cuban-trained guerrillas into Honduras.

Soviet and Cuban efforts, including the training of pilots, call into question the deterrent capacity of the Honduran Air Force, the nation's traditional defensive mainstay. Honduran Army units are undertrained; the country's total military force is one-fourth that of Nicaragua; and its inventory of transportation, communications, and air defense materiel is skimpy and aged.

It should be noted that the perception of threat is not one exclusively of Honduran leaders, whether civilian or military. In September 1983 a Costa Rican affiliate of the Gallup organization asked 700 Honduran adults with a least 1 year of secondary school what country, if any, was either a threat or a help to Honduras. The interviewers volunteered no names of countries. Eighty percent named Nicaragua as a military threat to Honduras. One percent so identified the United States. (This contrast was further emphasized when 93% identified the United States as helping Honduras to solve its problems.)

Honduras is not trying to match Nicaragua's buildup of ground forces. Honduras wants to avoid war with Nicaragua. The country has, therefore, embarked upon a selective military modernization program to establish a minimal deterrent for self-defense. The Honduran military is concentrating on developing a force with sufficient firepower and mobility to meet and attack wherever it might occur and to perform an effective counterinsurgency role.

U.S. Assistance. Our policy toward Honduras is to support a democratic regime under pressure from external forces. Honduran authorities, including the military, agree that economic problems are the most serious questions that the country faces, and U.S. assistance has been concentrated in this sector. While Hondurans express gratitude, they are frustrated that the levels of aid have not been sufficient to bridge the current export-import gap.

U.S. economic assistance ($84.4 million in the continuing resolution for FY 1984; $84.5 million in the FY 1984 supplemental request; $139.0 million requested for FY 1985) is designed to assist Honduras through the difficult period of adjustment. It would provide critically needed foreign exchange to increase the availability of domestic credit as well as to foster private sector participation in the development process.

The U.S. military assistance program has concentrated on training and basic equipment. No sophisticated weapons or systems have been transferred to Honduras. Moreover, that assistance remains modest when compared with the threat facing Honduras and the state of its defensive forces.

The bipartisan commission recommended increased assistance to build a credible deterrent. Our aid $41.5 million in the continuing resolution for FY 1984; $37.5 million in FY 1984 supplemental request; $62.5 million for FY 1985) would provided training, helicopters, fixed-wing transport and communications aircraft, naval equipment and patrol boats, vehicles, medical equipment, radar, communications equipment, ammunition, and spare parts. Some of these items would be used in equipping two new infantry battalions.

The Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) was established in June 1983 to offer training to friendly countries in the region through their military assistance programs. The RMTC is a Honduran facility. Over 100 U.S. Special Forces comprise the majority of the training staff. We are requesting $45 million over the next 2 fiscal years to make the current austere premises a more effective facility for wider regional training.

To enhance Honduran and U.S. capabilities and to demonstrate resolve, we have also conducted a series of major joint military exercises with Honduras. These exercises have also reduced the level of armed incidents instigated by Nicaragua along its common border with Honduras.

To support the exercises, three airfields were upgraded to receive C-130 transport aircraft. These improvements are largely temporary. Engineering units also built 300 seahuts to house exercise troops. They were more cost effective and, in Honduras' climate, healthier than tents. As contemplated, they are being dismantled.

During the Ahuas Tara exercises, two radar facilities capable of detecting aerial infiltration were set up in Honduras. The Honduran Government hopes to purchase a replacement for the long-range early warning surveillance system when it is redeployed. The short-range surveillance radar will soon be returned to the United States.

In May 1982 the United States agreed to improve two other airfields in return for access for various contingency uses. The $13-million construction project to improve runways, ramp space, and fuel facilities at Palmerola airbase is scheduled for completion in June. An $8-million project at La Ceiba has been delayed by Congress pending submission of an overall military construction plan for the region.

The Defense Department has requested funds as part of its FY 1985 budget to construct a prestock ammunition depot, an airplane hangar, and a 150-man living facility at Palmerola as well as prestock ammunition depot at San Lorenzo.

We are analyzing possible participation in the construction of other Honduran facilities if access to such facilities might complement our regional defensive needs.

But even with the expansion of U.S. military assistance, including training at the Regional Military Training Center and the conduct of the Ahuas Tara series of joint exercises, some doubts among the Honduran leadership over the reliability of U.S. sustained support persist.

Military Aid and Democratization. A frequent criticism of U.S. policy toward Honduras is the assertion that all this military activity, in fact, weakens democracy by militarizing the country.

A careful look at what has happened politically--and militarily--in Honduras over the past few years suggests the contrary conclusion: that the whole direction of events has been from military control toward a civilian, democratic polity.

Honduras returned to civilian and constitutional rule in January 1982 after nearly 18 years of military governments. At the time of President Suazo's inauguration of January 23, there was a clear transfer of power from military to civilian hands. This process had already begun during the transition period of the Constituent Assembly, when the key Communications Ministry shifted from military to civilian direction, as did the Ministry of Justice and the Agrarian Reform Institute. The Foreign Ministry and the Forestry Agency were returned to civilian control, leaving the Defense Ministry and the telephone and telegraph agency as the only major government bodies still headed by military men.

The Liberal Party government has established a solid reputation for honesty and technical competence. It has exercised clear and unquestioned authority in economic and internal political matters, including appointments. President Suazo makes the decisions.

The Honduran budget gives higher priority to health, education, and public works than to military expenditures. The government has now initiated a voter registration program to prepare for the November 1985 presidential, congressional, and municipal elections. And in Honduras there are no rumors of coup plotting.

The U.S. role is just as clear. In the first place, the civilian-military relationship is the product of Honduras' own history and political dynamics; the level of U.S. military assitance is not a significant factor. At each stage in the return to democratic rule, the U.S. Government encouraged the restoration and specifically discouraged those elements which sought to maintain de facto military rule. U.S. military assistance has permitted the Honduran Government to husband scarce resources, not divert them from economic to military use.

Honduran democracy is stronger, not weaker, than it was 2 years ago; and Honduras today is clearly more progressive and more democratic than it was before the 1980s. U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua

The military components of U.S. policy toward Honduras are closely related to our objectives with regard to Nicaragua. Those objectives, in turn, reinforce the overall policy of support for democracy, development, and security in Central America.

We seek an end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla groups, severance of Nicaraguan military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc, restoration of military equilibrium by reduction of Nicaragua's military strength rather than a corresponding buildup by its neighbors, and fulfillment of the original Sandinista promises to support democratic pluralism.

These objectives are consistent with the goals the Sandinistas themselves set as the Somoza dictatorship was collapsing. They match the objectives of Nicaragua's neighbors, from small, concerned, democratic Costa Rica to the regional powers--Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela--all deeply affected with the threat to peace in Central America. And they are consistent with a series of bilateral and then multinational approaches to Nicaragua over the last 3 years.

This record of consistency, of increasingly convergent views, is itself a remarkable piece of history which deserves greater attention and study. The chronology of demarches for peace--and of the Nicaraguan reaction to them--best provides the background to what is happening now.

The Search for Serious Negotiations. When the Sandinistas came to power in July of 1979, they assumed that they would succeed in monopolizing power in Nicaragua and help to overthrow neighboring governments, beginning with El Salvador. They were confident that Cuban and Soviet support would enable them to overcome resistance. They made promises about nonalignment and demoncratic pluralism, and they called just as openly for "negotiations"--using them, however, as a tactic to divide their neighbors and neutralize the United States.

Prior to mid-1983, the Sandinistas' record on these key regional issues was one of total intransigence. They drove non-Marxists from the government, repressed independent groups, established intimate ties with Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and gave full support to the guerrillas in El Salvador and to terrorists in Honduras and Costa Rica. They even spurned U.S. bilateral aid when congressional conditionality insisted that Nicaragua end support for subversion. And they rejected or ignored U.S. and other bilateral peace proposals as well as the multilateral San Jose peace framework.

In short, for 4 years the Sandinistas consistently rebuffed economic and diplomatic incentives to change their behavior and enter into serious negotiations.

Over the past year, however, various pressures on Nicaragua have increased enough to start giving the Sandinistas some second thoughts. These pressures include West European criticism of Sandinista repression and subversion; stead-fast resistance to Sandinista pressures by all of Nicaragua's neighbors; the embarrassing collapse of the Sandinista attempt to undermine Contadora at the United Nations last fall; the failure of guerrilla forces to break the stalemate in El Salvador or to advance elsewhere in the region; the setback to Soviet and Cuban influence in Grenada; the continuation and expansion of resistance to the Sandinistas inside Nicaragua; and, frankly, the evidence of the U.S. military presence in the immediate area--in Honduras, in El Salvador, and at various times offshore. To these must be added the consensus, expressed by the bipartisan commission and shared by the sponsors of the Contadora negotiations, that Nicaragua's military ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union are an obstacle to peace and development in the entire region.

The first indications of possible Sandinista flexibility occurred in July 1983 when Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega announced willingness to take part in regional peace negotiations. Then, in September 1983, the Nicaraguan Government formally agreed to the 21-point Contadora Document of Objectives--which includes all demands by their neighbors--as a basis for peace. in November the Sandinistas embardked on a flurry of high-visibility diplomatic activity to advertise their claimed desire for peace. This was coupled with hints of loosened ties with Cuba, plus hints of eased internal controls, e.g., dialogue with Catholic Church officials and initial discussion of the elections now announced for November 4.

These moves could still prove wholly tactical. The Sandinistas have yet to give up anything significant, either domestically or in their links to Cuba and the Soviet Union. We have seen no evidence of fundamental change in Nicaragua's relations with the Salvadoran guerrillas. What has taken place so far may well represent only a surface shift aimed at lulling us, the rest of the world, and the Nicaraguan people. Our conclusion--shared by most observers in the area and in Europe as well--is that continued pressure is necessary. The Contadora Negotiations

For pressure to work, it must have defined political goals--a reasonable alternative that satisfies common concerns. That is the essence of diplomacy in the real world. And the key point is that such a set of clearly delineated goals does exist: they are contained in the 21 points agreed to by all nine Contadora countries last fall.

The Document of Objectives agreed to on September 7, 1983, by the five Central American states, including Nicaragua, is not a fuzzy series of admirable but unreachable goals. It is a specific set of standards written in terms fully understandable to all the participants. And it is a formula that would achieve our objectives in Nicaragua--if actually implemented on a verifiable and enforceable basis.

Compare our own four basic objectives in Nicaragua with the substance of the Contadora Document of Objectives.

* We seek an end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla groups; the Document of Objectives calls for an end to support for subversion.

* We want Nicaragua to sever its military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc; the Document of Objectives calls for the proscription of foreign military bases and the reduction and eventual elimination of foreign military advisers and troops.

* We seek reduction of Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would restore military equilibrium in the area; the Document of Objectives calls for the reduction of current inventories of arms and military personnel.

* We seek fulfillment of the original Sandinista promises to support democratic pluralism; the Document of Objectives calls for the establishment of democratic systems of government based on genuinely open elections.

* Finally, we seek a diplomatic solution that is verifiable and enforceable; the Document of Objectives calls for adequate means of verification and control.

The substance of the 21 objectives is virtually identical with our own reading of what is necessary to satisfy legitimate U.S. interests in the area. Those who doubt that should compare the Contadora substance to the October 1982 San Jose statement, of which we were a signatory together with eight other democratic countries.

The joint exercises, the infrastructre developed in Honduras to support those exercises, the fleet maneuvers, the fears of Nicaragua's neighbors, the warnings to the Sandinistas from Europe and from around this hemisphere--all are part of this carefully nurtured framework of pressure-with-a-purpose. What the Sandinistas are being asked to do is clear to them, to their neighbors, and to us. The path to a political "solution," to regional democracy and disarmament is encompassed in the 21 objectives.

The Honduran record with regard to these negotiations is also clear. The record shos that Honduras has been firmly supportive of a comprehensive regional approach to the resolution of political tension in Central America.

Many Hondurans, including senior government officials, consider the achievements of the Contadora process--especially the Document of Objectives drafted in September 1983--as an essentially Honduran achievement. This interpretation can be supported by a reading of the Honduran peace plan presented to the Organization of American States by foreign Minister Paz Barnica on March 23, 1982. Honduras has been consistently willing to discuss all issues with any of its neighbors, including Nicaragua, but insists--along with Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala--that the principle of reciprocity and procedures for verification are intrinsic to the achievement of a meaningful peace.

The basic fact is this: if the Sandinistas adhere to those principles in a way in which we can have confidence--whether on the basis of a formal treaty or not--its neighbors will do the same, and so will we. The pressure will have worked, our concerns will have been alleviated, and a political solution will have been achieved in Central America. But for that to happen, no one can afford to let up on the pressures without a corresponding change on the other side. Prospects for the Future

The months ahead are critical. They will determine whether the progress to date proves ephemeral or begins to establish a pattern for regional stability.

We know what the standards are. There are benchmarks along the way; and we must all keep careful track, in effect "conditioning" our attitudes and actions on what is actually happening in Central America: we are looking for tangible evidence--that El Salvador and Honduras are continuing to develop a democratic polity; that Nicaragua and Guatemala are taking credible steps toward fair elections, including openness to all political factions; and that democratic governments are able to protect themselves against the antidemocratic terror of the far left and the far right.

We can, with some precision, envision a better future for the people of Central America. Costa Rica, Honduras, and increasingly El Salvador demonstrate that the vision is attainable. And we will have erred consciously if we do not use our resources now to help them move toward that future.

COPYRIGHT 1984 U.S. Government Printing Office
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