The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces

The operational elements of United States Army Special Forces are direct descendants of the units of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, that were infiltrated into metropolitan France during World War II. The OSS units were tasked to organize, train, supply and direct the Maquis of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, or FFI, in support of Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in June 1944; and Operation Dragoon, the invasion of Southern France, in August 1944.

This is not to imply that Army SF is not a direct descendant of the OSS units employed in other areas of the world that were active in the development, support and direction of the indigenous resistance to Axis occupation. However, the organization and the mission of the operational detachments of the original 10th SF Group bear a remarkable resemblance to the organization and activities of the OSS Operational Group, or OG, that became Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional) in August 1944.

The OGs were Major General William Donovan's idea. As Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky (1) explained when he introduced Major Alfred T. Cox to a group of newly assigned officers who would form the "French" OGs, the concept was to use American soldiers who had language skills and were trained in commando-type tactics.

The soldiers would not only provide training and material support for the resistance, they would also form the nucleus for local resistance forces who would attack enemy facilities and lines of communication deep behind the lines. Much of the training that Major Cox and others developed for the OGs was based on the experience of British commandos. It placed a heavy emphasis on physical training, demolitions, special weapons and the hit-and-run offensive operational techniques of guerrillas.

Al Cox, an Infantry officer, was a strong and agile athlete who had played three major sports while studying civil engineering at Lehigh University During his senior year, he had been named captain of the football team and co-captain of the baseball team. He was elected president of his class during his junior and senior years, and he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. (2)

The OSS had recruited Cox when he was an instructor of guerrilla warfare at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. With the assistance of men like 1st Lieutenant Art Frizzell, Cox led the French OGs through the demanding training in preparation for the day when the tactics and techniques would be put to use against the Wehrmacht.

The French OGs arrived in North Africa in February 1944. Referred to as Unit B, 1st Contingent Operational Groups, 2677 Headquarters Company 055 (Provisional), the French OGs were organized as a field-service headquarters, or FSHQ, commanded by Major Cox. The OG FSHQ was the echelon above the OG, and it controlled and directed the activities of two to five OGs. The FSHQ consisted of eight officers and 20 enlisted men and was comparable to the SF B-detachment of later years. Organizationally, the FSHQ included the operations, medical, communication, supply and administrative personnel who were active in the training, preparation, deployment and support of the OGs in the operational area. (3)

In August 1944, Unit B was redesignated Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional) to distance the purely military OGs from the "agents, spies, and saboteurs" of the 2677th Headquarters Company of the OSS. The event that prompted the separation was the execution of two officers and 13 enlisted men of Mission Ginny from Unit A, 1st Contingent (Italian OGs). All the members of Ginny had been captured March 22, 1944, on an operation in Italy to destroy a railway tunnel on the La Spezia-Genoa railroad line. During interrogation, they had disclosed the details of their OSS association, and it was feared that they were executed because of their OSS connection. (4)

The French OGs were aware that their involvement in guerrilla warfare would bring harsh treatment from the enemy if they were captured. (5) Many of the soldiers may not have been aware of the implications of Hitler's Kommandobefeyl, (6) but they sewed the patch of the Seventh U.S. Army on their left shoulders in the hope that it would somehow ensure their treatment as prisoners of war.

In the spring of 1944, the French OGs (7) were placed under the tactical control of the Special Projects Operations Center, G-3 Special Operations, Allied Forces Headquarters, in Algiers. The OGs of Unit B had been organized into 14 OG sections, and the plan was for each section to organize and train the French Resistance, the Maquis, for the purpose of delaying the movement of enemy reserves to the invasion lodgment area in Normandy; to harass enemy lines of communication in their area of operations in southern France; and to conduct such sabotage operations as were directed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean in support of Operation Overlord. (8)

To prepare the troops for commitment deep within the enemy occupied areas of southern France, the OGs' arduous training in the Atlas Mountains of North Africa had emphasized night patrolling and scouting, guerrilla warfare, demolitions and fieldcraft.

The first section to be deployed was Operation Emily, (9) commanded by Art Frizzell. Emily departed on the night of June 6, 1944. But the weather system that battered the Normandy beaches reached Southern France, as well, and the drop zone was obscured. Emily returned to Algiers. Two days later, Emily successfully infiltrated on drop zone Chenier, near La Bastride-du-Hautmont in the department of Cantal. (10) The members of Emily were met on the drop zone by British Major R. MacPherson of Jedburgh Team Quinine, (11) who had landed there only a few minutes ahead of them. Emily was assigned the mission of denying the Wehrmacht the use of the rail bypass from Cahors-Figeac and Figeac-Brive in the Department of Lot. (12)

OG Justine was the second section to deploy. Justine, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Vernon G. Hopper, parachuted onto drop zone Taille Crayon near Vassieux on the Vercours plateau during the early morning of June 29. Justine's mission was to strengthen the Maquis in the Vercours region and to carry out guerrilla warfare against German supply lines, lines of communication and telecommunications.

OG Louise arrived on drop zone Tandem, in the Department of Ardeche, July 18, to strengthen the Maquis, to harass the Germans, and to reconnoiter the west bank of the Rhone River and the area of Ales-Langogne. OG Betsy was also dropped onto drop zone Tandem, but it arrived July 26. Betsy joined Louise and assisted in attacking targets and harassing and attacking German installations and lines of communication.

OG Ruth infiltrated Aug. 4 and was met by a disorganized group of Francs-tireurs et Partisans, or FTP, (13) personnel who were expecting a supply drop. After a considerable delay in moving to its area of operation, Ruth began attacking bridges to prevent the Germans from moving along the railroads and highways in the area.

OG Pat and OG Alice were deployed Aug. 6. Pat parachuted onto drop zone Virgule in the Department of Tarn to cut lines of communication within the triangle of Toulouse, Bedarieux and Severac. Further to the northeast in the Department of Drome, Alice landed on drop zone Framboise, three kilometers southwest of Bourdeaux, to reconnoiter National Highway Number 7 and Route Napoleon, to report German troop movements, and, with the Maquis, to interdict and harass German columns whenever possible.

Near dawn on Aug. 12, OG Peg parachuted onto the wrong drop zone. The reception party was expecting a supply drop. According to Lieutenant Grahl H. Weeks, the OG team leader, "The Maquis were very excited about the unexpected American arrival, and it was some time before we could get them started to work." Peg's mission was to harass German forces along Route Nationale 117 and to interdict lines of communication in the Carcassonne Gap area of the Department of Aude.

The next day, Aug. 13, an Italian-speaking section, OG Nancy, infiltrated onto drop zone Armature near Saint Christol on the Franco-Italian border to interdict lines of communication in the region of the Montgenevre pass. Another Italian-speaking section, OG Helen, also departed Aug. 13 for France to block Col de Larche in the Alps, but because of weather, Helen had to return to North Africa.

Cox was deeply involved in the pre-mission preparation of the OG, and he personally conducted the final briefing for each section before it departed. With the bulk of his unit in the field, Cox; Captain Morin, his executive officer; Captain J. "Doc" Hamblet, the unit medical officer; and five enlisted men, boarded a bomber in Algiers Aug. 24. As Mission Lehigh, they would parachute into southern France to aid the resistance movement in the Ardeche Department and coordinate the operations of the other OG sections in the Rhone River west-bank area.

Shortly after midnight on Aug. 25, Lehigh landed in German-occupied France. The infiltration was generally successful, but Sergeant Campbell, the unit first sergeant, was injured on landing. (14) Another casualty of the drop was the radio, (15) but Corporal Rockman was able to repair it and establish contact with the base station at the Special Projects Operations Center in North Africa. After assembling, the personnel moved by local motor transportation to an inn at Devesset.

At Devesset, Cox spoke for several hours with Commandant Paul Vauicheret, also known as Vanel, about the enemy and friendly situation in the Ardeche. Vanel was chief of the Interallied Military Mission Pectorial and was the appointed commander of the FFI in Ardeche. (l6) Cox learned from Vanel that the resistance movement in Ardeche consisted of approximately 5,000 armed men organized into battalions. The Armee Secrete, or AS, some of whom were sedentaries (comparable to the minutemen of colonial America), owed their allegiance to General de Gaulle's Cornite Francais de la Liberation Nationale, or CFLN, (17) and were well-trained, disciplined military units. On the other hand, the FTP, the military arm of the French communist movement, at best owed only begrudging allegiance to CFLN. Vanel considered the FTP to be poorly trained, undisciplined and generally unreliable.

Vanel explained that the areas along the German lines of commumcation were divided into sectors, and that each sector was assigned to either an AS or an FTP battalion. For political reasons, there was no liaison between the sectors, which complicated the coordination of operations.

During the afternoon, Hamblet and several others visited the hospital at Chainbon-sur-Lignon. They found T/5 Biodeau of OG Louise, who had broken his leg during the parachute jump on July 18. They also found Sergeant Linnell, T/5 St. Sauveur and Private Crough, all of OG Betsy, who had been wounded by shrapnel from a bomb dropped by a German aircraft Aug. 10; and Sergeant Lynch, also of Betsy, who had suffered a broken collarbone in a vehicle accident Aug. 20.

The four U.S. wounded from OG Betsy and 25 Maquis casualties from the German air attack were initially treated in the French infirmary at Vanosc and then evacuated to the hospital in Saint Agreve, 35 kilometers away. The French doctors had worked furiously on the wounded, but they were unable to save Sergeant Barnabe, one of the Betsy squad leaders, who died shortly after surgery. Some days later, the other wounded had been transferred to the hospital at Chambon-surLignon.

Each OG section had a medical aidman who had received extensive medical training in the U.S. before joining the OSS. The medics provided excellent treatment in the field. Their medical supplies included sulfonamides, which the French lacked, and they were later able to obtain penicillin. (18) As a medical officer, Hamblet was available to assist the French in developing field medical services and evacuation systems, but the pace of operations precluded that type of advisory effort. (19)

Cox traveled by motor vehicle (20) to the sector where the members of OG Louise were operating. Louise had received 37 mm guns Aug. 15, and early in the morning of Aug. 25, near the city of Vallons, Lieutenant Rickerson, the executive officer of Louise, with other members of the section, took withdrawing German forces under fire. Late in the afternoon, the Maquis security force on the flanks of the gun position withdrew without warning. The Germans attacked the guns, which the Americans were forced to abandon after a fierce firefight. Cox learned that this was not the first time for a sudden withdrawal on the part of the Maquis.

Upon his return to Val-les-bains, Cox recommended to Vanel that each OG section be assigned to a sector in which the Maquis had demonstrated good leadership, discipline and combat ability. Cox insisted that Vanel ensure proper liaison between sectors and that a centrally located reserve of materiel and troops be established. The reserve would be deployed to tip the scales when it appeared that the Germans were about to defeat the Maquis.

On the morning of Aug. 27, Cox, Hamblet, Morin, and Sergeants Delage, Beaudoin and O'Lear drove to Annonay. Shortly after arriving, they learned from the Maquis that a German column was moving north near Tournon. They departed immediately for Tournon. When they arrived there, a Frenchman warned them that Germans were only a few kilometers away.

Cox, Morin, Delage and O'Lear struck out toward the top of a hill to observe the German column, while Hamblet and Beaudoin hid the vehicle. Unfortunately, the advance guard of the German column -- two open cars and a double line of infantry -- appeared on the road in front of the four men and immediately began firing on them. Morin and O'Lear managed to fade safely back into the mountains, as did Hamblet and Beaudoin, who had moved up after hiding the motor vehicle. Cox and Delage, however, were caught in the open, and they ran, zig-zagging across a plowed field. Fortunately, the German column was more concerned with the Maquis than with the two fleeing men.

The German column leapfrogged forward with professional precision and placed small-arms fire, automatic-weapons fire and mortar fire on likely ambush sites along the road. Cox and Delange managed to sprint through a line of trees to a water-filled ditch some 300 yards from the road, where they lay, covered with brush, while several German patrols beat the bushes nearby.

An hour later, the two men were startled by two women who splashed up the ditch searching for a place to hide. The nerve-wracking wait continued, and the women added to the danger with their unconcerned chatter. Miraculously, the German patrols that were prowling the fields and tree line nearby failed to locate the group.

After dark, two Frenchmen discovered the little group and led them to a house away from the road. After they changed into French civilian clothing and hid their wet uniforms and equipment in the barn's hayloft, Cox and Delange were led to the house, where the French family, at the risk of their lives, provided the sanctuary of their home to the two men.

The women prepared a meal, which the soldiers devoured and washed down with a delicious red wine. Tired to the bone, the two Americans tumbled into bed, disturbed only by the noises coming from the German column that moved throughout the night.

The next morning, still in civilian clothing, the two men crossed the road during a break in the German column and gained the cover of the heavily forested hills, where they once again donned their uniforms. (Ten days later, Cox returned to the area to thank the family for their hospitality. He learned that German patrols had searched all the homes in the valley less than an hour after he and Delage had departed. The men, he was told, were taken further up the valley as hostages and later, for some unexplained reason, shot.)

Morin and O'Lear spent an uncomfortable night in the woods, and when daylight returned, they were located by the Maquis. Hamblet and Beaudoin hitchhiked to Devesset, where they were reunited with the other four men later in the morning. That afternoon, they learned that personnel from Betsy had been strafed by what was thought to have been a U.S. plane. T15 Raymond Bisson, the section medic, had been killed. Lieutenant Paul E. Boudreau, the section leader, had been seriously wounded and had been evacuated to the hospital at Chambon-sur-Lignon.

Information concerning the German column that Cox and Delage had narrowly avoided was passed to the OSS base station in Algiers. Intelligence received from the Maquis in the Tournon area over the next few days indicated that German combat forces and supporting units consisting of approximately 50,000 troops, more than a thousand vehicles, a few half-tracks and some artillery, had passed through Tournon continuously for four days and nights.

On Aug. 29, Cox and Lieutenant McKenzie, who had accompanied him to Val-les-bains, learned that a German column was preparing to move from Vallons to Privas. McKenzie hurriedly departed to bring up Louise and the 37 mm guns, which they had recovered from Vallons. Cox, Vanel and the local Maquis chiefs performed a reconnaissance of the area, but the Maquis became bogged down in endless discussion when they began planning.

The Maquis placed a company on every route the Germans were likely to use. Theoretically then, the Maquis would have the Germans surrounded, but in reality, the Germans blasted through the single Maquis company on the route they had chosen and continued on their way unmolested by the other Maquis units. Cox was exasperated; there had been too much talk and not enough action.

Cox knew that small bands operating in true guerrilla fashion -- hitting and running, slashing continually at the enemy's flanks and fading info the countryside -- could exact a tremendous materiel and psychological toll on the fleeing German forces. Unfortunately, the more certain the success of the Allied armies became, the more the Maquis leadership wanted to behave like a conventional force. The Maquis leadership focused more and more on the liberation of Lyon and other large cities in the area, ignoring the opportunity to batter the retreating German columns.

During the night of Aug. 29, OGs Helen and Lafayette had parachuted in. In the afternoon, Lafayette departed for the Maquis headquarters at Chateau Olivier in a truck provided by the Maquis. OG Helen remained in Devesset until Aug. 31, then moved by truck to Saint-Etienne.

In the early morning of Aug. 31, after spending the night at Chateau Olivier, Lieutenant Odilon Fontaine of OG Lafayette, joined by Lieutenant Rickerson and T/5 Henry D. Collette of OG Louise and a Maquis officer, traveled to Chomerac to investigate reports of German forces in the area. When they arrived, they learned the strength and the location of the German units from a German POW who was being held by the Maquis.

Another German prisoner agreed to assist them in contacting the German commanders. This POW went through the lines and returned with a Russian who was the company commander of a Russian volunteer unit with the German Army. The Russian told them that there were five battalions of German troops in the hills east of Chomerac.

The US. party left the Russian with the Maquis and made their way to the German position, where they contacted a German battalion commander, a major. The major contacted his commander, a colonel, who arrived with the other four battalion commanders.

The colonel, who spoke fluent French, explained to the interpreter, Collette, that he wished to discuss terms with the American commander. Collette contacted Cox at Devesset, but before Cox could arrive, a French armored-reconnaissance vehicle appeared and began firing at the Germans. Without further negotiation, the German officers threw their hands in the air, shouting, "We surrender to you Americans!"

The number of German prisoners taken was two colonels, six majors, 22 captains and lieutenants, and 3,794 enlisted men. The Americans later learned that the two colonels, one of the majors and 150 other German POWs had been executed on the orders of a Maquis chief for atrocities they had committed against the Maquis and French civilians.

At FFI headquarters in Yzeron, Cox learned that the long-awaited attack on Lyon was scheduled for Sept. 2, and he hurriedly returned to Devesset. On Sept. 1, OG William, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Harry L. Herres, arrived in southern France, parachuting in strong winds just before midnight. Cox issued OG William a warning order for the attack on Lyon, and he returned to Yzeron with Hamblet and McKinzie to arrange the use of the OGs in the attack. Cox established contact with the chief of staff of the French 1st Armored Division, which would take part in the attack.

The next morning, Cox joined OG Helen, which was to spearhead the attack in their sector. Apprehensively, Cox watched Helen move out in battle formation on the outskirts of the city. He knew only too well that if the Germans elected to put up a fight, it would take more than the lightly armed Maquis to drive them out. He and Hamblet proceeded on foot toward the high ground on the west bank of the Saone River that overlooked Lyon. To their amazement, they found that they were ahead of the attacking Maquis. Huge crowds of French civilians swarmed around them, giving them a wild welcome. "No comic South American revolution ever had as much firing and as little effect. The opposition consisted of, at most, two German machine guns and the Milice (21) firing rifles and submachine guns from windows. The Maquis and the French armored cars opened up with all their weapons, spraying the front of the buildings. Civilians were everywhere, hugging and kissing the men as they fired, with complete disregard of all the firi ng."

The festive mood of the civilians and Maquis quickly turned nasty The Miliciens were ruthlessly hunted down and summarily executed. Women who were accused of consorting with the Germans were stripped, branded, mutilated and tortured before being shot. In the frenzy, the mob killed several "agents" of allied intelligence, even as one victim was claiming that he could prove he was a loyal Frenchman. Fortunately, in a few days the FFI imposed control over the city, and the mayhem slowly diminished.

Major Douglas G. Bonner of the 4th Special Forces Unit (22) located Cox in Lyon, and the two decided to assemble the OG sections at Grenoble. Cox sent Hamblet to arrange the evacuation of the wounded to the assembly area, and by Sept. 17, all units had closed on Grenoble.

The 14 OG sections that had infiltrated southern France were, in general, successful at organizing and training the Maquis. In concert with those Maquis forces, the OGs conducted operations to destroy priority targets on the railroads and highways. They also established roadblocks and ambushes, and they cut communication and power lines in order to harass and impede the enemy forces that were moving toward and away from the invasion beaches.

Through their communication link with Algiers, the OGs relayed vital order-of-battle information for their area of operations. Several of the sections located and assisted downed allied airmen. The least tangible, but probably the most important aspect, of the OGs was the tremendous lift their presence gave to the Maquis. (23)

As a result of their operations with the Maquis, the OGs reported 461 German soldiers killed in action, 467 wounded in action, and 10,021 German prisoners of war taken.

During the stay in Grenoble, Cox conducted a post-operations critique. All OG members expressed the opinion that the extensive training they had received was effective. All personnel had received basic infantry, guerrilla warfare, mountain operations and parachute training prior to deployment. At least 50 percent of the training was conducted during darkness, and some of the men commented that the field training problems were more difficult than the operations.

The OG members generally agreed that more emphasis should have been placed on the operation and maintenance of foreign weapons and vehicles, on methods of instruction, on French military nomenclature, and on radio maintenance and repair (for the radio operators). The soldiers considered their equipment, on the whole, to be satisfactory. Complaints about the footgear and clothing indicate that the jump boot did not hold up well in the mountainous terrain, and that the U.S. field jacket did not provide sufficient protection against the cold. The use of the mountain sleeping bag allowed the soldiers to sleep comfortably almost regardless of conditions. The consensus was that the carbine with folding stock, the .45-caliber pistol and the Marlin submachine gun were useful at short range. However, the soldiers agreed that the Browning Automatic Rifle and light machine gun were essential and should have been available from the beginning.

The SSTR-1, the radio issued to the OG sections, was compact and lightweight, and it had the necessary range, but it was not durable. Most of its failures were due to minor flaws in the basic components and their construction. With only two or three exceptions, the operators had no idea how the radio functioned and therefore could not correct the failures. Even the operators who understood the sets had neither the tools nor the spare parts to repair them. The power pack was the second most likely component to fail. The majority of the power-pack failures were related to loose connections, shorts, lack of insulation and overheating of the unit.

The unanimous conclusion among the OGs, Jedburghs and other elements was that the OSS units were committed much too late to achieve maximum effect on the Maquis. In the experience of the OGs, every day that was spent in training the Maquis brought a greater combat effectiveness.

The consensus was that the real Maquis, the patriotic Frenchmen who risked everything in order to liberate France from the Nazis, were above praise. Many of them, operating in small bands or as individuals, carried the fight to the Germans for three to four years without adequate supplies of food, weapons or ammunition. Their presence in the countryside made the occupation a continual hell for the Germans.

While the organization and the discipline of each Maquis unit varied, the presence of former officers and NCOs of the French army usually resulted in a well-disciplined and better-trained force. The FFI organizations could have been more effective had the Maquis been required to confine their efforts to guerrilla warfare, harassing the fleeing enemy at every opportunity. Instead, the FFI often attempted to bring together a large force as an army of liberation of the larger towns in the area.

In general, the OG sections were warmly received by the French; however, on rare occasions FFI chiefs deliberately hampered OG activities. The actions of the FFI chiefs often had a political basis: serious animosity existed between the various groups. The consensus among the OGs was that no political group should be permitted to have a "private" army.

After studying the experience of the Jedburgh teams in southern France, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. Baker, in his final report of the SPOC Debriefing Operations at Avignon, strongly recommended that all future operations contemplated for Jedburgh teams be strictly separated from political considerations. If that was not possible, then the team should be fully briefed on all the political aspects of its task, and personnel should be selected with the political aspects in mind. The same observations would be valid for OGs as well.

Similar to the French OG sections, the FA Team, SF Operational Detachment Regiment, as organized under the original TO&E 33-2 approved in April 1952, was authorized 15 men: a detachment commander, an executive officer and 13 enlisted men. The FA team was, in theory, capable of organizing, supporting and directing a regimentalsized guerrilla unit.

The functional specialties represented on the FA Team were medical, demolitions, communications, weapons, operations and intelligence. The scouts of the OG section were replaced on the FA Team by additional specialists in medical, weapons, demolitions, and operations and intelligence. The field radio repairman was added to the FA Team organization because of the problems the OSS operational teams had experienced with their communications equipment in the field. In southern France, the next echelon in the OG organization functioned in a similar manner to that envisioned for the FB Team, Special Forces Operational Detachment District B.

Colonel Aaron Bank, who was an OG, a Jedburgh and a member of the Special Operations Branch of the 055, was involved in and exposed to the OSS/SOE field activities in the European, Mediterranean and China-Burma-India theaters of operation. Bank was personally involved in the conflicts that would arise over command and control. In an after-action report, he complained that Interallied Military Mission Isotrope "had decided beforehand as to our disposition and also the distribution of our arms, which immediately created a barrier between us, as I had been briefed to operate as a guerrilla organizer and leader, and the disposition of my arms was my own affair." Bank later concluded, "Jeds should never work with Missions as there is a constant clash." (24) His experience in southern France may account for the hierarchical arrangement of the FA, FB and FC teams in the 10th SF Group and for the concepts of their deployment and support.

Bank was also well aware of the OSS/SOE support organizations in North Africa, Britain, France and the Far East. He knew from firsthand experience what was necessary for the support of the UW mission that was envisioned for Special Forces. His experience was incorporated into the 1952 SF TO&E that established the SF group and the SFOB. The SF group and the SFOB would perform essentially the same role as the OSS/SOE command-and-control, logistics-support and commumcations organizations.

Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, who some insist was as responsible for the development of US. Army Special Forces as Bank was, certainly made an important contribution to the form and substance of the emerging Special Forces. Volckmann, who had refused to surrender to the Japanese in 1941, evaded into the mountains of northern Luzon and organized five regiments of Philippine guerrillas. (25) The OSS and SOE were not involved in the development, support or direction of those guerrilla forces. The Allied Intelligence Bureau, organized under the assistant chief of staff, G2 in the Southwest Pacific Theater, provided the organization and support for Volckmann's guerrilla forces.

However, the arrangement did not work well. "The special operations group was primarily concerned with fostering resistance and conducting sabotage behind the enemy's lines, while NIB was primarily concerned with strategic and combat intelligence." (26) Being that as it may, the "Philippine guerrilla units performed valuable services by operating coast-and-air watchers stations, providing information, obstructing Japanese communications and operations, and maintaining the morale and loyalty of the civilian population." (27)

Regardless of which person had the most influence on the Department of the Army's acceptance of the organization and on the concept of employment of the 10th SF Group in 1952, the implication is that U.S. Army Special Forces is a

synthesis of the organizational and operational experience of the OSS. It is not clear whether Aaron Bank and Al Cox, who worked for the CIA after World War II, ever conferred during the development of the 10th SF Group. Veterans of the French OGs now insist that Cox taught Bank everything he knew about guerrilla warfare and that therefore Cox had a definite influence on the ultimate form and substance of the 10th SF Group.

[FIGURE OMITTED]

Notes:

(1.) Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky parachuted into Sardinia in September 1943 to persuade Italian General Basso, who was the commanding general of the Italian troops on the island, to assist in neutralizing the 270,000 Italian and 19,000 German troops on the islands and to assist in securing the flank of the Salerno invasion. In August 1944, Obolensky was infiltrated into the southern part of Indre Department of France as commander of Operation Patrick. Serge Oboleasky, The Memoirs of Serge Obolensky: One Man in His Time (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

(2.) The Lehigh University Epitome (yearbook), 1940.

(3.) During World War II, the operational units, including the OGs, were imbedded in an elaborate organization for command and control, logistics support and communications that, in many respects, was replicated in the U.S. Ax-my Special Forces operational base.

(4.) Information supplied by Albert Materazzi, operations Officer, Company A, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional), including basic operating instructions for Ginny, report of the Ginny operation, report of the first attempt to relieve Ginny party, report of the second attempt to relieve Ginny party, and other documents related to the execution of the officers and men of' Mission Ginny. Copy in the Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

(5.) Cox wrote to the commander of the 2677th Headquarters Company OSS (Provisional), in early May 1944, "I sincerely believe that I am speaking for myself; for many of my officers, and for many of my men, in saying that we realize fully the risks entailed in our type of operations and that we are ready and anxious to assume those risks.... It would be a terrible disappointment to many of us if the OG idea were to be abndoned [sic]"; A. Materazzi documents, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Gamble, Subject: Future Employment of Operational Groups, dated 8 May 1944.

(6.) Part of Hitler's Kommandobefehl (Commando Order) stated, "From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships or aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals when found should be prepared to give themselves up, as a matter of principle, no pardon is to be granted them."

(7.) April 1944, two OGs and personnel for a field service headquarters from Unit B, 1st Contingent, were transferred to the United Kingdom under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Serge Oboleasky, who was concurrently the commanding officer of the OGs, European Theater of Operations. NARA Microfilm M-1623, Roll No. 9, Vol. 4-A, January-June 1944, Operational Groups, 6.

(8.) Directive SHAEF/1724O/13/ops, Role of resistance groups in the South of France, dated 21 May 1944, contained in Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Section VII, "Resistance in France." Copy located in the Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

(9.) The operation name was used to identify the OG section and FSHQ. Each operation had a named signal plan: For Emily it was Helium, and for Lehigh it was Simone.

(10.) Personal communications with A.P. Frizzell, May 2000.

(11.) Arthur Brown, The Jedburghs: A Short History. Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Jedburgh teams were ostensibly composed of American, British and French soldiers, when in fact, only 10 of the 101 Jedburgh teams were so composed. Eighteen of the teams had two Frenchmen or Dutchmen, depending on the destination; 32 had two Americans; and 41 had two British soldiers. The teams were infiltrated into France for the purpose of organizing, supporting and directing the Resistance. Eight teams, Clarence, Claude, Daniel II, Dicing, Dudley II, Edward, Gambling and Stanley II, were deployed to Holland.

(12.) Initially, the railway bridge over the Cele River at Conduche was selected, and on June 12, 1944, the bridge was destroyed by OG Emily, which was supported by FTP personnel. Operations Report, Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Prov.), Operation Emily.

(13.) FTP was controlled by the French communist party and was often at odds with the other resistance groups.

(14.) Of the 27 officers and 155 enlisted men who parachuted into southern France, 23 were listed as wounded in action, 10 of whom were injured on the jump. Commanding Officers Report, Operational Report. Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Prov.), Grenoble, France, 20 September 1944, 2. Archives, US. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. (Also located at Record Group 226, E 190 Box 741, National Archives II.)

(15.)Damage to radio gear during the parachute drop was a problem that plagued the operational units.

(16.) Paul Gaujac, Special Forces in the Invasion of France (Translated by Janice Lert) (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 1999).

(17.) Arthur Layton Funk, Hidden Ally. The French Resistance, Special Operations and the Landings in Southern France, 1944 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).

(18.) Personal communications with Dr. John Hamblet, 10 April 2000.

(19.) Hamblet was not the only medical officer who was infiltrated into France. Captain Fred B. Agee, US. Army Medical Corps, was infiltrated into the Haute Vienne Department, as Mission Antagonist, to provide medical services to members of the Maquis; to assist in organizing such other medical services as were available for the purpose of serving members of the Maquis; and to cooperate as far as possible with any doctors located in nearby villages who were in any way serving the Maquis. NARA Microfilm Set M-1623, Roll No. 9 (OSS Aid to the French Resistance).

(20.) Motor transportation was readily available to the Maquis. Unfortunately, the vehicles were notoriously unreliable and the driving was often reckless.

(21.) Michael Pearson, Tears of Glory: The Betrayal of Vercors 1944 (London: Macmillan, 1978). The Milice were political police directed by the puppet government at Vichy; they wore distinctive blue uniforms. They were the French equivalent of the Gestapo. Their methods were every bit as brutal as the Gestapo's and even more hated.

(22.) Funk, Hidden Ally, 38-39. Special Forces Unit No. 4 was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William G. Bartlett. British Lieutenant Colonel E.S.N. Head was the deputy commander. The unit consisted of 22 officers (10 U.S. and 12 British) and 42 enlisted men (12 U.S. and 30 British).

(23.) Operations Report, Commander's Report.

(24.) Isotrope had promised the FTP eight Bren automatic rifles and 40 Enfield rifles that Team Packard had brought in. Bank concluded that the FTP "was always more interested in politics than fighting the Germans. They never used all the arms they received and in my opinion are keeping the arms for ulterior motives. They should be disarmed as fast as possible." Operational Report, Team Packard. National Archives Record Group 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders 34 and 35, Location: 190/6/15/4; Martin, "Report on Jedburghs (Zone Sud)."

(25.) Operational Report of Team "Packard" in Gard and Lozere Departments, dated 10 October 1944, signed Aaron Bank, Captain, Infantry. National Archives Record Group 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders 34 and 35, Location: 190/6/15/4; "History of OSS Aid to French Resistance," National Archives Record Group 226, Entry 190, Box 741, Location: 190/10/4/2.

(26.) The Special Forces Regimental History Calendar, 1994. Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

(27.) FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1951, 6-7.

Ian Sutherland is an assistant prosecuting attorney for Cape Girardeau County, Mo. A former Army officer who retired in 1979 as a lieutenant colonel, he served in a variety of assignments, including the 82nd Airborne Division; the 1st Battalion, 3rd US. Infantry (the Old Guard); the 5th Special Forces Group; and the American Embassy in Teheran, Iran. He served three years in Vietnam with the 5th SF Group and other government agencies. In addition to a bachelor's degree, he holds a master's in zoology and physiology from Tulane University, a master's of public administration from Harvard University, and a law degree from the University of Missouri at Columbia. He is the author of The U.S. Army Special Forces, 1952-1982 (1990) and Brightlight (2001) a historical novel based on his experiences in Vietnam. He is currently doing research for a book on the activities of the OSS Operational Groups.

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