Media on the battlefield: 'a non-lethal fire'

David Connolly

Public Affairs and the media played a key role in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This operation proved that now more than ever, the U.S. military must be prepared to engage the media and provide timely, factual information. This article attempts to share some experiences with the media during Operation Enduring Freedom and the early stages of OIF. The intent is to explain, from a company/ field-grade point of view, how media played a part in the operations and how our tactics, techniques and procedures related to current doctrine. Thoughts on how field-grade officers can prepare themselves to conduct media interviews in today's environment are shared. At this time, it is uncertain how doctrine will change as a result of our lessons learned.

From August 2002 to July 2003, I was assigned to 3rd U.S. Army, Coalition Forces Land Component Command as the media relations officer. During that time I supported OEF in Kuwait and Djibouti, Horn of Africa. My responsibilities included involvement in the planning and execution of OIF embed media initiative.

I am currently assigned to Fort Leavenworth in the Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. I had the opportunity to address students in an elective course, "Media on the Battlefield." The presentation was well received and many believed that some of the information should be presented for future use.

Introduction

Former Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Eric Shenseki, once said that "If we do not speak for the Army others will." This is a very true statement. The media should be considered as a component of non-lethal fires/non-kinetic targeting, another tool at our disposal to help accomplish the mission. The media will write their story, with or without our input. It only makes sense to engage the media to ensure the whole story is told. The media is a venue in which we can pass along our command messages, which contain truthful and factual information. The bottom-line is that we should always keep in mind what we are there to do. Always remember the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines who are on the ground sacrificing everyday. If we can help their morale and ultimately make their job easier by using the media, we should. It is safe to say that 99 times out of 100, we the members of the U.S. military, are acting with the right intentions. Meaning, we have nothing hide. We have been given our orders and are attempting to carry them out within laws of land warfare. But bad things happen in war. Not everything goes our way. During these times it is best to confront the media and articulate to the world our side of the story.

When integrated and synchronized with Information Operations efforts, Public Affairs and in particular, the media, can be a force multiplier. In CFLCC prior to crossing the LD, the Public Affairs staff leveraged the Information Operation themes and messages to the fullest extent possible. It is important to understand the difference between IO and PAO, however. Basically IO and PAO belong to the same career field, Information Operations.

One difference is that IO can use deception and specifically target the enemy. Public Affairs must be aware what themes and messages that IO is pushing during each phase of the operation. The intent is to leverage IO. During the initial phases of OIF CFLCC always ensured that Public Affairs planners were involved in the Information Operations Working Groups. This ensured they were involved in the effects targeting board process. In that case, they could bring that information to the media director. The media director would then have clear picture of what the commander's intent was and what the staff was attempting to accomplish.

Armed with this knowledge the media director could prioritize which of the thousands of media queries to work on while maintaining a level of fairness and equity to all reporters. As an example, prior to crossing the LD, IO was pushing themes to the enemy concerning capitulation. Knowing this, the media director could push reporters out to units responsible for dealing with large numbers of enemy prisoners of war. These type stories would send a message to the enemy and the world. The enemy would see how they would be fed, clothed and provided shelter. Capitulation might appear to be a good option given their current status. The world would see that we were trained and ready.

We should cooperate with the media within the limits of mission, safety and operations security. There is always a tendency to over-classify information to avoid speaking to the media. There are essentially two things you always want to protect: timing and intentions.

Always ask if the information provided to the media will give an adversary something that they can use against us. If OPSEC or safety concerns make it impossible to support a media request, then simply tell them so. But remember that information is classified for a certain time period. Always remember timing and intentions.

How many times have you run across a document that was classified by the originator ten years ago? When reading the document you can't figure out why it is classified. Today's graphics may be classified, but once that phase line is crossed or the information can no longer be used against you, they probably are no longer a secret. You still must be responsible with information. The reporter should understand when he/she can write or speak about what is seen. We were successful during the decisive combat phase of OIF when reporters were allowed to access to command centers. The practice of allowing reporters in command centers is elaborated upon later when embedded reporters are discussed. This is always a sensitive area.

"Go ugly early" is a term sometimes used in public affairs. Bad things happen in war. Again, not everything goes our way. We had nearly 700 embedded reporters with units prior to crossing the line of departure. They saw and heard everything. There were many times when something bad happened and Soldiers were unsure how to respond when a reporter was on the scene. There was a case early on near the Umm Qasr area. Some civilians had been injured by coalition fire.

A CNN embedded reporter captured the scene as British and U.S. troops attended to the injured. Initially they shouted at the reporter to get back and not be "such a ghoul." Eventually cooler heads prevailed and they allowed the reporter to continue to film as long as he remained out of the way. The images of the Soldier's faces told the story. They were concerned that they had injured innocent civilians on the battlefield. Again, bad things happen. But the film showed that the primary concern at that point was to provide medical attention. The same care we would give to a coalition Soldier.

The embedded reporter had a right to be there to do his job, which was to report the activity. We could have gained more leverage by engaging the reporter (by way of short stand-up interview) with a leader on the scene who could have released known information and delivered a command message. The message could have included the sympathy for the injured and how we make every attempt to avoid these things from happening followed by basic, releasable facts that were known.

Coupled with the images, the world would understand the situation and not have only part of the story told or taken out of context.

Again, embeds will be discussed later. We must now, more than ever, be able to articulate our story on the spot without violating OPSEC. In order to do this, we must incorporate public affairs training at home station.

The best-case scenario is when Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are the spokespersons, not the PAO. Again, it goes back to training. All soldiers must be questions pertaining to his or her area of responsibility. 3rd Infantry Division had the benefit of a great deal of training prior to crossing the LD. They were on rotation for Operation Desert Spring in the fall of 2002. We began what we called, "training embeds". We knew that if we went to war with Iraq we were going to embed hundreds of reporters like never before.

Reporters were embedded with units for three to four day periods. This gave the Soldiers an opportunity to get used to having reporters present 24/7 as they carried out their duties. They got used to the presence of reporters and learned how to deal with them. The reporters saw all, the good, the bad and the ugly. The reporters also learned how to do their job in the harsh desert conditions. They began to learn how their equipment would work, how to move with a unit, etc.

The benefit from this experience was evident when they crossed the LD with the embeds. There were very few problems regarding the new relationship. Following the relief in place in Baghdad between 1st Armored Division and 3rd Infantry Division, we immediately began getting several complaints about reporters having their cameras taken and not being allowed to do their job.

This may have happened for several reasons. 1st AD did not have the benefit of the training embed program. It appeared that 1st AD had trouble initially dealing with the volume of reporters. Even though by this time, there were relatively fewer embeds, there were still hundreds of reporters present.

As stated earlier, training and experience dealing with the media weren't the only issues. Initially, we did not have a Coalition Press Information Center established in Baghdad. There were problems with reporters using press badges issued in Kuwait and attempting to get through checkpoints with them in Baghdad.

There were two types of badges issued in Kuwait. One for embeds and the other for those who were not. The badges issued to non-embeds in Kuwait were not intended for use in Iraq. They were only to be used during coordinated opportunities through the Kuwait CPIC.

The decision on whether or not to badge is debatable. CFLCC made conscious decision not to badge in Baghdad initially. Reporters knew their way around the city. They didn't desire or need PAO escort. At that time, they only needed information on where to go to cover certain activities.

On one hand, badges issued by the coalition at least show Soldiers on the ground that this person has at least been through some sort of formal registry process with the military. On the other hand, badges can be abused by reporters. Initially in Baghdad, they became the "get-into-every-checkpoint-free pass."

At this point, many reporters and affiliates were tired of having their freedom of movement dictated by the military. That is one reason they chose to leave their embed slots. In some cases, it was apparent that the reporters wanted a badge in Iraq to make moving around easier, not to be escorted or coordinate opportunities. Some of the reporters in Iraq had not registered through Kuwait previously. They wanted their "pass." Remember, this was very early after the fall of Baghdad.

As time went on and a CPIC was established, badges could once again be issued and controlled. We failed to predict the early mass exodus of embeds once a few statues fell down. Again, embeds are addressed later.

Preparing for interviews

Preparing to conduct media interviews is a skill required of today's military members. There are two basic types of interviews to be prepared for: the taped, stand-up interview and the print interview. During these types of interviews, no one hears the question, only the response.

Press conferences are usually reserved for those higher in the chain of command. Even at the CFLCC level, a decision was made not to conduct press conferences initially. It was known that Department of Defense would be conducting them in the District of Columbia and Central Command would conduct a daily press conference in Qatar. CFLCC had 700 embeds with units. There was no need to place a leader in front of reporters and have them attempt to articulate accurate timely information. Press conferences are unique in that the audience hears the question as well as the response. The preparation for all types of interviews remains essentially the same however.

Preparing for an interview is basically a negotiation. Stress to the reporter the need for information before you begin. Remember, the media can be a non-lethal fire. Ask yourself what the story can do for your unit, the mission.

Think about what phase of the operation the unit is in. What themes and messages are IO pushing? How does this story help leverage them? Is this the right time to do the story? Remember to protect timing and intentions.

For example, in Kuwait prior to crossing the LD, maybe you don't want to do a story about how you are going to fight oil well fires. Don't give the enemy that information yet. After you cross the LD and have passed that phase, go for it. Many reporters will want "fluff" stories. Those are fine, but given the choice, prioritize stories depending on what phase of the operation your unit is in. If you haven't crossed the LD yet, a story about Soldiers training in the desert should be given emphasis over one about women in the Army. Remember, you can send a message to the world and the enemy that you are trained and ready. You can do a story about women in the Army, or whatever requests a reporter has, later. Be polite, honest, helpful and friendly to journalists, but remember the mission and Soldiers on the ground. How can you help them?

When preparing for an interview, do what is done preparing for other military operations; gather intel. Ask questions like "what is the story about?" Know what angle the reporter is after? What aspects of a subject are they after? Who else are they talking to? You may have to augment information they are already getting. Sometimes, if you know who they spoke to previously you may have to refute information. How knowledgeable is the reporter on the subject? What do they know about the military? You may have to educate them. What type of stories does this reporter typically write? Are they pro- or anti-military? War? Gather background information on them, get their bio.

Ask the journalist to send you his/her questions. They won't give you everything, but look for the focus. Facts may need to be gathered from the rest of the subject-matter experts on the staff to help articulate our side or the rest of the story. Remember, you want the media to walk away with the whole story and message. Asking for questions also helps to prepare for what might be asked during the interview. Sit down and brainstorm every question you think might be asked, especially, hard ones. What question do you not want to be asked and be unprepared for? You need to have a response for all questions.

If you can't do the interview tell them why. More times than not, they will understand. For example, in Baghdad a CBS crew got wind of what they thought was an effort to find a pilot downed in the 1991 Gulf War. CFLCC would often get off-the-wall requests like this, but after some investigation, it was learned that, in this particular case, it was true; a team was in fact, investigating the whereabouts of missing Navy CMDR Michael Scott Speicher. For obvious reasons (timing and intentions), they could not do the story at that time because it would jeopardize their investigation. After a meeting between the CBS crew and investigating team, agreements were made to wait until such time as the information could be released without detriment to the investigation.

Never get out in front of the President or DoD. Know what senior leaders are saying about the unit's operation. This helps you anticipate questions. Another term, "PAO (PAG) by transcript." Is sometimes used. If you have access to the Internet, review recent DoD transcripts. Chances are the same questions will be asked at your level. You don't have to regurgitate the SECDEF's responses, but you can ensure that your messages are in line and focused on how things are from your foxhole.

Military leaders must be aware of what is being said to avoid their intended message being taken out of context. For example, if the President said yesterday "there are indications that foreign fighters are involved in conducting these attacks" and you say, "We have no indications of foreign fighter involvement." It would appear that you are not on the same sheet of music. If you knew what the President's statement was, you could re-phrase the response to more accurately articulate your message.

Maybe, in your specific area of responsibility there are no indications of foreign fighters. The President is speaking for the entire country. You are talking about your AOR, however large or small it may be. You could have said, "In our area, there are no indications ..." This way, you can attempt to avoid be taken out of context. Just being aware is the start point.

Know current events. If doing an interview tomorrow, what happened in the news today that relates? How does that event impact what you are going to talk about? Remember, you are the military to some journalists no matter what the topic. Stay in your lane and speak only about what you know about.

Conducting the interview

The interview itself is all about control. You want it, the reporter wants it. You have to learn how to structure effective answers and control the interview.

Don't be question driven, be message driven.

The trick is to use your messages as guideposts and not repeated phrases. This is where the skill comes in. Everyone gets annoyed when they see someone on TV who sounds like a robot continuing to press rewind and play over and over. Those people lose credibility and appear never to actually answer anything. Some people can transition and flow well, some can't. It takes a certain amount of preparation and experience. You are not conducting an interview just to play stump-the-chump with a reporter. You should try to articulate command messages that will positively influence the outcome of your mission. Use the media as a non-lethal fire.

Help raise the morale of that young E-4 on the check point. If you have the information, and it is releasable, by all means give it. But consider what other information you need to deliver to tell the rest of the story.

For the purpose of this article, the focus is on standup, taped interviews where the question is never heard. This is a situation many of us will more than likely be involved in.

Structuring effective answers:

As stated previously, you are engaging the media not only to respond to their questions, but also to deliver a message about your mission that is important for the world to understand. Again, constantly ask yourself how you can help the soldiers on the ground by providing information to the media. To do this, you need to structure effective answers or responses. Come to the interview with about three or four messages to deliver. Think of each message as a pyramid.

State your message:

At the top of the pyramid you should state your message. This is your response to the first question. And for a taped-standup interview, it doesn't mater what the question is. Deliver your most important message first. So, if interrupted later, it is already out there. Nobody will hear the question on a taped interview.

Many times even if a journalist came to you with a specific question in mind, if you deliver a clearly articulated message, they will use it. You may tell them something that they didn't know. It may look and sound so good on tape that the affiliate's editors desire to use it as their sound bite.

For the many skeptics out there that will say this would never work, here is an example. Memorial Day was a bad day. The coalition had some incidents in and around Fallujah. A number of Soldiers lost their lives. About this time it was already clear that the media was tending to focus on things that went wrong, almost ignoring many details about the good things that were continuing to happen. Daily they would receive two news releases filled with facts and statistics about recovery and security. Yet, if one ambush or fatality occurred, that was all the public heard about. Who knows the reason why, you can probably guess; maybe it was sensationalism, politically driven from their bureaus, whatever.

The CFLCC Commander, LTG David McKiernan was painfully aware that this was happening as well. After the evening battle update assessment he was providing the staff with guidance. He told them that they must all become a public affairs officer and get this message out. He asked the staff, "What did we come here to do?" After a short silence, he started talking about the mission's objectives; removing the regime, searching for and eliminating weapons of mass destruction, etc.

His basic message was "We are not done yet." We were only weeks into what we knew would be a long, tough campaign and it was important to him that the world knew this. We were prepared to hunker down and would expect that these weren't the first or the last casualties we would endure.

The CG was back in Kuwait at this time. As the CFLC media director, I was watching the battle update assessment from our van in the EECP in Baghdad. At this time, we still didn't have a CPIC established. I usually would meet reporters at the Baghdad convention center and attempt to field their queries. So, I knew the next morning what the focus of their queries would be. I knew what the CG's message was. I, as a PAO, normally would not go on camera, but when it is important, it doesn't hurt. I didn't have time to prepare or even have access to a commander or key leader. I did have a coalition partner with me, a lieutenant colonel from the Australian army, but they still weren't talking to the media at that time.

It would have been nice to have him go on camera and articulate this message. Bottom-line was that time was of the essence and I had what I had. Me and my notebook where I scribbled notes as the CG spoke. Early the next morning one of our Marine PAOs and I finalized a position statement, based directly from the CG's comments and ran it by my boss, the CFLCC PAO, who said go for it.

The first call came from Associated Press Television, I think. (A worldwide audience, perfect.) They called me and asked, "What happened at Fallujah?" They wanted a talking head and I wanted the CG's message heard. I said come on down, I'll give you a standup. They did and asked what happened at Fallujah. I gave my statement and never mentioned any facts of any specific incident at Fallujah. They quickly said thanks and packed up and ran. They wanted to be the first, the exclusive. Next came CNN, Reuters, all with international audiences. Only one, Reuters, asked the follow-up "Ok, got that, but can you tell me what happened at Fallujah."

By now everyone was running the position statement, the rest of the story, the message. They needed and wanted the rest. Which I then gave because I had the information and it was releasable. The important thing is that the world heard, first thing in the morning, what the CG wanted them to hear.

You'll be glad to hear that I took my share of trash talking from most of the staff that day, "Hey there's Hollywood." But more importantly, everyone remembered where he or she heard those words. "Isn't that what the CG said last night?" Exactly! My point is that it doesn't take a PAO to do this. Anyone listening could have done the same thing. Being a PAO and having other good PAOs from our sister services and coalition partners around me helped accomplish the mission. Know what is important to your commander. Know the message.

Support your message:

After delivering your message, support the message. In the middle of the pyramid elaborate your position statement. Provide an explanation, evidence that supports the initial statement. At this point provide facts, key stats, description of a certain program, or a supporting argument or rationale. For example, if supporting a statement made about what you are doing in Western Iraq, talk about how many patrols conducted, the number of arrests made, The food and water delivered. If the position statement said that you are doing great and wonderful things winning hearts and minds, back it up with the facts that the media may have overlooked.

At the bottom of the pyramid expand. Illustrate your message here by giving a prepared example or analogy. If using the example above, tell them about a specific raid in one of the towns.

Be in control:

During this entire process the goal is to be in control of the interview. Get them to follow. Hook the reporter's interest. Be passionate about what you are talking about. Usually you can have a reporter follow you through one message or pyramid. The skill comes in when bridging to a second or third message. The goal is to smoothly transition to the message so you don't sound like an idiot or a parrot repeating things over and over. This takes practice and experience and sometimes a bit of charm. One key leader who comes to mind is Colin Powell. He uses textbook communication skills in delivering a speech, as well, as when talking with reporters. He transitions fluidly so the untrained eye/ear may not notice. The fact is, he effectively communicates his messages and avoids losing credibility by sounding like a robot. The need is to continually bridge back to your message. The hard part is to always be aware of which questions are out of your lane. The tendency is to attempt to answer any and all questions. The key is to first think about what is being asked. If it's not for you to answer, transition back on track, "I don't know about that, but what I can tell you is ..." or "DoD might have more information on that, but the important thing to remember is ..." Control the interview. Flag or spotlight your message with phrases like: "First, let's clarify the facts ..." or "Let's look at what is really important ..."

The hook is a tool used to effectively control the interview. You want the reporter to follow. The pyramid states to briefly stop between your initial answer and elaboration. What that means is to offer a statement like, "You should have seen what happened yesterday.." or "We have this new approach...." Then pause briefly enough time so the reporter can ask, "Well, what's that?" I realize that this won't work that easily every time especially, with savvy reporters. But, you get the idea. You want the control.

Embeds

During the decisive combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom CFLCC embedded an unprecedented number of reporters. It is debatable whether or not this is the way of the future or not. It remains to be seen how the military will deploy embed reporters in the future. We may never embedded reporters in the numbers seen during OIF. The affiliates have a say in the issue as well. They need to commit to the resources the idea as much as anybody.

The notion of embedding from "beginning to end" never really materialized. Many reporters dis-embedded themselves for different reasons soon after arriving in Baghdad or shortly thereafter. Some left simply because they were exhausted, mentally and physically. They had seen a lot of action. And in some cases, seen fellow journalists killed or wounded.

Embedding during decisive combat was a good deal. They didn't seem to mind the structure and limited freedom of movement (between units). They enjoyed a certain sense of security, especially when facing many unknown circumstances. Once decisive combat was declared over, many journalists and their affiliates decided it was time to dis-embed. Some took pressure from colleagues who called them "turncoats" or accused them of losing their objectivity. They desired to go back to "real" reporting.

Embeds worked for us because many connected with the military. No longer did they report, "they just did this" rather they started saying, "we just did this." They became part of the unit. They saw that human beings who cared about their actions fought the war. They saw that even when things went bad, the military members went out of their way to do the right thing, many times at risk to their own safety.

Embeds saw things that we have been saying for years but could never really prove. They saw that we care about limiting collateral damage. They saw in command posts, hundreds of minds struggling all night over target lists and the effects of striking specific targets. They saw the amount of thought and work involved in deciding on each and every target. We didn't simply "carpet bomb" Baghdad or target every single power source. We took a look at each location to be hit and if striking that target would achieve the desired effect.

They saw Soldiers put their own lives in danger to save the lives of civilians on the battlefield.

There was a reporter from Associated Press who was embedded with the 3rd ID during the "Thunder Run" into the airport. This reporter was in a tank within the column and was given a headset. Every intersection was heavily defended. The roads were crowded with everything from uniformed enemy soldiers, to combatants in civilian clothes in technical trucks, to average citizens going about their business because they believed that the coalition was not there yet. The fighting was aggressive. Soldiers and leaders all were fighting outside the hatch with M16s, M4 and sometimes beating people off their vehicles with ammo cans.

As this happened, lead vehicles were still passing information like "Blue car, bad guys with RPG, white car, family of four, let them go." The reporter simply could not believe this. You can tell someone about it, but unless you show them, they may never believe you.

Getting back to the future of embeds, there are two thoughts: One is that maybe, we are currently riding a wave of popularity with the media. We are in their favor, for now. Things may go back to a certain level of tolerance with each other. But what we have accomplished with embeds can continue. Many of the embedded reporters were young, 20 or 30 somethings. They were some of the best and brightest that their affiliate had to offer. They will someday be the leaders of their organizations. They may be the anchors, or key leaders who can advise the bureau chiefs on military related matters.

Already some who previously were relatively unknown, are working the weekend anchor slots. These reporters saw for themselves and have developed a certain understanding, respect and rapport with us that can continue for years to come.

Another thing we learned by embedding hundreds of reporters is that the rate of information had drastically increased. We didn't fully appreciate how much information would be out before it went through the official reporting chain. We still had to be responsible with information and not officially "release" it until it was confirmed and on the significant activities report. There was a lot of pressure to confirm things, which we simply couldn't on the spot. We had to accept that they were out there and let them report. We would still handle information in the same manner. Once it was confirmed we would acknowledge. If unconfirmed, we would either refute or simply state that to our knowledge, it didn't happen.

The way in which we released, or articulated information, had also changed. We now, more than ever, had to confirm the obvious. There was a young Soldier who apparently shot himself in a port-a-potty in one of the camps in Kuwait before we crossed the LD. We had just recently RSOI'd the embedded reporters in the units. When the release was written it stated something to the effect, "A Soldier has died from an apparent, self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head." CENTCOM asked why we chose those words.

We never used those words strongly speculating a suicide. True, but we never had a FOX reporter as the first person on the scene either. The reporter heard the shot, was standing right there when the door was opened. One Soldier, one weapon, and a gunshot wound to the head. Apparently, he died of a self-inflicted wound. We didn't say that he killed himself. The investigation would reveal what happened. The point is that we all realized at that moment that the game was different. If we didn't confirm the obvious up front, we would have lost a certain amount of credibility.

I think it is useful to understand how embeds were deployed. For OIF it worked like this: DoD asked CFLCC how many reporters they could handle given the task organization. CFLCC worked with subordinate PAOs to work out specific numbers. CFLCC then provided DoD with a number. DoD took the number and allocated slots to specific affiliates and media organizations. Those affiliates and organizations assigned personnel to fill the slots. Not all the reporters assigned as embeds wanted the slot. Some had been in the AOR for months and benefited from the training embeds. Some had never been there at all. Between DoD and CFLCC the best attempt was made to ensure the right reporters and media types were in the right place. There was a mix of different categories of media spread out among the task force (print, TV, weekly magazines, regional/Arab media, etc). Subordinate commands had input if they desired a specific anchor or reporter to embed with their headquarters. Some had already built a good rapport with individuals through training. The DoD embed list assigned reporters down to division level. Divisions then pushed them down, at times, to company level.

Some are very passionate to disagree with letting reporters in command centers without a security clearance. It is safe to say that it was proven that we can do this without violating OPSEC by establishing strict ground rules while still being responsible with information. Some have said, "We give away too much about our capabilities by letting in civilians without clearances." One example given is that reporters learn too much about how far and fast we can go. We give this away by doing it. After we cross the LD and execute, everybody knows our capability. What we must protect are our TTPs and information that we will use again in the future.

Just because a reporter is let into a command center doesn't mean that you show them every secret in the book. Be responsible with information. It is challenging, but do-able. Again, we need to get away from the tendency to over-classify while still protecting sensitive information that should remain classified even after the current fight is over.

It is a balancing act that requires thought. Tomorrow, today's graphics and basic plan or concept of the operation may no longer be sensitive but some of the tactics, techniques and procedures required to build them still need to be protected. Security at the source requires that each individual understand the difference. Be conscious of what information you are providing and the situation at the time you are providing it. Once more, protect timing, intentions and anything that an adversary can use against us.

Ground rules:

All reporters who desire access to our forces are required to sign ground rules whether they are embedded or not. Most will abide by them because they want to continue to have access to our forces. Enforcing the ground rules is sometimes difficult. As mentioned, once embeds were pushed down to the units, before you knew it, there was some poor company executive officer who had the additional duty of "babysitting" a reporter. Security at the source was the rule. It became impossible to watch a reporter 24/7.

It was especially dangerous when reporters had satellite phones and the capability to go live at any moment.

Geraldo Rivera is a prime example. He went live on air and basically violated everything you would normally protect; timing, intentions and things an adversary can use against you. He was embedded with the 101st while they were on the move toward Baghdad. He scratched out a sketch in the sand that showed their formation, where they were, how far and fast they had traveled and when they would be at their next location.

V Corps immediately notified CFLCC and asked to pull him, which was CFLCC initiated. The 101st, who did not have the benefit of live television was upset because, "He was their man."

Say what you will about Geraldo, but he is great for morale. That was apparent even when he came to Kuwait for a meeting on Camp Doha pleading for a late embed slot. Even lieutenant colonels and colonels would light up at the site of him. He was a nice break from endless hours of nagging staff work and operation orders.

Not many reporters drew that sort of reaction. His incident with the 101st was an example of the difficulty in watching a reporter 24/ 7. He was eventually pulled, knowing he would go back because the division wanted him back, after a heartfelt apology, of course. Luckily, it did not appear his actions ever got anyone killed.

Units can always add to ground rules that reporters sign with the higher headquarters, in this case, CFLCC. One good one would be to instruct the reporter never to go live unless there is a Soldier or "handler" present. This would have worked well in the Geraldo situation.

Depending on the reporter, they may have good intentions and just not realize that a certain piece of information may be sensitive at the time. Remember, reporters are just like Soldiers, in that there are good ones, bad ones, experienced and inexperienced ones. You have to work to train them and set the standard of conduct.

No ground rule is foolproof. If it is in writing, we must live with it. One of the CFLCC ground rules stated that no image or photograph would be taken of a deceased coalition Soldier. LTG McKiernan felt strongly about this ground rule. He did not want family members to learn of their loved ones' fate in the media. There was much debate with DoD on whether or not it should be a ground rule.

Army Times had a photograph of a young 101st Soldier who was badly wounded and was being carried by his comrades. He later died. The first reaction to Army Times was, "You can't run that photo, it violates the ground rules." They took the position that were not violating a ground rule because the Soldier was "dying" and at the time of the photo was not dead. Even after CFLCC and the Soldier's family pleaded that they not run the photo, they did.

Historical note:

We dis-embedded four journalists and two photographers, because the intent of the ground rule was on publication of the photograph. This was obviously an editorial position taken by Times Publishing. As a result, all Times Publishing employees were dis-embedded for one week. DoD did not re-embed them, CFLCC did.

To be fair, one of the journalists and one of the photographers were leaving anyway. Of the remaining three, we allowed one to go back to unit. It was not the person who took the photograph. The other recourse that was taken was to have the paper publish a letter to the editor from McKiernan. Not so effective since they did not have to print his last line, which stated that he and hopefully nobody he ever associates with ever buys another copy of the Army Times. So, even when you think a ground rule is self-explanatory or simply in good taste, be sure if they are in writing to articulate your intentions in detail.

Dealing with media effectively requires training and experience like anything else. You won't personally like every reporter encountered. Put personal feelings aside and get on with the mission and allow them to do theirs. When encountering the media, always ask yourself how to use this non-lethal fire to help accomplish the mission and most importantly, how to assist the Soldier on the ground at the checkpoint or on patrol.

ACRONYM QUICKSCAN

AD--Armored Division

APTN--Associated Press Television

BUA--battle update assessment

CFLCC--Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CGSC--(U.S. Army) Command and General Staff College

CPIC--Coalition Press Information Center

EECP--Early Entry Command post

EPW--Enemy Prisoner of War

IO--Information Operations

IOWG--Information Operations Working Groups

LD--Line of departure

OEF--Operation Enduring Freedom

ODS--Operation Desert Spring

OIF--Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPORDS--operation orders

OPSEC--Operational security

RIP--relief in place

RSOI--Reception, staging, onward movement, integration

SIGACTs--significant activities

TTPs--tactics, techniques and procedures

WMD--Weapons of mass destruction

CPT Connolly was assigned from August 2002 to July 2003 to the 3rd U.S. Army, Coalition Forces Land Component Command as the media relations officer. During that time he supported Operation Enduring Freedom in Kuwait and Djibouti, Horn of Africa. He was then involved in the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq including the embedded media initiative. Connolly was a member of CFLCC's Early Entry Command Post, which entered Baghdad, Iraq on April 10, 2003.

Following his tour in 3rd Army, Connolly was assigned to Fort Leavenworth at the Command and General Staff College. During that time, he was afforded the opportunity to instruct some of the CGSC students during the C401 (Media on the Battlefield) portion of the course.

Prior to be assigned to Third Army, Connolly was assigned to the United States Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Ky., as the Public Information officer (October 2000-August 2002).

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