Comment on Vilas - response to previous article by Carlos Vilas on mass organizations in Nicaragua

COMMENT ON VILAS

Carlos Vilas's article ("The Mass Organizations in Nicaragua,' MR, November 1986) provides important material for discussion on the themes of mass organizations and popular participation in revolutionary Nicaragua. It is true, as the article points out, that the mass organizations and the sudden and dramatic participation of the Nicaraguan people in their vital affairs following the triumph have experienced many difficulties. It is also correct to identify the U.S. war and the economic crisis as having a serious impact on the nature of this participation. However, one is left with an inadequate explanation of how and why this is so, since the article overlooks other processes intrinsic to revolutionary change that have a fundamental effect on the mass organizations and popular participation.

To summarize, the article argues that a process has been underway in Nicaragua since mid-1982 in which the mass organizations have moved from popular decision-making bodies to operational (decision-implementing) organs for the state/FSLN; and that this is the result of ever greater centralization and control by the war and economic crisis, but also by Sandinista methods of governing. We take issue with Vilas on the underlying assumptions and conclusions which--although most are not stated outright--frame the article. The term "popular democracy' is not used but, it seems to us, is a key theme which underlies the article and which therefore frames our commentary. Space does not allow for elaboration on our critique; we limit ourselves to outlining a few basic points:

For us, real democracy is achieved on the basis of social and economic equality, and in Nicaragua this means constructing a more just social system. Progress toward greater democracy in the superstructure can take place almost overnight following a revolutionary triumph, as was the case in Nicaragua. Yet this progress loses meaning if it does not rest upon the ongoing transformation of social and economic structures (and on qualitatively raising the political and ideological level of the masses). The article does not examine the dialectic between the construction of a democratic socioeconomic order and the political expression of democracy, but rather limits itself to the latter, which cuts the discussion of democracy off from its material base and therefore idealize it. As a result, for example, the article argues that the shift in priorities from the urban to the rural areas "reduced the state's ability to satisfy the "traditional' demands of the Sandinista Defense Committees,' but mentions nothing of the long-term foundations for basic socioeconomic development and equality at a nationwide level that this reprioritization is laying. We believe that Nicaragua's new constitution, which institutionalizes the revolutionary transformation of the society, is as (or more) important in the long run for democracy than the extent of popular participation through the mass organizations at the current moment of war and crisis. Democracy is constructed over a period of many years, if not decades; it is not something that can simply burst into being overnight. To identify the initial, abundant expressions of political democracy in the first few years of the Nicaraguan Revolution, at a time when the tremendous post-triumph upheavals that all revolutions experience had not fully begun, can obscure an examination of more fundamental questions and processes regarding democracy.

Without the question of "democracy for whom,' any discussion on the form and extent of democratic practice is hollow. The Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) have certainly deteriorated since 1982. However, the CDS started out as a mass organization that spanned the entire class gamut at a time of initial post-triumph euphoria, when internal (national) class fissures were subordinated to general enthusiasm, initial reconstruction, and cross-class unity derived from the anti-Somocista alliance. But revolution would not be revolution without the inevitable polarization between antagonistic classes and social sectors; in Nicaragua this has logically meant a modification of the nature of mass organizations, or more precisely a deepening of their class character. This logically implies ruptures, of varying degrees, in the original "scheme' of mass participation, in which periods of redefinition can appear as regression in the extent of popular democracy. In fact, the dynamism of UNAG and the ATC--as class organizations (the peasantry and the rural proletariat, respectively) --attests to the relation between the class articulation of a mass organization and its experience over the last seven years (deteriorated, strengthened, etc.), at a time of deepening of the class character of the revolutionary process and heightened conflict with imperialism. Vilas notes that interest in the CDS-coordinated neighborhood distribution programs declined when workplace distribution commissaries were established, suggesting that this is another instance in the decline of popular participation. Yet the commissaries are meant to exclusively benefit the working class at a time of severe shortage, and thus represent a step forward for the revolution even though they appear as a decline in popular participation.

The mass organizations cannot be equated with popular democracy; they are but one form. We believe it important to examine the other forms of mass participation, such as broad public access to government institutions, party officials, and the mass media; legal structures which allow the popular classes to utilize the state in their own defense (for example, a poor family may call on the police to prevent a landlord from evicting it; evictions are now illegal, and the police enforce a juridical code which generally favors the working classes); the autonomy project on the Atlantic Coast; the town halls all over the country to debate the constitution, etc. Vilas mentions only one example--youth participation in rural production in the war zones--at the end of his article. We maintain that numerous forms of popular intervention in socioeconomic and political affairs other than the mass organizations have been developing since 1979 and not only flank, but in some cases overtake, participation through the mass organizations.

The article seems to warn (without stating outright) that the FSLN has potential anti-democratic tendencies which have come to the surface in a situation of war and economic crisis and have affected popular participation. We do not agree that there are necessarily contradictions between the interests of the state and those of the popular masses, between centralization and democracy, and between state/party "control' and popular "control.' There is a dialectical relation between the FSLN as a vanguard party (representing the interests of the broad masses) and the masses themselves. A series of processes and mechanisms assure that the FSLN remains accountable to its mass base. It is faulty to focus on who actually makes final decisions (the state/FSLN leadership) without addressing the more important questions of in whose objective interests are those decisions made, and what processes lead to making a final centralized decision. In fact, "control' by the FSLN is only possible by mass participation in channels set up to exercise this control. For instance, state control over merchants is only possible through the broad participation of neighborhood residents, trade unions, etc., in commercial policies. Similarly, Sandinista State Security is highly effective thanks only to its linkage to the Revolutions's mass base. Moreover, how can implementation of decisions be separated from making those decisions? As tautological as the argument might seem, people either implement decisions through coercion (physical or psychological) or through a conscious decision to do so. (If the article is arguing--which we do not think it is--that the "operative function' of the mass organizations is a result of coercion, then Vilas would have a basis for claiming the deterioration of popular democracy.) In a country at war, only a highly centralized structure overseeing the entire national process of defense and economic survival can make the crucial day-to-day decisions for assuring victory over an imperialist enemy. Masses of Nicaraguans implement these decisions on the conscious understanding that they have delegated authority to their revolutionary leadership; if this were not so, the FSLN would not be able to govern.

For us, the crux of the discussion should be how popular participation has evolved in consonance with the consolidation of the revolutionary state and the structures of democratic centralism.

The earlier instances of mass participation corresponded to the first period of the Revolution; immediate reconstruction and recovering social organization at the grassroots level were essential, and this was expressed in the forms of popular democracy described in the article. While these forms are in no way obsolete, in the current juncture the overriding reality is the counterrevolution and economic crisis. Defending revolutionary power seized in 1979 is at this moment the most fundamental objective interest of the broad masses; democratic participation can and should be measured (although hardly exclusively) in terms of how this task is carried out, and it would be foolish to argue that the massive incorporation of the Nicaraguan people into armed and unarmed defense of their own historic project (a people's war in the classic sense) is anything but the strongest statement of popular participation in he Revolution.

Space limitations mean that we can barely identify these points of discussion, much less elaborate on them. Despite our brief critique, we agree with Vilas that some problems faced by the mass organizations can be traced back to misguided tactical and strategic approaches on the part of the ESLN, although this would require an article in itself. But the "problems' of popular participation in Nicaragua are not "deviations' from revolutionary practice; to expect that revolution --any revolution--can follow a smooth road toward social emancipation and democracy is more than unrealistic; it is idealism.

COPYRIGHT 1986 Monthly Review Foundation, Inc.
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