Air campaign tactics under fire

NATO'S campaign in Yugoslavia has come under fire from politicians and military experts who have argued that air power alone cannot resolve the conflict. They point to the recent past as providing the best proof of their arguments. Air power kicked off the battle for Kuwait but it did not end it.

The United States Air Force Balkan Air Campaign Study, which considered the effectiveness of the campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, found the performance of the so-called 'smart' weapons was mixed. The latest Tomahawk models, being used in the current campaign, did well, but the high speed anti-radiation missiles, known as HARM, did not work so well.

Widely scattered forces make poor targets, yet the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is being conducted by often lightly-armed small detachments of militia and 'police'. But, there are other ways in which the Yugoslav campaign differs from Kuwait. In the first 10 days, Nato mounted just 2000 sorties against targets in Yugoslavia, almost the same number as on the first day of the Gulf War. The British contribution in the Balkans was just eight RAF Harriers. These have now been augmented by another four Harriers and eight Tornados. The USAF opened the campaign with tank-busting A- 10 and F-16 fighter bombers, plus a handful of elderly Boeing B-52s to launch cruise missiles. Given the time taken in attempting to bring about a negotiated settlement between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs, Nato could have assembled a better balanced and stronger air element. It could even have influenced the outcome of the Rambouillet talks. While the initial attacks were, wisely, carried out against Serbian air defences, the Nato air forces should have had the air power in place to rapidly move to attack oil production, armaments depots and communications targets. At the same time, armed helicopters should have been used against Serb vehicles and personnel operating the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Why didn't Bill Clinton and Tony Blair insist on greater preparedness before launching the air campaign? Two reasons seem to account for this. The first is that neither really anticipated a prolonged operation. The second is the British, French and American armed forces seem to have been run down to a dangerous level. David Wragg is an aviation historian. His book, Bomber Battles, will be published by Sutton in September. He is also the author of Carrier, Published by Sutton and the United States Naval Institute.

Copyright 1999
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