75th FA Brigade: SOSO in OIF and BCT at the NTC

On any given day, the 2,100 Soldiers of the 75th FA Brigade are preparing for National Training Center (NTC) rotations at Fort Irwin, California, Warfighters and other exercises designed to measure wartime readiness. However, combat operations and the increasing number and diversity of postwar stability operations and support operations (SOSO) are straining current readiness strategies.

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Success in modern warfare depends on "flexibility" and "the ability of units to conduct small unit and infantry type operations," according to the "Initial Impressions Report" of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by the Combined Arms Assessment Team 01 (CAAT 01) from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 75th FA Brigade's preparation, execution and postwar activities surrounding OIF underscore the need to reassess current force structures and capabilities. For an Army at war, units must not only be proficient in their traditional tasks, but also have instilled in Soldiers and leaders the flexibility to accomplish any mission.

After 11 September 2001, the 75th FA Brigade fought in major combat operations in OIF, transitioned to SOSO missions and sent elements to the NTC as a brigade combat team (BCT). Although executing combat operations in Iraq was within the bounds of the brigade's traditional mission, leading the military search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), providing security and screening operations along the Iran-Iraq border, policing the battlefield and then serving as a BCT were all missions the 75th had never done before.

If recent operations are any indication, FA units will continue to be called upon to lead unique missions, partly because many of the traditional tasks become secondary in a SOSO environment. Thus, our continued success will depend on whether or not we can adapt and operate efficiently in the changing operational environment in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

In October 2002, the brigade was realigned with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4th ID). The brigade headquarters participated in the 4th ID's mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) in preparation for the attack on Iraq from Turkey. With only a few weeks' notice, the 75th Brigade commander had to reassess, reorganize and reassign key personnel and equipment to facilitate interoperability and develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to support the Army's most modernized digital division.

As the MRX concluded, the brigade headquarters was directed to form the first task force (TF) ever to hunt for WMD during combat operations while still deploying 1st Battalion, 17th FA (1-17 FA) (Paladin) and 6-27 FA, a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion, to support the 4th ID. In less than 90 days, the brigade mission had evolved from reinforcing the 1st Cavalry Division, to reinforcing the 4th ID, to forming the Army's first sensitive-site exploitation (SSE) TF, known as "Exploitation TF." The brigade had about 60 days to form, train and deploy to Camp Udairi, Kuwait, while simultaneously deploying two battalions to execute autonomous missions in support of TF Iron Horse with the 4th ID.

Exploitation TF. The 75th FA Brigade established an intelligence exploitation base to fuse current and historical intelligence and provide command and control ([C.sup.2]) to eight weapons hunting teams searching for evidence of WMD in Iraq. Exploitation TF included Active and Reserve Components units and Coalition partners totaling more then 400 personnel. (See Figure 1.)

The unique organization included Soldiers and civilians from the 52d Explosive Ordnance Detachment, 1-147 and 1-159 Aviation Battalions, 87th Chemical Battalion, 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, various Coalition partners and teams of experts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)--in addition to the Soldiers of the 75th FA Brigade.

Resembling a typical BCT headquarters, Exploitation TF included a Combined Joint Military Operations Center (CJMOC) as well as the traditional tactical operations center (TOC). The CJMOC consisted of intelligence, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN), explosive ordnance and technical escort experts. The CJMOC performed the centralized plans and intelligence functions, including conducting daily targeting meetings, providing tactical and technical SSE mission briefings and fusing intelligence.

The Exploitation TF commander directed SSE operations from the TOC. From there he also coordinated SSE missions with other major subordinate commands (MSC), directed logistical support and synchronized operations with the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the theater command at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The CFLCC planned the majority of the deliberate SSE missions.

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Leadership, security, communications and medical personnel for the weapons hunting teams came from the 75th FA Brigade. Although a number of the brigade had backgrounds in special operations or other unique qualifications, the majority of the officers. NCOs and enlisted Soldiers had little expertise in conducting non-conventional operations. These Soldiers were the core of the US Army's TF hunting WMD.

The sensitive-site teams (SSTs) led the hunt for WMDs in Iraq. The SSTs were task-organized direct support (DS) to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEE) and the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3d ID) initially to assess designated WMD sites. Technical experts from DTRA assigned to the SSTs surveyed the sites, assessed WMD intelligence and reported preliminary findings to the Exploitation TF as the units they were attached to sped across southern Iraq.

The CJMOC intelligence fusion cell analyzed the SST reports and made recommendations to the commander about whether or not to launch mobile exploitation teams (METs) to the sensitive sites for more detailed analysis. Based on the size and disposition of a sensitive site and the maneuver forces' ability to secure it, surveys typically lasted from several hours to an entire day.

METs Alpha and Bravo, consisting of roughly 25 Soldiers each, operated in the 101st Airborne Division and 3d ID sectors and entered Iraq shortly after the ground war began on 19 March 2003. Aided in their search by SST reports and other intelligence tips, the METs systematically exploited potential WMD sites.

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Joined on occasion by technical experts from the Exploitation TF, the composition of the teams changed slightly with each mission, depending on the mission's requirements. For instance, when MET Alpha was conducting a mission at a military-industrial complex near the city of Karbala, it was joined by a team of nuclear experts from DTRA. The nuclear and radiological DS team (DST) experts examined potential radiological, or "rad," sources and tried to determine the existence of, or whether or not the site was linked to a WMD program. Teams modified their equipment and personnel to account for the unique aspects of each site.

As WMD-related intelligence was collected. METs transmitted the information to the supported MSC and Exploitation TF for analysis and disposition instructions. MET exploitation missions were more detailed then SST surveys, typically lasting much longer. This was the case near Karbala where MET Alpha spent nearly two weeks exploring the vast complex that spanned more than 100 square kilometers.

Commanding the weapons hunting teams and managing volumes of intelligence information were different from anything an FA brigade had done. The 75th's transformation from an FA brigade headquarters to an Exploitation TF, including integrating unfamiliar organizations and practices, strained [C.sup.2] and intelligence management.

Equipment based on a traditional organization was reconfigured to facilitate many tactical requirements of the Exploitation TF headquarters and weapons hunting teams. Although the brigade made the most of the existing equipment and did what it could to acquire the shortages, a deficit still existed.

Shortages of personnel with WMD expertise, linguists, intelligence analysts and other technical experts limited the number of teams and placed the burden of gathering, analyzing and exploiting sites and information on non-experts. The lack of trained specialists caused Soldiers to improvise "on the move." Discipline, ingenuity and dogged trial and error compensated for the many equipment and personnel shortages that plagued the 75th's Exploitation TF.

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These Soldiers faced several challenges while searching for WMD.

* The Iraqis looted or destroyed WMD sites and evidence. Widespread Iraqi paranoia and active counterintelligence efforts made it difficult to interpret information gathered from the people and evidence salvaged from sites looted or deliberately destroyed. When MET Alpha left its temporary headquarters in a large weapons manufacturing plant in Qadisiyah south of Baghdad with the 101st Airborne Division, the plant was in excellent condition. By the time the team flew over the same site nine days later, it literally was stripped to the frames and burned.

For many desperate Iraqis, the security vacuums created by advancing maneuver forces unable to secure rear areas made sensitive sites irresistible targets.

In addition, materials and documents were deliberately dispersed and destroyed. Targeted destruction of specific items was evident at nearly every site.

On one occasion at an Iraqi intelligence services' headquarters in Baghdad, the team found Iraqis destroying materials even while US forces were scouring the area. One suspect detained by MET Alpha during the exploitation of the intelligence headquarters compound had passports and false identification from three countries and refused to answer any questions other than to claim he had forgotten something in the building.

In an urban environment--without adequate security--the job of eliminating looters, stopping deliberate destruction, safeguarding the team and completing the mission was very difficult.

* Many Iraqis with WMD knowledge feared retribution from Saddam Hussein's followers and did not trust the Coalition Force's capabilities to protect them. Toppling the Iraqi regime intensified the disorganization and paranoia in Saddam Hussein's compartmentalized, secretive, incompetent government. These factors limited the number of informants willing to come forward and cast doubt on intelligence gathered from those who did.

In many cases, those directly involved in WMD programs fled to avoid retribution or capture.

The shortage of maneuver forces jeopardized security for the teams as well as for potential informants. The teams had difficulty convincing informants of our resolve to safeguard cooperative Iraqis.

* Equipment and personnel shortages hindered the weapons hunting teams. Exploitation TF deployed without the ability to move itself or send secure information across the vast distances of the Iraqi desert. Equipment shortages forced a permanent reduction in the number of weapons hunting teams from eight (three METs and five SSTs) to six (two METs and four SSTs).

The plan to move MET teams by rotary-wing aircraft was not executable due to aircraft shortages and bad weather. Vehicles were assigned double and triple duty, serving as transportation for security platoon personnel, MET teams, and personnel and equipment from the Exploitation TF headquarters. On one occasion, vehicles and personnel supporting MET Alpha had to be recalled to the Exploitation TF headquarters, nearly 150 kilometers south of their location, to move the headquarters from its base of operations in southern Iraq to the Baghdad International Airport.

* The METs needed secure communications. Each of the teams deployed with standard single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) and tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios designed for conventional operations. However, the sensitivity of much of the intelligence necessitated a more secure and reliable means of relaying the information to the headquarters. On many occasions, even the TACSAT radios proved to be unreliable or inadequate due to the sensitivity and quantity of information. On several occasions, the teams were without communications.

Exploitation TF handed over [C.sup.2] to a largely expanded Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) in July 2003. Although media accounts focus on the failure to discover stockpiles of WMD, the 75th Brigade Diamond Team Soldiers along with their joint and Coalition partners were instrumental in identifying the scope of the Iraqi WMD programs.

In the nearly five months in Iraq during the first critical phases of the war, the TF established the framework for future SSE operations.

The TF disbanded in Kuwait with a departure as unceremonious as its arrival.

1-17 FA (Copperheads)--A Maneuver Task Force. Throughout its preparation for and participation in OIF, the Copperheads were attached to TF Iron Horse, a 26,000-plus force centered on the [C.sup.2] of the 4th ID. The roles and missions assigned to 1-17 FA spanned a wide range during its yearlong deployment.

The first mission for 1-17 FA was to provide DS fires to the division cavalry squadron, 1-10 Cav, that led the 4th ID into Iraq 14 April 2003. This TF, TF Saber, cleared and secured a large portion of the area of what would be the 4th ID's zone of operations. As the rest of the division closed into the zone, TF Saber executed a road march to the east to screen the division's eastern flank along the Iran-Iraq border.

Later, two division priorities dramatically altered 1-17 FA's mission. First the 4th ID leadership decided to employ 1-10 Cav elsewhere in the division's battlespace. The 4th ID also focused on establishing Iraqi security forces. These decisions led to the formulation of TF Copperhead commanded and controlled by 1-17 FA. (See Figure 2.) TF Copperhead recruited, trained and equipped Iraqi forces, including border police and customs for the Diyala Province and an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) battalion. In addition, the task force served as the 4th ID's lead on collective operations and training with the 1st Battalion, New Iraqi Army.

Given the size of the zone (larger than Massachusetts) with an Iranian border trace of more than 250 kilometers, TF Copperhead counted on the contributions of professional Iraqi organizations.

With these non-standard missions, TF Copperhead looked to Army programs and references for guidance. 1-17 FA fell back on the military decision-making process (MDMP) to figure out what to do and how to do it. The TF developed a list of objectives envisioned for these organizations and then identified associated key tasks and strategies to achieve those objectives. The TF then referred to appropriate Army doctrinal manuals, standing operating procedures (SOPs) and administrative regulations to formulate the standards for implementation. This same analysis process was used to establish and develop other programs and processes in OIF, to include the political ones, such as selecting mayors and city councils.

The credit for executing these key tasks goes to the company-grade officers, NCOs and Soldiers of TF Copperhead. By the time TF 1-17 FA redeployed, it had created in its zone a border police of more than 1,300 and an ICDC battalion of more than 900 members plus worked with an Iraqi Army battalion of 600 soldiers and four municipal governments (mayors and city councils).

6-27 FA--Policing the Battlefield. The 6-27 FA Proud Rockets deployed in April 2003 with the mission to reinforce the fires of the 4th ID Artillery. Based on its arrival time, its mission was changed to supporting TF Bullet I (41st FA Brigade, V Corps) and TF Bullet II (17th FA Brigade). For eight months, the Proud Rockets executed the critical but nonstandard mission of policing the battlefield--securing and clearing cached Iraqi weapons, equipment and munitions as well as providing site security, executing cordon and search operations and providing medical and humanitarian relief.

Like the other elements of the brigade, 6-27 FA discovered the fundamentals of doctrine remain valid for planning and executing these tasks, but internal adjustments to task organization and the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) were required. Additionally, the battalion's Soldiers and leaders clearly demonstrated they were adaptable to the changing roles and environment.

As they executed their mission analysis, they determined what previous training remained valid and identified those tasks that were new. They established training programs, executed detailed mission rehearsals and implemented appropriate risk mitigation actions to ensure Soldiers could safely accomplish the mission.

The Proud Rockets transported and helped destroy more than 1.5 million pounds of ammunition, provided humanitarian relief and helped recover missing American Soldiers. Their efforts helped make the country safer for Iraqis and Coalition Forces.

NTC 03-09--An FA Brigade as a BCT. In August 2003, a few days after downloading equipment returning from OIF, the brigade reorganized, reconfigured and deployed from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to the NTC. The brigade deployed its Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) (-) and 1-77 FA (MLRS) (-). The unit became the first FA brigade headquarters to complete an NTC rotation as a BCT headquarters.

The brigade maintained its traditional counterfire responsibilities while assuming tactical control of a TF that consisted of one light infantry battalion and one FA battalion, one engineer and two armor companies, one each light FA and air defense artillery (ADA) batteries, and a regimental support squadron.

The brigade staff was, once again, thrust into an unfamiliar role as it grappled with the fact that no collective training, staff integration or coordination was possible before forming the TF. The SOSO scenario, again, challenged the expertise and training readiness of the staff to manage a maneuver TF and strained the brigade communications, automation and tactical equipment's ability to facilitate [C.sup.2], logistics and intelligence functions.

Questions for the Future. The Diamond Team's experiences after two years and several nonstandard missions has made clear that to maintain relevance, units must be modular and flexible enough to perform just about any unexpected role. The question about how the Army prepares units to go to war is not whether or not it needs to continue to refine training and its organization--clearly it does. The real question is, "How can the Army focus and prioritize limited training time, supplies and other resources to accomplish the dramatically expanded range of readiness objectives?"

This requires changing military thinking and adopting flexible, modular units that can perform the new varied missions of modern warfare.

Tenacity and ingenuity, not pre-deployment training, often overcame the challenges of unfamiliar nonstandard missions. The growing number of these missions necessitates a review of the fitness of current organizational and training paradigms to maintain and sustain unit preparedness to execute full-spectrum operations.

The increasingly complex task of preparing units for the contemporary operational environment (COE) raises a few key questions. Do current mission-essential tasks account for the full range of operations artillery units are performing in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq? Do stopgap pre-deployment training plans and MRXs fill the void left by mission-essential task list-(METL)-focused training that fails to account for the full range of combat and SOSO? If not, how can units include the variety of unique tasks as part of the unit METL without distracting from the core combat competencies? How can we organize and train units modularly enough to "plug and play" in any environment without degrading the ability to perform traditional roles?

Field Artillery will remain useful as long as it adapts traditional military paradigms to meet Army operational needs.

* Team Apache
  --A/1-17 FA
  --Scout Section
* B/1-17 FA
* C/1-17 FA
* C/1-10 Cav (-)
* 2d BCT BRT
* Team Wolfpack
  --Service/1-17 FA
  --244th EN Bn Contact Team
  --Laundry/Bath Team
  --204th FSB Contact Team
* Team Eagle
  --HHB/1-17 FA
  --Team Bersheid CA
  --Team Doner CA
  --PSYOPS Det
  --411 MP Co (-)
     * 1st Plt Grizzly 16/17
     * 2d Plt Grizzly 26/27
  --THT Jupiter 53
  --SEN Team

Legend:
    BCT = Brigade Combat Team
     Bn = Battalion
    BRT = Brigade Reconnaissance Team
     CA = Civil Affairs
     Co = Company
    Det = Detachment
     EN = Engineer
    FSB = Forward Support Battalion
     MP = Military Police
    Plt = Platoon
 PSYOPS = Psychological Operations
    SEN = Small-Extension Node
    THT = Tactical HUMINT [Human Intelligence] Team

Figure 2: Task Organization of 1-17 FA's Task Force Copperhead

By Lieutenant Colonel Vincent L. Price, Major Dale E. Owen and Chief Warrant Officer Three Richard L. Gonzales

Lieutenant Colonel Vincent L. Price has commanded 1st Battalion, 17th FA (1-17 FA), 75th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and in Iraq since June 2002. Previous assignments include serving as the Executive Officer and Deputy Fire Support Coordinator of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery and Operations Officer and Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) in 3-82 FA, 1st Cavalry Division, both at Fort Hood, Texas. He was a Brigade FSO deployed to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor and an Assistant S3 during Operation Desert Storm (ODS), both with the 1st Cav. He holds a Master of Public Administration from Harvard.

Major Dale E. Owen is the S3 of the 75th FA Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He served as the Executive Officer and S3 of 1-17 FA, deploying to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and earlier, as the Assistant S3 for the 75th FA Brigade. Previously he was an Observer-Controller/Trainer in the 1st Training Support Battalion at New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. He commanded B Battery, 3-82 FA and served as the Assistant S3 and a task force FSO, all in the 1st Cavalry Division. Major Owen deployed to the Gulf for ODS as a Platoon Leader and, later, Executive Officer in Howitzer Battery, 3d Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Richard L. Gonzales, until recently, was the 75th FA Brigade Counterfire Officer. Currently, he is a Targeting Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. During OIF, he served as the Officer-in-Charge of Mobile Exploitation Team (MET) A, Exploitation Task Force, 75th Brigade. In the 1st Armored Division, he was the Targeting Officer for TF Falcon deployed to Kosovo for Operation Allied Force, and a Firefinder Radar Technician in C/25 FA deployed to Bosnia for Operations Joint Forge/Joint Guard. As a Fire Support NCO in the 2d Battalion 75th Rangers, he deployed to Panama for Operation Just Cause and to the Persian Gulf for ODS.

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