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  • 标题:Establish an NGO Reception Center at Baghdad Airport? … What the hell is an NGO?
  • 作者:Joseph C. Winkelmann
  • 期刊名称:FA Journal
  • 印刷版ISSN:0191-975X
  • 出版年度:2004
  • 卷号:Jan-Feb 2004
  • 出版社:Field Artillery Association

Establish an NGO Reception Center at Baghdad Airport? �� What the hell is an NGO?

Joseph C. Winkelmann

During the transition, the 3d Division Artillery (Div Arty) was tasked to provide force protection and security at the Baghdad International Airport and surrounding zones. An additional task required the Div Arty to establish a reception center for all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) arriving at Baghdad International Airport to provide humanitarian assistance. Now that certainly was a first.

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The Mission. The Div Arty was to establish an NGO Reception Center to receive all NGOs arriving by air transport at Baghdad International Airport, provide them temporary billets and transport them securely to destinations in Baghdad. Normally, military operations dealing with civilian organizations and humanitarian relief agencies are inherently a civil affairs (CA) function, but not in this instance. In addition, over time, the mission developed into one with a greater scope and responsibility than the original concept entailed.

Initially, the personnel assigned to establish and manage the NGO Reception Center did not know what to expect. The Div Arty took on a wide range of duties on a daily basis.

Establishing Operations. The division tasked the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to provide a detachment of one platoon of armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for security and the 123d Signal Battalion to provide six family of multipurpose tactical vehicles (FMTVs) to transport NGO personnel and supplies into Baghdad. The 94th Engineer Battalion provided 40 cots for billeting and 60 cases of meals ready-to-eat (MREs) for humanitarian workers.

We established the NGO Reception Center in the former Iraqi Airways Cargo Terminal. This terminal, like much of Baghdad International Airport, was in disrepair due to years of neglect. Electrical power was sporadic, bathroom facilities were not functional and offices designated as soldier and NGO personnel living space were looted and extremely dirty. After days of clearing debris and cleaning, the building was almost ready to receive visitors.

While clean, the reception area was austere. A storage warehouse within the Republican Guard compound on the airport provided the final touches. We repositioned furniture, decorative pieces and oriental rugs destined for Ba'ath Party members and Saddam's palaces to furnish the NGO Reception Center. This turned the former cargo terminal into a comfortable lobby.

Communications consisted of an AN/VRC 92 single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) set on the Div Arty force protection net and a mobile subscriber radio terminal (MSRT) phone to coordinate with outside units and agencies.

Manning consisted of an officer-in-charge (OIC), a captain; assistant OIC, a first lieutenant; NCOIC, a sergeant first class; assistant NCOIC, a sergeant; and two Soldiers. The remote access unit (RAU) team providing communications support consisted of two NCOs and four Soldiers. The communications team took on the same responsibilities as other personnel. Operations were 24 hours a day.

Operations Begin. Operations began slowly. The non-military and government organizations operating the airport were neither prepared for, nor had guidelines to allow humanitarian assistance flights into the airport. The first week we received four flights from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and two flights from AirServ (US State Department-approved air transport for US humanitarian organizations). These flights carried previously evacuated humanitarian workers returning to evaluate the situation in Baghdad and reestablish support operations.

This small number of flights allowed us to refine our mission requirements, develop a contact list and phone roster, and establish an in-processing procedure for arriving personnel. We became known as the Baghdad International Non-Governmental Organization Center (BINGO). The name stuck.

We initially operated under the assumption that the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), currently referred to as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), would establish control of arriving and departing personnel into and out of Iraq. To our surprise, ORHA did not establish control. It relied on us to track and screen all civilian and foreign military personnel arriving into and departing from the "civilian" side of the Baghdad International Airport.

Our tracking procedures consisted of recording each person's name and taking a digital photo of him/her; requiring a passport/military identification; recording the ID number and the country of origin; determining the agency, position and occupation; and, finally, recording the flight number and date of arrival. Adhering to these screening and tracking procedures became very important to security as the operation increased in volume and scope.

Everyday BINGO had to accomplished additional tasks, usually without prior notification by or coordination with a higher authority. On a daily basis, we reacted and adapted operations to changing coordination requirements and an increasing influx of new humanitarian agencies and equipment. (See the figure.)

BINGO personnel performed a myriad of duties. One day we loaded tons of humanitarian supplies onto trucks or coordinated for special machinery to download equipment and humanitarian aid. Another day we helped load injured personnel onto hospital aircraft.

Because Baghdad Airport was under maximum force protection and security, we had to escort NGO vehicles and personnel to and from the gates of the airport. We also became an information and transport support center for personnel who mistakenly came to the reception center. We coordinated for and helped transport all those intended for the military operations side of the airport. The NGO Reception Center became the NGO "Reaction Center."

Coordination became a large part of our daily operations. Working in an environment with limited and, sometimes, unreliable communications, we conducted all types of coordination between many facets of military and government organizations.

Coordination with ORHA was a puzzle that seemed to have many disconnected pieces. We spent many frustrating hours getting humanitarian organizations, commercial civilian business representatives and civil aviation representatives to the correct ORHA office of control. This coordination also included pinpointing the responsible CA office by jurisdiction or identifying the engineer unit with the assets available to accomplish a variety of missions.

Passport control, customs, immigration, civil affairs and ORHA representation was absent at this single air-entry point for all of Baghdad. Humanitarian agencies, representatives for commercial businesses and foreign military personnel (under the humanitarian aid umbrella) from all over the world started flooding into Baghdad Airport through the NGO Reception Center. The volume of traffic processed during our peak was 12 flights and 300 NGO personnel in a 24-hour period.

Div Arty personnel had to control an area referred to as the "Wild West." The potential for terrorists. Saddam loyalists and Ba'ath party members to enter or depart the country existed.

For example, some days we processed United Nations personnel, ICRC personnel, hundreds of Saudi Arabian armed forces personnel working at a hospital in Baghdad, civilian and military United Arab Emirates embassy and hospital workers, and British Airways representatives attempting to initiate flights into Baghdad International Airport.

Requests for additional support and control measures went to the 3d Infantry Division Headquarters. V Corps and ORHA. The verbal responses were favorable, and they recognized our legitimate concerns; however, reaction and execution were not. This was due to a changing and confusing bureaucracy resulting from the problem of establishing government control after the war.

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Eventually, working through ORHA, we received a CA representative to help in operations. The problem of support for BINGO originated from a jurisdiction issue between CA units in Baghdad and from the push by ORHA to turn the Baghdad International Airport operations over to the Iraqis.

Showtime--The Media, Etc. BINGO soon became a hotbed for media activity. Humanitarian flights from all over the world brought their own television news teams and print reporters to record humanitarian operations in Iraq. CNN, AFN and Fox News as well as other major US media frequented the NGO Reception Center and humanitarian ramp.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Representing the United States Army and 3d Infantry Division in Iraq to the world became our added mission. We were the first US Soldiers that many of these civilians and news personnel had ever seen up close. It was important for all personnel working there to portray a high degree of professionalism, good conduct, personal appearance and cooperation while maintaining control and making it clear that the US military was in charge.

Media events included the return of Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs) from the Iraq-Iran War more than 25 years ago, evacuation of hospitalized Iraqi citizens out of Iraq for advanced medical treatment and the arrival of thousands of tons of humanitarian aid. The most covered event was the NGO Reception Center meeting of Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner, the Director of ORHA; Paul Nielson, the President of the ICRC; and Jakob Kellenburger, the Commissioner for Humanitarian Assistance of the European Union. BINGO processed many international dignitaries.

The coordination, assistance and procedures established while the 3d Div Arty operated BINGO sent a positive message of support to the international community. We maintained security and quickly coordinated to facilitate humanitarian aid and medical assistance to help reconstruct Iraq.

After months of preparing for war and then fighting across Iraq, this change in mission gave our Soldiers a feeling of accomplishment on behalf of the Iraqi people. The flexibility and resourcefulness of our FA soldiers were evident in their instantaneous transformation from executing victorious combat to effective support operations.

Humanitarian Organizations
* International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
* Kuwaiti Prisoners of War Investigation Team
* RONCO-International Mine-Clearing Agency
* Save the Children
* Physicians for Human Rights
* Doctors Without Borders
* United Arab Emirates Government Humanitarian Agency
* Saudi Arabian Air Force Government Relief Agency
* Organization of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner Team for Washington,
  DC
* USAID-United States Agency for International Development
* International Medical Corps
* United Nations Humanitarian Organization International
* Women for Women
* Americares
* CARE

Commerical Agencies (Provided Billeting and Helped Coordinate)
* MCI Communications
* DHL Worldwide Delivery
* British Airways
* Global World Airlines
* AAFES

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Processed Through Baghdad
International Non-Governmental Organization (BINGO).

By Captain Joseph C. Winkelmann

Captain Joseph C. Winkelmann is the Assistant S3 for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery and served as Battle Captain during major combat operations and then Officer-in-Charge of the Non-Governmental Organizations Reception Center at Baghdad International Airport during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also in the 3d Division, he has served as a Troop Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3-7 Cav); Targeting Officer and Executive Officer for A/39 FA (Target Acquisition Battery); and Multiple-Launch Rocket System Platoon Leader for A/13 FA. He also was a Brigade FSO for the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Korea. He served 10 years as an enlisted soldier, attaining the rank of Staff Sergeant.

COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Field Artillery Association
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

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