Saddam never abandoned quest for WMD

The Duelfer report pretty much established that Saddam Hussein didn't have the weapons of mass destruction that U.S. intelligence -- and the intelligence agencies of various other countries -- calculated he had when President Bush launched the Iraqi war last year.

The miscalculation of the spymasters was caused in part by Saddam's own clever shell game, assuring the United Nations that he'd destroyed such weapons, while at the same time carrying out a series of deceptions designed to keep enemies like the United States and Israel and Iran -- and his own generals -- guessing that he might still have them.

As you delve further into the 960-page report by Charles Duelfer, top U.S. inspector of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), it is clear that while the threat may not have been imminent, it wasn't non-existent or fanciful.

While Saddam's WMD capability was virtually eliminated by the first Gulf War, the ISG established, from captured documents and interrogation of himself and his imprisoned aides, that he never abandoned his intention of re-creating it, focusing on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare capability but not excluding nuclear.

His aim was to get the post-1991 sanctions lifted to permit such a resumption. Especially targeted were permanent United Nations Security Council members Russia, France and China. By 2001 he had substantially undermined the sanctions and was within striking distance of a de facto end to them. He had corrupted the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program to acquire foreign exchange for potential weapons development. Procurement was under way for illicit importation of goods and technologies for both conventional and WMD arms. The Duelfer report says the Saddam Hussein regime subverted more than $11 billion for such purposes, primarily by illegal deals with high foreign government officials.

Ironically, Iran was the main motivator of this lust for WMD. "All senior-level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region," according to the Duelfer report. "The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations but secondary."

While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the United Nations permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery systems provided their range did not exceed 150 kilometers. In fact, the ISG uncovered Iraqi designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 kilometers, and for a 1,000-kilometer cruise missile. None of these systems were in production but demonstrated "Saddam's continuing desire for a long-range delivery capability."

As for chemical weapons, the ISG determined that while Saddam destroyed his major stocks in 1991, he "never abandoned his intentions to resume a chemical warfare effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable." However the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 2003 a string of "undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations."

The IIS was also instrumental in originating Iraq's biological warfare program in the 1970s. A secret team developed poisons or toxins, including ricin and aflatoxin for use against opponents of Saddam's regime. The ISG found no major stocks of biological weapons in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. incursion into Iraq.

But Richard Spertzel, an ISG biological-weapons expert, wrote in a Wall Street Journal article last week that Iraqi intelligence agents "had a plan to produce and weaponize nitrogen mustard in rifle grenades and a plan to bottle sarin and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers and medicine bottles which they would ship to the United States and Europe." Are we to believe, he asked, that this plan "existed because they liked us? Or did they wish to do us harm?"

On the nuclear front, while Iraq's significant program was largely defused after the first Gulf War, Saddam did express to senior aides his intent to reactivate it once U.N. sanctions ended.

While all this may not have amounted to an imminent threat, it was hardly inconsequential.

John Hughes is editor and chief operating officer of the Deseret Morning News. He is a former editor of the Christian Science Monitor, which syndicates this column. E-mail: [email protected]

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