Sweden's Social Dems: back at the helm - Social Democrats

Useful insights from a crucial election overseas

As we pick through the debris of the mid-term Donnybrook in this country, now's a good time to gain some perspective by examining the electoral customs of other democracies. A particularly instructive election was the resurrection this Fall of Sweden's Social Democrats -- a watershed political battle that underscored the value of a focused message. The race also proved that American techniques and Bill Clinton's famous 1992 rallying cry -- "It's the Economy, Stupid" -- can resonate not only here but beyond our shores.

The Social Democrats, the largest party in Sweden, started their climb back after losing in 1991 to a coalition of non-socialist, bourgeoisie parties led, by the Moderates (read conservatives). The Social Democrats had rarely lost an election since 1932, when they first; came to power and started building the "Swedish Model" a semi-socialist system where welfare, unemployment, education, pensions and health care are all provided by the state.

As FDR had done in the United States, the Social Democrats in Sweden responded to worldwide depression in the 1930s with strong government intervention. The U.S. then entered World War II, became a world power, and remained strongly capitalistic, while the Swedes remained neutral, continued to internally build their Swedish model, and became prosperous as a democratic socialist state with a strong emphasis on exports.

The Social DemOcrats were defeated in 1991 because of a weak economy and, in an echo of the mid-term elections in the U.S., voters' desire for change. Sweden, like many western countries, had undergone a severe recession in the late 1980s. The young leader of the Moderates offered opportunity and choice in business and in education and promised to cut both taxes and the bureaucracy -- very reminiscent of Ronald Reagan's message in the 1980s. Although they gained only 22 percent of the vote, that was enough for the Moderates to form a coalition government with other non-socialist parties; the Social Democrats received 37 percent of the vote but had no coalition partners with which to pull together a government.

Bildt's Honeymoon

Carl Bildt's honeymoon as Prime Minister lasted almost a year until it became clear that he could not turn the country around quickly enough. The problems were still there -- neither the old leaders nor the new faces who replaced them seemed effective. Worse for Bildt, he had violated the country's long-standing "social covenant" by aggressively pushing pro-market methods to overhaul the Swedish economy.

At this point, a group of youngish Social Democrats began a process that would eventually lead to victory. It was their belief that they could adopt the "American electoral model" of well-researched messages, delivered with discipline, focus and rapid response, as the way back for Social Democrats. Yes, it might mean some policy modification for the party, but more than anything this style of political communications and electioneering was needed to show the Swedish electorate that this old and established party was in fact dynamic, relevant and a real part of their lives.

Phil Noble was the lead American Consultant who first became involved with the Swedish Social Democrats, followed closely by Rick Ridder and myself -- all consultants with extensive experience in the U.S. and elsewhere. It was clear from the start that these Swedish pols already knew where they needed to go; they merely needed our assistance in getting there. They had conducted research and initial planning; now they were interested in ideas from the Americans on ways to refine and polish their basic campaign plan. This type of sophisticated relationship with an international client is dramatically different from our experiences in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe, where clients tend to seek more up-front handholding.

These Swedish politicos knew what they wanted and were very wily and well-trained in their own right, with all the advantages of advanced communications and infrastructure. Often in international counselling, the foreign locals have no idea how to use "polls," segmentation by voter attitudes are not even considered, and "keeping on message" is often like trying to corral Texas longhorns.

Noble took the lead in helping the Social Democrats become more thorough in their planning. He provided discipline, prompted them to focus on a single message, and came up with innovative new ideas about how to communicate that message. Ridder helped them develop a community-by-community polling program that determined local issue concerns and political support - using trained volunteers for both interviewing and tabulation (and they actually got quality volunteers to do this in most local areas).

My function was to evaluate their national polling program, bring focus groups into the mix, and develop a "strategic" method of analyzing public opinion data. Sweden boasts a good infrastructure for telephone interviewing and focus groups; indeed, the Swedes are premier in the world at counting and measuring themselves, as you'd expect in an affluent, socialist society. What was needed was the political link that years of experience in American elections gave us: the ability to interpret the opinion data, relate them to message development strategy, and implement appropriate tactics.

The Old Bugaboo

With more than a year to go, the Social Democrats moved into the lead with about 50 percent of the vote. Bildt, the conservative Prime Minister, couldn't move his poll numbers because he couldn't move the economy. He couldn't effectively raise the "tired, old socialist bureaucracy" bugaboo, because the Social Democrats were putting on a new face - featuring new leaders, projecting a team of Ingvar Carlsson, the 57-year old party leader who was a contemporary of the revered Olof Palme, and Mona Sahlin, the 37-year-old "housewife" politician who was the new president of the party. They also had a sexy new logo (a stylized rose) and punchier ways of communicating their manifesto. In many ways, the party's tone purposely mimicked the dynamism of the Clinton-Gore campaign in 1992.

As election day approached, the national volunteer tracking program showed a slight drop in the polls for the Social Democrats. This was partly due to welfare reform proposals in their platform that triggered an exodus of women voters to the Left party. Most of this "softening," however, was simply due to the difficulty inherent in holding such a strong lead for so long a period of time. If anyone benefited from this weakening, it was not the Social Democrats' major opponents (Bildt's Moderates) but rather the minor parties (ranging from bourgeoisie to progressive). Moreover, some younger voters (mainly women) liked one or two of the minor parties' specific issue positions but were already satisfied that the Social Democrats would win.

In the end, the Social Democrats did win - with 45.6 percent of the vote, which under Sweden's proportional representation system gave them almost a majority of the vote. The win was complete, garnering the second highest vote in the last 25 years and taking (or sharing) control in 22 of the 23 local governments. At the national level, the party has decided to rule alone, not in coalition, in an effort to get their economic manifesto passed in as complete a form as possible.

Victory: How Swede It Is

The lessons learned from this comeback victory? Two insights are especially salient:

* Even though political cultures of other countries may be mature and their societies modern, the sheer number of elections held in the U.S. gives our consultants vastly more experience. This experience makes them adroit at communicating a message; it also makes them shrewd when it comes to in-the-trenches electioneering. Most other countries only tool up their election mechanism every two or three years.

* It was refreshing to see a socio-political culture that wasn't prone to the frequent and often violent mood swings of the American electorate. The vast majority of Swedes know where they are coming from politically, they have a better grasp of public policy than American voters, and they apply that wisdom to their selection of a political party. They then expect that party to carry out certain policy goals if it gains power.

Because of this attentive, knowledgeable electorate, even when the Social Democrats began slipping ever so slightly at the end, it was difficult to discern why and who was dropping away from the party (a movement of 1-2 percent). It became clear we could not react to this slippage with the lightning speed that's typical of American consultants, because 30-second paid television and radio spots are essentially illegal in Sweden. Therefore, when the attempt to adjust the message was done, it was done methodically, logically, and at a slower pace than in the American system. The bottom line was an electorate making clear choices based on an informational base that had been developed over a long period of time -- a stark contrast to the meanness, shallowness and capriciousness that seems to infect American politics today.

Bill Hamilton is president of Hamilton & Staff, pollsters based in Washington, DC.

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