Munitions transformation

Imagine a scenario in which the Army launched a program to develop the next generation shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon. The requirements included a disposable launcher, coupled with enhanced sighting and target discretion capability, increased range, reduced collateral damage, enhanced lethality and reduced weight. After two years of refining the requirements, the research and development (R&D) effort was established with moderate funding. The R&D effort culminated after seven years (dragged out because of funding limitations), resulting in a low-rate initial production program in the eighth year. The prototype weapon fulfilled the requirements that had been established 10 years earlier and was ready for full production. However, when it finally came time to fund the procurement, the Army decided to kill the program. How and why did this happen? What was the impact of the decision?

The scenario presented in this illustration is far from fantasy. In fact, any number of past munitions programs could be plugged into this example. Names like SADARM, TOW Fire and Forget, TERM, ATACMS Block IIA, MPIM and MSTAR are among the recently terminated programs. What went wrong, and why were these programs terminated?

The answer cannot be traced to one individual reason. Instead, a number of factors influenced the final program terminations. The process favors failure. The time involved from concept to solution was too long, resulting in weapons that no longer adequately fit the needs and requirements of the Army. Throughout the development process, new requirements were being developed that better fit current and future needs. Limited funding extended the process out to a point in time when the original requirements were no longer applicable. Perhaps the biggest factor in the final decision to kill the shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon program in this illustration was the cost of executing the program-actually buying the munitions needed to replace the AT-4s and Dragons at a cost of millions of dollars over several years.

Perhaps the most important question concerns impact. It is easy enough to assume that because of the decision, the Army will continue to use the old munitions until the next replacement is developed. The truth is, in fact, much more complex. Not only will the old munitions still be required, but the cost of maintaining those rounds will increase significantly. In some cases, refurbishment programs will be required to keep those rounds serviceable past their designed lifespan. Transportation costs will increase with the need to replace overseas stocks (usually some of the earliest models) in order to refurbish them. Munitions requirements for other weapon systems may increase because of the lack of effectiveness of the old munition as determined by requirements models. Finally, Army force structure could be affected since the older munitions are usually required in far greater numbers, driving the need for transportation and ammunition units on the battlefield. The recent issues of munitions insensitivity (stability in handling and storage) and environmental friendliness are also of growing importance and will further complicate the process.

The solution to this problem is neither fast nor easy. The current cost estimate to fix the Army munitions problem is approximately $26 billion dollars and would take more than a decade to execute, assuming funding was available. How do we fix the problem? Because the solution requires a great deal of two things the Army never has enough of-time and money-finding the solution has been avoided, until now.

The Army, under the direction of the G-8, deputy chief of staff for Programs, has developed a strategy for the transformation of Army munitions. Within G-8, the director, Force Development, is spearheading this effort. The strategy is based on the premise that a solution to the munitions dilemma involves a long-range vision that addresses all aspects of the munitions life cycle, from concept development through firing or disposal. The development of unique, target-specific munitions, used with a single weapons platform, can no longer be accomplished affordably. As the technology of munitions has improved, the cost has also gone up. The increased precision of modern munitions compounds the cost problem, since the need for reduced quantities leads to increased per-unit costs.

The key elements of the munitions transformation strategy include: life-cycle requirements, common components, continuous R&D and production, block upgrades and eliminating demilitarization.

By including life-cycle requirements in the concept development process, the Army will start to manage munitions programs as it does weapon systems, including life span, storage and maintenance, recap or upgrade, use or disposal plans and costs. This change will allow the Army to include issues such as environmental factors, conversion to training use and packaging for storage and shipment, as part of the overall program-instead of dealing with these concerns as an afterthought.

To address the problem of reduced production and increased costs, the munitions transformation strategy strives to achieve multiple uses of common components to increase production quantities and maximize the significant investments made in the R&D process. By developing common fuzes, propellant, guidance systems, components, submunitions and warheads, the Army plans to achieve the economies of scale that were previously available only with the large procurement quantities associated with "dumb" munitions. However, this implies long-range thinking throughout the process.

One of the real world problems associated with the example posed in the hypothetical illustration is that the Army rarely buys enough munitions to fill the bunkers. In fact, procurement of warfighting munitions is dwarfed by the procurement of training munitions. Most weapon systems have had one or more types of munition that have been affected by delays or cancellation, resulting in the best munitions usually not being available. Meanwhile, current technology is far ahead of the munitions we now have, and production capacity is underutilized.

The solution to this problem of outdated munitions is changing to continuous R&D and production. Instead of waiting until R&D achieves the 100 percent solution, an interim solution would allow production to begin while R&D continued to work toward the next, improved solution. As real world needs change, this process will also change, adjusting the requirements, which will establish the next level for R&D, and identifying breakpoints for increased capability. As additional capability levels are reached, they can be inserted into production by the use of product improvements or modifications. Changes to required capabilities can be introduced into the R&D process without starting over from scratch, while continuous production continues to put improved munitions into the stockpile. Munitions previously produced can be improved via block upgrades with increased capabilities as already planned for in the life-cycle requirements phase. Since the R&D efforts are geared toward the development of common components, the block upgrade can involve several different munitions for different weapons platforms. An additional benefit of continuous R&D and production is a stable, continuous level of effort in both R&D and procurement, further reducing costs by preventing the peaks and valleys of effort associated with current munitions programs. Finally, by including plans for use in the life-cycle requirements phase of the process, plans can be made to convert aging components and/or munitions to training rounds, thus reducing or eliminating demilitarization and associated costs. Such plans will include the recapture of components or materiel from warfight specific components, such as warheads.

A strategy is nothing more that a piece of paper and a bunch of Power Point slides without a process to execute it. In order to implement the strategy, the director of Force Development of the Army G-8 has established a panel composed of Army staff representatives. The Munitions Transformation Solutions Panel will work to incorporate the elements of the strategy into current munitions programs and also ensure that future programs include the strategy elements from the start. This panel will be more than just another bureaucratic forum. It will have a big tool to ensure compliance: funding. The panel will directly influence decisions on program funding through the program objective memorandum process, driving strategy implementation as a result. This is not to say that critical breakthrough technologies or munitions will not be supported unless they include strategy elements. The goal is to consider all of the factors when making funding decisions, not just capability and cost. If the munition does not contribute to efficiencies in other areas like production, commonality, maintenance, storage, training and reclamation/reuse, then the capability or effectiveness of that munition would have to be significantly improved in order for it to be competitive for funding.

By implementing the munitions transformation strategy, the Army will develop long-range goals, shaping the requirements development process for future munitions. Research and development efforts will be focused on incorporating the latest technologies into munitions components, resulting in improvements across families of munitions. Production and R&D efforts will be stabilized, supporting the investment in equipment, facilities and people that are critical to keeping costs down while improving technical knowledge, quality and safety. Component commonality will initially keep production costs down, and eventually will affect the requirements and design of future weapon systems as developers craft programs to take advantage of the capabilities the new, modular munitions provide. Life-cycle management aspects designed into the new munitions will reduce the cost of surveillance, maintenance, packaging and transportation. In addition, options for conversion of warfighting rounds for use in training will minimize/delete the need for demilitarization, and the environmental impacts and hazards of unexploded ordnance for all munitions will be minimized.

Requirements development will involve capability boxes or zones, allowing the maximum creativity and commonality in design and development. Requirements will become living documents as capabilities are updated regularly to keep track of current and future needs. Research and development will be continuous, upgrading components as technology provides the next level of capability while continuous production ensures that we keep supplied with munitions that have the current capability set. Management will involve shaping new requirements, managing current assets and using the developed life-cycle factors to make timely decisions on upgrade, conversion, usage and maintenance of older munitions. Older, single function munitions will be replaced over time with multifunctional, common component items, thereby significantly reducing the number of different munitions in the inventory. Second and third order effects will include possible reductions in live fire training, stockage requirements, targeting systems and munitions-related force structure. The munitions transformation process will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, continuously developing, producing and adjusting to meet changing needs and requirements.

The components of the Army's munitions transformation strategy are wide-ranging, and the process of implementing them is perhaps even more daunting. Based on the complexity of this change, it would be easy to assume that the effort is doomed from the start. That assumption, however, will prove to be incorrect. The Army's munitions transformation strategy, as it stands now, or with modifications, will be implemented for one simple reason-it is critical to the future of the Army.

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM L. BOND is the deputy for systems management in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. He holds a master's degree in Acquisition Management from Florida Institute of Technology and graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College and the National Defense University's Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Apr 2003
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