Civil-military relations at the top

To the Editor:

I read with interest Colonel Richard Hooker's defense of the US military against the charge that it "operates freely in a charged political environment 'to impose its own perspective' in defiance of the principle of civilian control" ("Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," Winter 2003-04). While agreeing that the allegation, as laid, is mistaken for the reasons he points out, I would tentatively suggest that he shares a larger misconception with the critics in accepting that the question at issue concerns military bearing alone. It seems to me arguable that the charge quoted above can more easily be substantiated if one looks instead at the indifferent quality of civilian control.

On this view, the US society is facing a predictable long-term effect of the defeat in Vietnam, namely the purpose and achievement of General William E. DePuy in establishing the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The result of this historic achievement has, I suggest, been to shift the balance of intellectual power in civil-military relations very substantially in favor of the military. Any close student of the US professional military literature over the past few decades can see that, irrespective of service or rank, an area of defensible intellectual terrain has been sought and attained, such that never again will the US military be sent down the garden path by the "best and the brightest." This has nothing to do with the offensive "praetorian tendency" which is the central issue in classic civil-military relations theory as propounded by Finer, Huntington, and others. It has all to do with the defensive wish not to be ordered around by nincompoops. Military leaders know that they must earn the respect of the led. Why do civilian leaders seem not to care about this?

There are more aspects to this notion than can be conveniently discussed in the space of a commentary, but I suggest that it is more plausible to diagnose a comparatively weak civilian approach to military-political realities than to assert an overbearing military one. If so, then Colonel Hooker must be in error to the extent that he seeks to refute the critics by denying the gap. The gap is wide, and is growing wider.

It is clearly not in the interests of the United States or its allies to seek to reduce the gap by allowing critics to effect a dumbing-down of the intellectual caliber of the US armed forces, although anyone who revisits the pages of Allan Bloom's 1987 classic, The Closing of the American Mind, can form vivid ideas of why and how such a process could be encouraged. Media and academic coverage of military policy issues affords many examples. A better solution might conceivably involve a redefinition of the civil-military division of labor, so that the formulation of military policy no longer reflects a competition between civilian and military inputs, but rather a fusion of both. This perhaps represents the ultimate stage in "joint" thinking (for which the current appointment of a top soldier as top diplomat provides a conspicuous US precedent), although it may not be as innovative as it looks. At the higher end, it involves the concept of the "ambassador general" in charge of both the combat force and the postwar reconstruction administration. At the lower end, General Krulak's conception of the "strategic corporal," while perhaps unrealistic in terms of the training challenge, certainly identified the need for a form of mixed-ability soldiering, which seems to be very close to the constabulary role of the British armed forces in the days of the Empire.

The purpose of this commentary, however, is not to float fanciful ideas badly in need of historical elaboration. It is rather to suggest that Colonel Hooker might be misguided in attempting to defend military virtue, when the true task may be to expose and repair civilian vice. If the system is broke at one end, it seems idle to maintain that it ain't broke at the other. A modern theory of civilmilitary relations is needed to deal with a situation in which the military can out-perform the civil authority in military policy, not on an ad hoc but on a systematic basis, without laying itself open to the charge of insubordination.

Simon King

Research Director, Military Policy Research

Oxford, United Kingdom

The Author Replies:

Mr. King's comments are thoughtful and perceptive. While I appreciate that the qualifications of the civilian leadership in the Defense Department may be the subject of scholarly commentary, it seems to me that for the professional military such concerns are out of bounds. Our civilian masters are appointed by duly constituted political leaders through constitutional means, and for the military that is enough. It is for others to weigh their merits and demerits. Over time our system has worked remarkably well to balance the strategic requirements of the civilian leadership with the realities and necessities of military operations. As in any system that distributes power widely to avoid excessive concentration in any one branch or organ of government, there can be inefficiencies and disconnects. But these are as likely to stem from service parochialism or a more narrow military perspective as from any deficiency in the quality of the civilian leadership. In general I think it is fair to say that our civil-military arrangements have stood the test of time.

My specific purpose was to provide a counterpoint to those who insist that the military has somehow overstepped its bounds. In my view the military has the right to be heard, and to provide unfiltered military advice and expertise to the civilian leadership in both the executive and legislative branches. It does not and should not have the right to decide, or pass institutional judgment on its superiors. Three centuries ago a British sergeant of the 58th Foot said "Our King is answerable to God for us. I fight for him. My religion consists in a firelock, open touchhole, good flint, well rammed charge, and seventy rounds of powder and ball. This is the military creed." Not much has changed since then. Our business is to fight our nation's wars. It is for others to tell us where and when to fight. America's soldiers would have it no other way.

Colonel R. D. Hooker, Jr.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

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