Respectfully disagreeing with MG Valcourt

Dear ARMOR,

In his article, "Joint Fires and Effects in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team," in the January-February 2005 issue of ARMOR, Major General Valcourt describes the changes to organization and structure that the field artillery community is implementing in support of transformation. While the majority of his article, especially realizing the need for increased joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) is of great use, there are two points that require additional thought:

First, the issue of where the company fire support teams (FIST) and battalion effects coordinator (ECCORD) are assigned. I respectfully disagree with MG Valcourt's statement that, "Where they 'live' is not the real issue." I would submit that one of the fundamental principles of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) is where units "live." Armor, infantry, and engineer communities have made commitments to ensure units "live" as they will deploy and fight by breaking one of their fundamental organizations--the pure armor mechanized infantry or engineer combat battalion. Assigning field artillery personnel to the combined arms battalion (CAB) or recon squadron, accomplishes the same effect.

In the same way the squadron maintenance officer is responsible for training and certifying the troop maintenance teams assigned to the cavalry troops in a division cavalry squadron, the HBCT ECOORD, battalion/squadron ECOORDs, and company FISTs can all train and certify collectively without breaking the fundamental link to how they will deploy and fight. While it is reasonable to expect the fires battalion commander and command sergeant major (CSM) to maintain a mentor-type relationship with the artillerymen of the brigade, much like a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron commander and CSM mentor the mobile gun system (MGS) platoons in a Stryker brigade combat team, this mentorship should not effect the physical location of subordinate artillerymen. Permanently organizing, training, and equipping the HBCT the way it is expected to deploy and fight, is among the greatest strengths of our transformation.

The second issue is the brigade mortar platoons being consolidated with the fires battalion. While the fires battalion could easily accommodate the span of command, control, and resupply requirements associated with a consolidation, this seems to directly contradict what the HBCT was designed to do. The CAB is organized to train, deploy, and fight with minimal task organization or additional assets required. The mortars are a critical part of that equation. MG Valcourt is correct in his view of the mortars as "sacred." They are an integral part of the battalion and are personally connected to those they support. It is this personal connection and sense of responsibility that drives mortar crews to place effective fires just a little faster. Again, creating conditions where we train and "live" in our fighting formations is the most preferred option.

MG Valcourt's article highlights some of the great changes his branch is making to support transformation. While there may be room for discussion, his opening and closing statements could not be truer: Armor, Infantry, and Artillery are a team.

DAVID A. MEYER

MAJ, U.S. Army

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