Technology and transformation: implications on the company commander

The heart of transformation is combined arms at the company level, which makes the company the first echelon of maneuver with the organic capabilities to effectively employ all the elements of combat power with a command structure that allows it to see first, understand first, and act decisively. As transformation evolves, one may question, "At what point do the benefits of technology plateau as it applies to the company commander?" While technology will continue to grow and expand, physical and mental abilities of the company-level command structure must keep pace. While enablers that aid the commander will continue to be developed, internalized experience that becomes tacit knowledge comes with time.

The Search for Technology

The purpose of technology in its consumer applications is more freedom for users of a particular technology. This easily translates using the example of communications technology: a cell phone gives the user freedom from the landline; a microwave prepares food faster and saves time.

Technology's commercial and military endstates have a twist. We develop technologies to help us do more with less. More freedom for the user allows us to focus resources, such as time, money, manpower, and effort, elsewhere. Every business, bureaucracy, agency, or institution competes to get more from less. The search to increase the amount of product or output while incurring less effort or risk has been a theme of our military's development since its conception.

The Fly-by-Wire Concept and Digital Battle Command

Compensating for physical and mental limitations through enablers can be seen in the development of combat aircraft. Much like advanced flight control systems used to compensate for human physical and mental limitations to control advanced combat aircraft, digital command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is meant to aid in overcoming analog limitations. These enablers allow us to extend the boundaries of our limitations.

The fly-by-wire concept allows combat aircraft to perform incredible maneuvers and outperform the enemy. Original fly-by-wire designs in high-performance aircraft killed a lot of line pilots because they would "haul on the stick" and unintentionally put the aircraft into a maneuver that exceeds human capacity. In other words, the engineers designing the system put a lot of thought into ensuring the aircraft could not exceed structural limitations, but no one thought about human limitations. We may be seeing something similar with digital systems, where we pack data and span of control on a commander to the point of incompetence.

Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) is a command and control (C2) enabler. FBCB2 is part of the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) C4ISR structure designed to provide a common operating picture (COP) that maintains situational awareness (SA) and improves situational understanding (SU). Friendly SA occurs through the platform's global positioning system (GPS), transmitting its location through the digital enhanced positioning location and reporting system (EPLRS) radio and thereby updating the COP. Enemy SA occurs through soldier interaction, such as reporting enemy contact, which must be input into the FBCB2 or another connected part of the digital C4ISR, such as all-source analysis systems (ASAS), to populate the COP. Enemy reports spread instantaneously to systems that are actively on the net.

Combined with the various information collection platforms within the brigade combat team (BCT), the COP provides raw information to conceptualize the battlefield based on facts and assumptions. Despite some limitations, such as limited bandwidth, the FBCB2 is an enabler. It does the work of many quickly and efficiently, and has the potential for expansion in terms of digital transmission of orders and visual products (currently limited to basic graphics) to extend the reach of the immediate commander. Much like e-mail, important and time-sensitive information can be sent over long distances to subordinates for decentralized execution. This allows us to see first, understand first, and act decisively in larger battlespaces because we do not have to be everywhere at once, just at the decisive points.

The possible dangers in enablers, such as FBCB2, include becoming inundated with too much information (SA filters must be set); higher headquarters' assessment of the situation may not concur with the company commander's assessment; friendly SA currently does not extend to the dismounted soldier; and enemy SA must be input manually. These possibilities can lead to incomplete facts and assumptions. Overall, FBCB2 is an example of how technology allows us to do more with less.

The Interim Force as an Example: Look Mom, No Staff!

The SBCT company commander's responsibility is on par with that of a battalion task force commander of yesterday. As an SBCT rifle company commander, the battlespace is typically 25 square kilometers. The idea is that with the C4ISR package, the commander can tap into higher headquarters' suite of collection and analysis assets that will allow him to see first, understand first, and act decisively. Another way of looking at this would be that he does not have to "own" every inch of real estate in his battlespace all of the time, but must use his increased mobility, firepower, and C2 to apply overwhelming combat power at the decisive point in both time and space--not only does he have to be there, he has to know when to be there.

Since this example is relative to every echelon of command in the SBCT, the higher headquarters is leveraging its staff to assist the lower echelon in making the right decisions. The large amounts of collection assets and staff digital C4ISR alleviates some of the burden, but not all. The amount of tasks is also exponential as the higher echelon contends with their own increased battlespace and the tasks within that battlespace. The company commander encounters a gap between higher headquarters meeting his staff needs and balancing current and future operations. The company commander compensates by using his C4ISR package and his headquarters elements--fire support officer, XO, and first sergeant--in a function that sits somewhere between the traditional duties and responsibilities of company-level leaders and those of a battalion staff.

Intuitive subordinates, who are entrusted to meet the commander's intent as outlined on mission-type orders, are a necessity. Platoon leaders and squad leaders must have the ability to take the digital fragmentary order (FRAGO) and the rudimentary set of digital graphics accompanying the FRAGO, and execute the commander's intent realizing the possibility of having to clarify their understanding via FM or digital messaging. The battlespace is often too large and the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of information-based warfare is too fast to arrange a face to face every time. This requires a great deal of trust in subordinates who have comparatively little experience given the scope of their responsibilities in their increased battlespace.

Establishing trust and intuitiveness takes time and repetition. Trust is earned by observance; intuitiveness comes through familiarity. When bandwidth increases and video linkage between tactical echelons is the rule, recognizing understanding (or misunderstanding) will be complete, and the commander's comfort zone will increase when be can "read" his subordinates. Until then, the immediacy of the task often requires a leap of faith. Sooner or later, the commander must apply his attention elsewhere in his battlespace and trust his subordinates to execute his intent.

Company-level battle drills are another requirement. Simple schemes of maneuver that allow for greater latitude of sub-ordinates fill the gap between short-fused FRAGOs, with little time for troop leading procedures (TLPs), and increased SA/ SU gained through enhanced C4ISR. TLPs are an ongoing process in anticipation of the next mission. All available time is pushed to the lowest levels to ensure good pre-combat checks (PCCs), pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and rehearsals of squad- and platoon-level battle drills that support the company scheme of maneuver.

During the fight, the company headquarters often "tag teams" in and out of the "now" execution. The company commander must visualize the fight in the action-reaction-counteraction model, and continually extend this model until the enemy is defeated. The XO switches from reporting to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) and updating the COP with enemy reports to supervising a company shaping effort. The company first sergeant is executing logistics functions, but may also be reporting on a company shaping effort. The company fire support officer is processing fire missions and assigning fire support assets, deconflicting maneuver with fires, updating the commander, and reporting to the battalion fire support element (FSE).

The company headquarters executes and C2s current operations and plans future operations similar to a battalion tactical analysis center (TAC) and a battalion TOC during the 20th century. Digital technology does not fully compensate for lack of a dedicated staff. For a limited duration, and with the aid of the C4ISR package, the company headquarters can reach back and tap into a limited degree of the battalion's complete staff. The bottom line is: battle command at the company level has been changed by technology to do more with less.

Secondary and Tertiary Effects Which Glass Ball Is Most Important?

Struggling to maintain proficiency on the basics while learning, incorporating, and leveraging new technologies requires not only good planning skills to deconflict events, but sound judgment to realize which events are more important. Traditionally, the tools company commanders have available to assist them in making decisions include the mission essential task list (METL), the higher headquarters quarterly training guidance (QTG), and an assessment of the company's status, usually packaged in the quarterly training brief QTB. The commander's quarterly goals are listed in the QTB. Battalion and company weekly training meetings should allow him to react to changes from higher headquarters and adjust his own priority plans accordingly. These tools allow the company commander to fight the fight and not the plan.

With more technology comes more requirements. There are no more "entry level" soldier positions in the sense where we have a soldier arrive who is assigned as a rifleman, then works his way up to more challenging positions. In the SBCT rifle squad, the rifleman has one of two critical additional skill identifiers (ASI). He is either the Javelin missile gunner or the squad-designated marksman. Both skill sets are trained and maintained at the unit, usually through a battalion quarterly certification or course. Since almost everyone has an ASI or a technical skill, such as FBCB2 certification, which requires proficiency-style training, decisions about when to plug in collective training can be difficult. Add the normal taskings, last-minute taskings, maintenance associated with a technology-rich unit, and other required training, such as consideration of others and sexual harassment, and you are left with making judgment calls based on guidance from the battalion commander.

Establishing and following a training path that will lead your unit through individual, crew, squad, and platoon tasks, ultimately resulting in a lethal combined-arms company, requires judgment that can only come from maturity and experience. Often priorities must be rearranged to meet the objective. Candidness in assessing and reporting is critical. Tempering subordinates in your leadership role, so that you maintain course, requires emotional strength and determination. Vision is not enough; foresight to see and correct potential friction is a must. Current and future commanders must consistently be great leaders.

The Pedagogy of a Commander: Back to Sparta

Of the Hellenistic city-states, Sparta is often cited for military prowess. Their entire society appeared to have military culture embedded. Its no small wonder that such a society would produce very good soldiers and leaders. If you view the company commander strictly as a leader, then he begins to informally hone his skills for command on the schoolyard playground. However, the U.S. Army cannot begin molding commanders until they enter an Army institution such as the United States Military Academy, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, or basic training. At that point, every experience shapes him as a commander. Officers are groomed for positions of greater authority (the Army trains leaders two levels up) from the moment they arrive at their first duty station.

If technological endstate (for military purposes) equals doing more with less, which means leaders have increased responsibilities, then how do we shape their education so they are prepared to carry out increased responsibilities? Targeting the company commander, because he is the center of gravity in the new force structure, makes sense. The rifle companies within the SBCT are designed for full-spectrum operations, they are organically a combined-arms unit, and they are self-deployable for up to 48 hours from a forward operating base. Given their C4ISR package and conductivity with higher headquarters, they are capable of carrying out tough out-of-sector missions with little notice. The SBCT rifle companies are not an exception to the rule; they are the future. Transformation and technology will continue to further the Army's ability to do more with less, and the company commander is arguably the center of gravity.

The company commander shapes many other leaders through training plans, counseling, administrative responsibilities, and mentoring. Company commanders have contact with soldiers everyday, they are the first officer within the command structure with the potential to have a long term, personal awareness of their soldiers. Platoon leaders are too junior and their time in a position too brief, the battalion commander has at least four times as many soldiers to get to know and is more subject to external requirements. Not only does the company commander shape his team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon leaders in the moment, but he shapes them for increased future responsibilities as well.

Looking at it holistically, we have the greatest potential to grow the commanders we need from the moment they report to basic course. Everything we teach and infuse them with should be with the goal in mind that we are preparing them for company command. Problemsolving using a "what" theme, instead of a "how" theme should run the course of their education. Granted, technical knowledge must be taught to form a basis that allows for good decisions to be reached, but the way we teach that knowledge requires time management. Time with seniors must focus on guiding, mentoring, building, and shaping leader experiences with the goal of making a commander always present.

Moving Forward versus Standing Still

We must continue to acquire the best technology available for our military. To compromise on technology would allow potential enemies to challenge our primacy. We never want to come up short in technology as we did prior to World Wars I and II. What we should do is apply the "see first, understand first, and act decisively" model to the problem of outpacing physical and mental constraints and limitations. We must foresee problems associated with new technologies, as they apply to the command structure; understand the nature of the problems, such as too much information, too little information, and troops to tasks as it applies to battle command; and acting to correct problems by applying basics to determine possible solutions, such as more or better enablers or less requirements.

An example of creating better enablers is using the tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) to benefit the company commander. Currently, in an SBCT, the remote viewing terminals (RVT) can be pushed down to a battalion TOC. The TUAV operator is with the equipment, while the battalion staff provides C2 for the operation using FM and digital communications to direct the TUAV through its operator. The video feed from the TUAV has a north-seeking arrow and provides a grid, which is analyzed by the battalion staff. Significant information and intelligence is then passed by FM and digital messaging to the company commander and XO. The actual footage cannot be passed over the digital C4ISR because of limitations. Even if it could, the amount of raw information (most superfluous since the TUAV operator and ground commander have so many layers of C2 between them) would be overwhelming to an already maxed-out commander, XO, and FSO.

What would enhance the ground commander's C2 is refined near-real time footage from the TUAV. The analogy would be the Sunday football coverage provided by former coaches and players--footage that was received in the TOC and edited "John Madden" style with a stylus that had multicolor graphic capabilities. Real-time feed would come into the RVT and be recorded onto a networked hard drive. That footage then becomes available for editing by the battalion staff. Rooftops, and other graphic-control measures that correspond with current operation overlays, as well as enemy and adjacent unit information, can be applied. Intelligence generated by this refined information could accompany the product via FM or digital messaging.

This would reduce the clutter for the ground commander and allow true reach back to the battalion staff.

Unfortunately, digital imagery as big as UAV feed with graphics currently cannot be pushed via FBCB2, but probably will be in the near future, if a comparison in the speed of information transmission in the internet industry is any type of indicator. When it does arrive, we need to be prepared to provide company commanders with information of immediate value, not information that requires work while conducting operations.

Raw UAV feed that would be of use to the company commander would be from a UAV or unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that he could control and target. This type of raw information, coupled with an RVT located in the company commander's vehicle and an analyst working directly for the commander, needs little analysis to turn information into intelligence as it is targeted by the company commander and could be used to verify reports, provide reconnaissance on an area where he has accepted risk, or to cover an named area of interest (NAI). Systems, such as Dragon Eye, could meet this need.

In the initial concept for the SBCT, a few concerns were voiced regarding the level of professional development and maturity of a captain; in other words, would a captain be able to train, maintain, and employ something as big and complex as an SBCT rifle company? The counter argument became that since the SBCT is only an interim step in transformation, eventually all company commanders would have to be majors or second-time commanders. The reality is captains would have to be promoted to majors sooner, or reduce the number of branch-qualified captains in Active and Reserve Components, combat training centers, and other assignments, which would only increase the number of inexperienced majors, plus cause ripple effects along the captain and lieutenant ranks as more vacancies appear.

We need to target the company commander because he is the most critical leader. Because of his responsibilities and capabilities for developing a training strategy, he affects multiple levels of leaders below him. Because the focus for employing combined arms has been organically embedded in the company, he now takes on the responsibilities of what once belonged to the battalion.

In addressing physical and mental constraints and limitations of company commanders, we will equip them with the tools to do more with less. The key terrain is identifying where limits of the company commander can no longer be supplemented by available technology, and then addressing the shortfalls through professional development. How do we best transfer and share the critical experiences a company commander requires? As a profession, we have risen to the challenge; the current Stryker company commanders are doing very well training and employing the very robust organizations within the SBCT to their full potential, and many of the same technologies are being used in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Captain Robert Thornton is currently assigned to the Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab Unit of Experimentation, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from Austin Peay State University. His military education includes Infantry Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Fort Lewis, WA; assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st SBCT, Fort Lewis; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (1-187), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; platoon leader, Antitank Platoon, D Company, 1-187 Infantry, Fort Campbell; and rifle platoon leader, C Company, 1-187 Infantry, Fort Campbell.

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