Methods for IED reconnaissance and detection

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are one of the most dangerous risks facing coalition forces in Baghdad, Iraq. As of January 2004, IEDs were responsible for the deaths of over 100 American soldiers, wounding countless more, and causing millions of dollars in damages to vehicles and equipment. This article identifies some of the ever-changing enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and thus the adaptable methods that must be used to successfully combat this threat. While the tactics addressed in this article apply to patrols specifically tasked to conduct IED reconnaissance missions, every patrol moving along major routes in zone is a potential target, and thus an IED reconnaissance and detection patrol.

Before discussing the elements of IED reconnaissance and detection, the nature of the threat must first be established. An IED is a near-ambush on a convoy with the purpose of disrupting or harassing operations in theater. At times, the blast is accompanied by small-arms fire, but generally the enemy attempts to flee the scene as soon as possible. After conducting their own reconnaissance on U.S. forces for several months, the enemy has learned that we will respond with overwhelming force to an attack, and he has little chance of inflicting further damage after the initial shock has past.

The enemy usually operates with no more than a two- to three-man team to conduct the ambush, sometimes employing an observation post (OP) in the guise of someone working on a broken vehicle. This operative then either alerts the triggerman or triggers the device himself when a convoy approaches. The triggerman positions himself in a residence or some other type of urban cover and awaits the prearranged signal from the OP.

Over the nine months in which the enemy has employed IEDs as a regular form of attack, his methods have changed to counter U.S. adaptation to the threat. Initially, IEDs were buried or disguised as trash and street signs. Later, they were hidden in dead animals along the roadside, and then hidden in trees, on light poles, or under overpasses. Most recently, as we have continued to adapt to counter the threat, the enemy has reverted to burying the explosives once again. This time, however, he is using multiple IEDs, complicating an already difficult task for U.S. forces. One other TTP the enemy has demonstrated is to conduct a hasty ambush by simply dropping an IED on the side of the road just before a convoy passes and then triggering the device.

IED reconnaissance and detection is a deliberate route reconnaissance to facilitate freedom of movement for follow-on forces along main routes in the zone. While conducting the reconnaissance with an offensive, aggressive posture, it is primarily a security operation to counter an ambush, and therefore leaders must adhere to the three-to-one ratio. Currently, as the enemy uses no more than two to three men at the ambush site, two vehicles with eight U.S. personnel are sufficient on these reconnaissance patrols during the day. During limited visibility, however, using four vehicles with a minimum of 16 personnel increases the chance of detecting an IED.

There are four methods for IED detection: observing the OP or triggerman; identifying the explosives or where they are hidden; gathering intelligence from the local population; and actually being attacked. The first method is the most difficult, as it is easy for the enemy to blend in with the local population, and there are an abundance of broken cars along the side of the road as potential OP sites. However, there are a few key indicators a soldier can look for. For example, if a man working on a broken vehicle appears to be paying undue interest to a passing convoy or is holding some sort of communication device, such as a radio or cell phone, the convoy should stop and search the man and the vehicle as well as question him. The triggerman will be carrying some method for remote detonation, and if he is careless, he may display such a device as the convoy approaches. The patrol leader must ensure that 360-degree security is maintained at all times. As always, there is no such thing as being too cautious while attempting to combat the IED threat.

The second method of detection requires very observant scouts combined with a slow march rate to facilitate the visual acquisition of a sign that an IED is present. The staggered column formation has been the most successful movement to cover both sides of the route. Trash, boxes, and dead animals along the side of the road must all be scrutinized for any sign of wires or antennae for remote detonation. Since an urban environment is three-dimensional, signs, lampposts, poles, and overpasses must also be carefully observed for wires or antennas. To combat those who are burying the devices, soldiers must look closely for loose dirt that appears recently dug up, or wires coming out of the ground. These signs are not easily discernable and it takes practice to observe them while moving down the road.

Dismounting scouts to conduct reconnaissance with the vehicles in traveling overwatch is the best method for identifying IEDs before entering the kill zone, though it is not always practical. Leaders must make the decision based on time available, the current mission, and the most recent intelligence available. In addition, leaders should conduct rehearsals in which they test their soldiers' abilities to spot key signs of a possible IED.

Gathering human intelligence (HUMINT) is the third method of IED reconnaissance. This can be conducted in conjunction with, or separate from, the reconnaissance and detection patrol. As conditions in Iraq continue to improve, and U.S. forces have greater success against the remaining terrorists, the local population is becoming increasingly more helpful in providing key intelligence against the enemy. The nature of IED attacks provides reasonable assurance that the local population knows what the enemy is doing and how he is doing it. However, Iraqi people have lived in unimaginable fear for so long that they are still unsure as to their safety if they provide information to U.S. forces. HUMINT will continue to improve as time passes and democracy takes hold.

The final method, while undesirable, is still a method of detecting an IED. When an IED attack is actually initiated on a patrol, soldiers must be ready to react instantaneously, despite being disoriented by the explosion. Leaders must ensure their soldiers practice and use proven standing operating procedures (SOPs) if contact is made with an IED attack. All of the vehicles push through the kill zone as quickly as possible, advancing approximately 300 meters. The gunners and dismounts are all scanning for any possible sign of the triggerman or a threat. The patrol leader assesses any casualties and then calls in a situation report. After waiting at least a minute, while scanning for a threat, the rear vehicle then falls back 300 meters opposite the blast site and the patrol cordons off all avenues of approach and begins searching the area. The wait time is to ensure there are no secondary devices that will explode as the vehicles pass back through the area. However, if the patrol waits too long to cordon off the site, there is a greater chance the triggerman will escape, and important evidence related to the device, which could provide more information on enemy TTPs, may be lost. If a patrol is actually attacked by an IED, there is a chance to destroy the enemy who emplaced the device, and thus the purpose of creating freedom of movement for follow-on forces is accomplished.

In addition to these proven methods, several other options are available to combat IED threats. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) assigned to cavalry troops, as well as scouts in helicopters, can provide successful aerial reconnaissance. Aerial surveillance can move quicker and provide advanced warning to reconnaissance elements on the ground. Scout elements on the ground can then move forward to confirm or deny information provided by air elements. Another tactic is to place an OP in cooperative residences near named areas of interest (NAIs). While this has been unsuccessful to this point, the tactic still has potential. If left in place for several days, these OPs could have some success in observing the enemy attempting to emplace an IED.

Using civilian vehicles that match those commonly found on the roads instead of high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), which signal their approach with a distinctive sound, could allow for detection of the enemy. These unconventional methods may improve the military's ability to destroy the enemy before he has a chance to trigger an IED. Finally, as training for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) continues, these forces can be used in the future for intelligence gathering, as they will blend with the local populace.

The dangers presented by the increasing IED threat must be dealt with swiftly and unequivocally. IEDs represent a significant barrier to the safety of both U.S. forces in Iraq as well as Iraqi civilians who are hit by the blasts. Conventional methods of reconnaissance and detection, such as observing OPs or triggermen, identifying IED sites, or successful HUMINT, as well as unconventional methods, such as aerial reconnaissance using scouts or UAVs, OPs in residences, civilian vehicles, and ICDC surveillance will all have increasing effectiveness when synchronized. Leaders must continue to analyze shifting enemy TTPs to continue to adapt to the changing battlefield environment.

First Lieutenant Christopher J. Shepherd is assigned to B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA. Ha received a B.A. from James Madison University. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course and the Scout Platoon Leaders Course.

COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army Armor Center
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