B-2 drops bad reputation in Kosovo air war

Performance of stealth bomber may signal new era for U.S. military.

Los Angeles Times

KNOB KNOSTER, Mo. -- Two years ago, an Air Force ground crew rolled a B-2 Stealth bomber from a hangar here and hosed it down before a skeptical civilian audience to settle a question: Would an afternoon cloudburst melt the bomber's delicate skin and knock the plane out of the sky?These days when the B-2 emerges from its shelter at Whiteman Air Force Base, onlookers ponder a far different question: Is a plane once mocked by critics as the Pentagon's ultimate gold-plated boondoggle about to become America's weapon of choice in the early 21st century?The most expensive and controversial warplane ever built, the B-2 has undergone a stunning reversal of fortune with its combat debut in the air war against Yugoslavia. With its radar-evading capacity and huge payload, the bat-winged bomber is suddenly looking like the answer to the kind of military emergencies that the United States has encountered in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf and the terrorist training camps of Afghanistan.

With only 24 hours notice and apparently minimal risk to its crew, the B-2 can accurately drop as many as 16 2,000-pound bombs on heavily guarded targets in any corner of the world. The B-1 bomber is faster, and the 37-year-old B-52 can carry more bombs, but the B-2's stealth qualities give the Air Force, for the first time, the ability to strike anywhere before the enemy knows an attack is under way.

Though some technical questions remain, the B-2 in many circumstances can strike with more speed and punch than the cruise missiles that have become the hallmark of the Clinton administration's approach to warfare.

Some military officials, including Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Short, U.S. air commander in the Kosovo campaign, have called the B-2 and its all-weather, satellite-guided bombing system the greatest technology success story of Operation Allied Force. They are predicting that America's regional military commanders, who are cautious about using unproved systems and who delayed the B-2's debut for months, now will turn to it regularly.

Development of the B-2 began in 1981 in the early days of President Reagan's arms buildup. The Pentagon's objective was to acquire a heavy nuclear bomber that, barely visible to radar, could penetrate Soviet air defenses to destroy elusive mobile nuclear missiles.

The sleek plane, shaped like a boomerang, has a wingspan of 172 feet and a length of only 69 feet. Its tailless, horizontal design, radar-absorbing plastic composite skin and other features make it hard to track with radar. It is also tough to find with sensors that pick up heat, sound or electromagnetic impulses. And it often is difficult even to see in the sky.

The B-2 was used from the first night in the Kosovo war to smash well-protected fixed targets, including air defenses that put other NATO planes at risk.

Flying in pairs on a 30-hour round-trip mission from Whiteman Air Force Base in farm country 60 miles southeast of Kansas City, the B- 2s smashed Yugoslav command bunkers, radar installations, communications sites, bridges, arms factories and other heavily defended targets. The aircraft is refueled in the air twice on the way there and twice on the return leg.

The B-2's mission was to "go in after the highest threat and the hardest targets," said Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy Barnidge Jr., commander of the 509th Bomber Wing, which includes all the B-2s. "We kick the door in and make it so others can follow."

A major ingredient in the B-2's successful combat debut is a new technology that uses satellite guidance to direct dumb bombs to their targets. Unlike laser munitions, which are disabled by clouds, these Joint Direct Attack Munitions can be dropped under any weather conditions.

As a result, the B-2s were sometimes the only bombers on the attack during frequent bouts of bad weather that crippled the air campaign through much of April.

Overall, the six B-2s used in the war flew about 50 missions, less than 1 percent of the total. But they dropped about 11 percent of the bombs used in Yugoslavia, or nearly 700.

Defense officials have declined to release a full list of the plane's targets. But they have disclosed that it was a B-2 that dropped three bombs on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three people, including two Chinese intelligence officers.

The blunder wasn't a mistake by the air crew but rather by NATO strike planners, who mistakenly thought they were striking a military supply center several hundred yards away.

The mission illustrates that the airplane was considered stealthy enough and accurate enough to be sent against sites in congested downtown Belgrade, where air defenses were formidable and the risk of unintended damage was high.

Andrew Krepinevitch, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a nonpartisan defense think tank, praises the B-2's performance in the Balkans but says that the "jury is still out" on some key technical issues.

Also, some senior military officials contended that the Pentagon's regional commanders will be cautious in calling the B-2 into service because the cost of the plane is so high it is considered a "national asset."

"No one wants to be the first to lose a B-2," said one Pentagon planner.

Nevertheless, even some longtime critics acknowledged that the B- 2's debut proved the plane has a combination of assets that will make it highly attractive to military leaders.

It can be flown from the U.S. heartland, at a time when it is increasingly difficult to find forward bases for U.S. aircraft.

With a turnaround time of 24 hours, it often can reach faraway targets faster than Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are carried on ships that sometimes take days to steam into position.

And its radar-evading capacity, while not proved conclusively in the Kosovo air war, is doubted by few. Experts predict that the B-2's stealthiness will be valued more and more as politicians' tolerance for casualties declines.

The advent of the B-2, said William H. Arkin, an air power expert, has now "really eclipsed the era of the cruise missile."

A key ingredient is the B-2's sophisticated radar targeting system, considered the best of its kind, which gives the pilots nearly photo-quality pictures of the targets they are about to hit. The pilots compare this information to spy satellite images and correct the targeting data loaded into their bombs.

"The real capability is the fliers and all the people who plan the mission," said Gen. Ronald Marcotte, the 8th Air Force commander who oversees all U.S. heavy bombers.

From their seats far above the conflict, the B-2 pilots witnessed the fearsome intensity of the air war.

One pilot, a major with 11 years of flight experience, said that he will always remember a deafening one-hour bombardment near the end of the war. He and his co-pilot counted their own bombs exploding, one after another, in brilliant white flashes that came 50 to 80 seconds after the munitions were dropped.

Not far way, B-52 bombers dropped long strings of 500-pound bombs that illuminated the nighttime sky to near-daylight brightness.

"It was brutal -- it was vicious," the pilot said.

The B-2's capabilities send a clear and powerful message to adversaries, he said: "If the United States is angry enough, they can go anywhere in the world -- you won't even know they're coming -- to strike you."

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