文章基本信息

标题：Understanding sellers’ agents in the residential property market
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作者：Chuyi XIONG ; Ka Shing CHEUNG
期刊名称：International Journal of Strategic Property Management
印刷版ISSN：1648-715X
电子版ISSN：1648-9179
出版年度：2021
卷号：25
期号：3
页码：179-189
DOI：10.3846/ijspm.2021.13724
语种：English
出版社：Vilnius Gedinimas Technical University
摘要：Buyers in the property market ofen use an agent who is employed by the seller to assist their home searches. Tis unique and widely used agency arrangement in the property market is known as “sellers’ agents”. While principal-agent theory advocates that buyers should directly hire their agents (i.e., buyers’ agents) to do the home-hunting, search theory however implies that sellers would employ their agents (i.e., sellers’ agents) to increase the probability of the sale and selling prices. Although sellers’ agents and buyers’ agents are two very distinct institutions, many previous studies assume that their agency characteristics are identical and provide limited insights on how such a seemingly subtle but crucial agency arrangement aﬀects transaction outcomes. Using transaction data from Wuhan China, this study disentangles the eﬀects of the buyers’ and sellers’ agents on properties’ selling prices and their time on the market. Te fndings indicate that on average transactions conducted by sellers’ agents will be associated with a signifcant selling price premium of around 3.4%. As a critical test, we further show that the transactions completed by sellers’ agents with selling price premiums will have a shorter marketing time than those completed by buyers’ agents.
关键词：sellers’ agents;search theory;overpricing;time on the market;online listing;second-hand real estate market