文章基本信息

标题：On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games
本地全文：下载
作者：Thomas Brihaye ; Véronique Bruyère ; Julie De Pril 等
期刊名称：Logical Methods in Computer Science
印刷版ISSN：1860-5974
电子版ISSN：1860-5974
出版年度：2013
卷号：9
期号：1
页码：1
DOI：10.2168/LMCS-9(1:7)2013
出版社：Technical University of Braunschweig
摘要：We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model showed that Nash equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are guaranteed to exist in the multiplayer (resp. two-player) case. The existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case remained and is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus our study on the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also introduce the new concept of subgame perfect secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria (resp. subgame perfect secure equilibria) in multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability games. Moreover, we provide an algorithm deciding the existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case.
其他关键词：turn-based quantitative games, subgame perfect equilibrium, secure equilibrium, reachability objectives.