文章基本信息

标题：Analysis of coordinated control of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei smog based on evolutionary game theory
本地全文：下载
作者：Yuan Qing-min ; Tan Xin
期刊名称：E3S Web of Conferences
印刷版ISSN：2267-1242
电子版ISSN：2267-1242
出版年度：2021
卷号：248
页码：2030
DOI：10.1051/e3sconf/202124802030
出版社：EDP Sciences
摘要：Based on the perspective of ecological compensation and ecological claims, this paper analyzes the stability of Beijing Tianjin Hebei haze governance alliance by using asymmetric evolutionary game model, and obtains the optimal strategy combination. The results show that: a reasonable ecological compensation standard is very important for enterprises to adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies. Only when the total value of ecological claims in the two places is higher than the cost of energy-saving and emission reduction, enterprises will adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies, and the implementation of energy-saving and emission reduction strategies will not be shaken by the amount of ecological compensation.
其他摘要：Based on the perspective of ecological compensation and ecological claims, this paper analyzes the stability of Beijing Tianjin Hebei haze governance alliance by using asymmetric evolutionary game model, and obtains the optimal strategy combination. The results show that: a reasonable ecological compensation standard is very important for enterprises to adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies. Only when the total value of ecological claims in the two places is higher than the cost of energy-saving and emission reduction, enterprises will adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies, and the implementation of energy-saving and emission reduction strategies will not be shaken by the amount of ecological compensation.